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FOREWORD

The U.S. Army War College’s Ninth Annual Strategy
Conference was held at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania,
during the period March 31-April 2, 1998. The theme of the
con feren ce wa s “Chal l engi ng the Uni ted States
Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be
Defeated?” There were some 150 attendees, including active
duty military personnel as well as members of academe, the
U.S. Defense and service departments, think tanks,
corporations, and news media.
This book is an outgrowth of that conference, though it
makes no effort to present a comprehensive and literal
record of events in the mold of traditional colloquium
“proceedings.” Rather, the book is organized as an anthology
of selected conference presentations, complemented by
sufficient notice of roundtable and question-and-answer
discussion to provide a glimpse of the vigorous interplay of
ideas evoked by this most timely of topics.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS:
ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE AND THE
WESTERN MINDSET1
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

The concept of asymmetrical warfare is a popular and
much discussed issue in U.S. defense literature these days.
Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010), the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), and the National Military Strategy (NMS)
are just a few of the documents that express concern about
it. Understandably, the Secretary of Defense has made
addressing the phenomenon a central theme of his
administration.
2

3

4

All of that said, what exactly is meant by asymmetrical
warfare? In broad terms it simply means warfare that seeks
to avoid an opponent’s strengths; it is an approach that tries
to focus whatever may be one side’s comparative
advantages against its enemy’s relative weaknesses. In a
way, seeking asymmetries is fundamental to all
warfighting. But in the modern context, asymmetrical
warfare emphasizes what are popularly perceived as
unconventional or nontraditional methodologies.
5

For most potential adversaries, attacking the United
States asymmetrically is the only warfighting strategy they
might reasonably consider for the foreseeable future. The
Gulf War was an object lesson to military planners around
the globe of the futility of attempting to confront the United
States symmetrically, that is, with like forces and orthodox
tactics.
In this essay I briefly examine how the West’s cultural
disposition and mindset affect its concept of asymmetrical
warfare. I contend that the West’s current focus may leave it
vulnerable to asymmetrical challenges that arise from
opponents whose cultural perspective differs significantly
from that of the West.

1

Technology-Oriented Asymmetries.
In the West in general, and America in specific,
asymmetrical warfare is frequently conceived in
technological terms. JV 2010 states, for example, that “our
most vexing future adversary may be one who can use
technology to make rapid improvements in its military
capabilities that provide asymmetrical counters to US
military strengths. . . .” Unsurprisingly, therefore, weapons
of mass destruction and information warfare are often
proffered as illustrations of the asymmetrical warfare
genre.
6
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The technological orientation of the Western mindset is
to be expected. In his book, On the Origins of War, Donald
Kagan writes that the scientific revolution ongoing since the
16th century has had a profound effect on the West. As a
result, he maintains,
It is a special characteristic of the modern Western world, as
opposed to other civilizations and the premodern Western
world, to believe that human beings can change and control
the physical and social environment and even human nature.8

In due course, faith in the efficacy of technology and
scientific methodology invaded thinking about warfare.
That technology proved important to the military
dominance of the West for over a century only reinforces the
idea that it will continue to drive military success in the
future.
9

Furthermore, focusing on technology reflects the
quintessential American approach to waging war.
Historians Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski declare
that since the mid-19th century (but particularly in the
20th century) the United States has relied upon
“increasingly sophisticated technology to overcome
logistical limitations . . . and to match enemy numbers with
firepower.” This emphasis comports with America’s
sense of itself. The comments of General George S. Patton,
Jr., typify the classic American view:
10
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The Americans, as a race, are the foremost mechanics of the
world. . . . It therefore behooves us to devise methods of war
which exploit our inherent superiority. We must fight the war
by machines on the ground, and in the air, to the maximum of
our ability.11

This concentration on technology continues today. JV
2010, the “operationally based template” as to how
America will fight future wars, centers on the question of
how to “leverage technological opportunities to achieve new
levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.” Clearly, the
American “mindset” (if not that of the West generally) tends
to see all difficulties—even the complex challenge of
war—as technical problems subject to engineered
solutions.
12

13

14

Culturally-Oriented Asymmetries.
War does, of course, present technical problems but is
not itself one. It is instead a contest of human wills that
transcends the logic of the physical sciences. Importantly, it
is also more than simply a violent form of a Westernized
notion of politics. Indeed, the Clauswitzean mantra of the
U.S. defense establishment, i.e., that war is an extension of
politics by other means, has been much deconstructed by
the work of John Keegan and others who address war’s
cultural basis.
15

Complementing Keegan’s thesis is that of Samuel
Huntington. He argues that future conflicts will likely be
clashes between civilizations with fundamentally different
psychological orientations and value sets. Huntington
maintains that certain ideas define what it is to be Western,
and therefore add to what might be called the “Western
mindset.” These include such concepts as “individualism,
liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality,
liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, [and] the
separation of church and state.”
16

What is important about Huntington’s work is that he
reminds us that the rest of the world does not necessarily
3

share these values. Thus, we should not expect that they
will think the same way as the West about many subjects,
including warfare. Lieutenant General Li Jijuan of the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army recently observed that
“each civilization has its own notion of war which cannot
help but be influenced by its cultural background.”
17

Nevertheless, an appreciation for the fact that other
civilizations may look at war from a fundamentally
different perspective is not only unknown to many in the
W est (a n d A mer i c ans es p ec i al l y) but whol l y
counter-intuitive to them. Americans persistently seem to
assume that other peoples think basically the same as they
do. Along these lines, Edward L. Rowney, a retired Army
lieutenant general and former U.S. arms control negotiator,
commented recently that:
Our biggest mistakes stem from the assumption that others
are like us, when in fact, they are more unlike than like us. We
insist on ascribing to others our cultural traits, not recognizing
that we have different objectives due to our unique historic
backgrounds and sets of values. In short, “We fail to place
ourselves in the other person’s moccasins.”18

When this obtuseness towards the mindset of our
adversaries is allowed to affect strategic thinking,
asymmetries result. H. R. McMaster argues in his book,
Dereliction of Duty, for example, that the graduated
application of airpower during the Vietnam War—intended
to signal our resolve to support South Vietnam yet do so in a
way that the United States believed demonstrated
restraint—wholly misperceived North Vietnamese thought
processes. McMaster contends:
Graduated pressure was fundamentally flawed. . . . The
strategy ignored the uncertainty of what was the
unpredictable psychology of an activity that involves killing,
death, and destruction. To the North Vietnamese, military
action, involving as it did attacks on their forces and bombing
their territory, was not simply a means of communication.

4

Human sacrifice in war evokes strong emotions creating a
dynamic that defies systems analysis quantification.19

The technological orientation of the Western mindset
along with the assumed universality of Western values
distorts the analysis of asymmetrical warfare. Consider the
potential dangers of technology-based asymmetries. The
West readily examines them because solving that kind of
problem plays to the West’s own notion of its comparative
advantage, i.e., in the areas of weapons innovation and
production. Such perceived “technological” asymmetries
are almost welcomed by the West’s military-industrial
complex.
The much-ballyhooed Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA) exemplifies this trend. The RMA seeks to produce
radically more effective militaries through the widespread
application of emerging technologies, especially advanced
computer and communications systems. While it provides
enormous opportunities for sales of new equipment to
Western forces fearful of technological obsolescence, much
of the new weaponry too often seems optimized for
high-tech, peer-competitor war. In other words, it is aimed
principally at a form of warfare that is symmetrical (in
relation to the West) in its essence. In truth, few potential
adversaries will wage symmetrical, high-tech war against
the United States because doing so presents enormous
training, logistical, and resource requirements, and these
are “demands that few societies can meet.”
20

21

The characterization of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) as asymmetrical threats is a further manifestation
of the West’s analytical distortion. In truth, the premise
that WMD constitute asymmetrical threats vis-à-vis the
West—at least insofar as inter-state war is concerned—
deserves challenge. Given the West’s still-sizable nuclear
arsenals and its relatively robust capability to deal with
other-than-nuclear WMD warfare, are WMD really
asymmetrical to the West? So long as the West maintains its
current capabilities, it seems rather unlikely that an
22
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adversary could decisively employ WMD against it. In a very
real sense, using WMD against the United States and other
Western nations would represent an ill-considered attempt
to match the West symmetrically.
The use of WMD in the context of terrorism committed
by non-state actors is, of course, a profound and different
challenge. As serious a problem as terrorism is—especially
when WMD are involved—it is not likely to actually defeat
the West. It does not yet appear that non-state actors could
mount a sufficiently comprehensive attack to physically
vanquish a nation like the United States. Martin Van
Creveld has pointed out that terrorism has never succeeded
in the West because the nature of modernity is that it
provides redundancies that give advanced societies
resiliency against the sort of sporadic attacks that terrorists
carry out, even though individual incidents might be quite
costly.
23

The “Real” Asymmetrical Challenge .
Quite clearly, terrorism principally aims to affect its
targets more psychologically than physically. To that extent
it does suggest the real asymmetrical challenge for the
West. Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., the
Commandant of the Army War College, argues that in
future conflicts an enemy may perceive his comparative
advantage against the United States and the West not in
technological terms, but in the “collective psyche and will of
his people.” In turn, this generates an obvious question,
i.e., how will an enemy attack the West’s psyche and will?
The answer makes Americans and others in the West
uncomfortable because it raises the specter that basic
Western values, the very things Huntington sees as
defining the West, are in fact the asymmetries that future
adversaries will most likely seek to exploit.
24

The potential asymmetrical vulnerabilities about which
the West should be concerned are not so much technological
as the Western mindset believes (and even prefers), but
6

rather are those that turn the fundamentals of the West’s
culture and political system against itself. For example,
among the things that adversaries have learned in the
latter half of the 20th century is to exploit the West’s
democratic system. Consider the remarks of a former North
Vietnamese commander: “The conscience of America was
part of its war-making capability, and we were turning that
power in our favor. America lost because of its democracy;
through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobilize a
will to win.” Thus, by stirring up dissension in the United
States, the North Vietnamese were able to advance their
strategic goal of removing American power from Southeast
Asia.
25

More recently, by dragging the body of a U.S. soldier
through the streets of Mogadishu, the Somalis were able to
destroy the public support upon which the United States
and other Western democracies depend upon to sustain
military operations. We should expect such strategies to
proliferate as new communications technologies vastly
enhance the newsgathering and dissemination capabilities
of international media organizations.
26

Enemies may perceive vulnerable asymmetries in what
the West views as its virtues. While the mindset in the
United States and the West sees, as JV 2010 says, the
“moral strengths” and the “ethical standards” of its troops
as keys to military power, adversaries willing to abandon
Westernized legal and ethical regimes may well consider
them as things to exploit and manipulate. Increasingly,
opponents will seek to present Western militaries with
moral and ethical conundrums. For example, the Serbs
were able to discourage high-tech NATO air attacks by the
simple expedient of chaining hostage UN troops to potential
targets. The idea of purposely killing friendly troops in
order to destroy an enemy target will be very difficult for
Western forces to rationalize.
27

28

29

Where once the “Western way of war” meant that
adversaries risked wars often characterized by decisive

7

battles where the annihilation of enemy forces was
sought, today we see the emergence of a Western mindset
markedly more sensitive to casualties on both sides.
Enemies may consider this humanitarian concern as yet
another asymmetry on which they can capitalize in ways
the Western mindset considers unthinkable: they may
purposely put their own people in jeopardy if doing do
complicates or adversely affects the West’s use of its
military power.
30

31

Indeed, Somali warlords used women and children as
human shields against coalition forces during the
intervention of the early 1990s. Along similar lines, the
Libyans have threatened to encircle a facility alleged to be
involved with the production of weapons of mass
destruction with “millions of Muslims” in order to deter
attacks by the West. Most recently, when Western
military action seemed imminent, Saddam Hussein
surrounded his palaces and other buildings with
noncombatant civilians (some of whom may have genuinely
volunteered) in order to discourage attacks by Western
forces sensitive to the effect on their publics of civilian
deaths, regardless of the circumstances. Analyst James F.
Du n n ig a n cau tions that “i f the op p onents ar e
bloody-minded enough, they will always exploit the
humanitarian attitudes of their adversaries.”
32

33

34

Even those opponents—including possible peer
competitors—wh o seek to ac hi eve tec hnol ogi c al
asymmetries over the West may likewise find it profitable to
use our values against us. The West’s free-market, opencompetition economic system encourages innovation and
quickly produces technological advances. But the nature of
that system in a democracy makes turning new ideas into
deploy ed wea pons a c umber s ome and l engthy
process—something extremely worrisome in an age of rapid
technological change.
An adversary less constrained by the political realities of
a capitalistic democracy may be able to gain an

8

asymmetrical advantage by deploying the latest systems
more rapidly than can the bureaucratically-restrained
Western militaries. Author David Shukman explains:
While the Western military struggles for a decade on average to
acquire new weapons, a country with commercially available
computer equipment and less rigorous democratic and
accounting processes could field new systems within a few
years. It is the stuff of military nightmares.35

Parenthetically, it is unlikely that the openness of
democratic societies will allow the achievement of an
asymmetrical advantage via technological surprise against
future adversaries, despite the West’s best efforts. Ephraim
Kam asserts in Surprise Attack that ”since it takes a long
time to produce and deploy new weapons in sufficient
quantities capable of changing the military balance
between nations, information on their characteristics
usually becomes available in the interim.” While many
opponents will lack the resources to develop technologically
superior countermeasures, they may nevertheless be able to
develop low-tech offsets as has been done with some
regularity in the past.
36

In fact, an over-emphasis on technology can cause the
West to overlook the many low-tech ways in which
adv ersaries mig ht asymmetr i c al l y r esp ond to
gadgetry-obsessed—and gadgetry-vulnerable—Western
opponents. What is so remarkable about this is that so few
seem to remember the lessons of relatively recent history.
Two senior U.S. military commanders warn against the
siren song of technology in the Autumn 1997 issue of
Parameters. They point out that:
37

[Technological] supremacy could not prevent Holland’s defeat in
Indonesia, France’s defeats in Indonesia and Algeria, America’s
defeat in Vietnam, the Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan, or
Russia’s more recent defeat in Chechyna. All these episodes
confirm that technological superiority does not automatically
guarantee victory on the battlefield, still less the negotiating
table.38
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Future adversaries may wage asymmetrical warfare by
combining available low-tech equipment with a
culturally-oriented strategy. For example, Marines should
ex pect to face op p onents who d ep l oy r el ati vel y
unsophisticated mines, much as Iraq did during the Gulf
War, in the hopes of replicating the Iraq’s success in
deterring an amphibious assault following damage by
mines to the U.S.S. Tripoli and the U.S.S. Princeton.
Similarly , opponents wi l l l i kel y ac qui r e smal l ,
diesel-powered submarines to present the same threat.
What is important here is that such schemes might not be
able to stop a determined assault, but an adversary may
intend to simply exploit the growing aversion to casualties
in the West’s culture by causing some losses which would, in
turn, erode support for the West’s military effort.
39

40

Surface ships may face an even more insidious threat: an
enemy could use a civilian airliner covertly loaded with
explosives to launch an attack on a high-value target such
as an aircraft carrier. The plane might be flown by a suicide
pilot (or automatically guided) and carry a hostage or even
volunteer group of civilian passengers. Recalling the
recriminations that followed the accidental shootdown of an
Iranian airliner by the cruiser Vincennes, the adversary
may hope to create just enough hesitation on the part of the
ship’s crew to allow the aircraft to successfully penetrate the
defenses. Again, simply causing casualties—in this
scenario both U.S. military personnel and enemy
civilians—would be the aim.
41

It is paradoxical that these kinds of enemy actions
against forward deployed American forces might engender
a completely different reaction than acts of terrorism
against the U. S. homeland. Although the objective of both
might be to maximize casualties, the former could succeed
in undermining public support for an overseas operation
while the latter may well evoke a demand for extreme
measures against the perpetrators. Such is the mercurial
nature of contemporary U.S. public opinion.
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In any event, the kind of asymmetrical warfare future
adversaries may wage is not that which seeks to actually
defeat U.S. or Western military forces, but rather that
which assaults the psyche and will of the populations whose
political support is required by Western democracies to
sustain military operations.
Conclusions.
Hopefully, this essay will not be interpreted as an
anti-technology, Luddite manifesto. To the contrary, no
one—least of whom the author—disputes the dictum that
“technology and warfare have never been far apart.”
Moreover, it is unquestionably true that decisionmakers
must be extremely concerned about procuring the finest
technology for U.S. forces. Analysts Ronald Haycock and
Keith Neilson warn that to a great extent military
applications of technology have “permitted the division of
mankind into ruler and ruled.” And it is also still true that
technology is the West’s comparative advantage.
42

43

On e of th e g r eat d anger s , however , i s that
decisionmakers may delude themselves into thinking that
the challenge of asymmetrical warfare is exclusively
technological. It is especially a concern as more and more of
the civilian leadership lack first-hand military experience.
This has led some military officers to worry, as the Wall
Street Journal reported in 1995, that such leaders might
believe that “gadgets can somehow substitute for the blood
and sweat of ground combat.”
44

The West must recognize that consideration of war as a
technological or engineering problem has its limits. The
engineer’s culture is an “aggressively rational one” where
technical problems are solved with a logical application of
scientific principles.” War, however, is something
different. Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC,
explains:
45
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Technology permeates every aspect of war, but the science of
war cannot account for the dynamic interaction of the physical
and moral elements that come into play, by design or by
chance, in combat. War will remain predominately an art,
infused with human will, creativity, and judgment.46

What is necessary for the United States and the West is
to expand its assessment of asymmetrical warfare.
Asymmetrical warfare needs to be examined from the
culturally distinct perspective of potential enemies. As
unpleasant as it may be, the West must consider that
enemies may try to turn against us the very values that the
West is seeking to protect. In particular, the United States
and the West must not allow its technologically-oriented
mindset to blind it to the fact that modern war remains, as
already noted, a struggle of psyches and wills.
The West must be prepared to meet the moral as well as
technical challenge of future war. Enemies may concede
that physically defeating the military the forces of the
United States and the West is beyond their capability, but
nevertheless attempt to achieve their war aims by
overcoming the West’s will, testing it in new and innovative
ways. That is the essence of the challenge of asymmetrical
warfare in the 21st century. To the extent that we indulge
ourselves with visions that success in future war can be
reduced to finding high-tech “silver bullets,” all that the
West holds dear is in peril.
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PART I:
SYMMETRIES AND ASYMMETRIES—
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
Lloyd J. Matthews

Asymmetry—is it not a hot new buzzword equivalent for
such prosaic terms as difference, disparity, disproportion,
imbalance, etc.? Not really. Understanding asymmetry in
today’s military parlance begins with the unremarkable
fact that every state—from the most modern to the most
primitive—has both advantages and disadvantages in
waging war with another state, regardless of the relative
levels of advancement of the two.
To cite an extreme and purely hypothetical illustration,
suppose a powerful modern force from an advanced Western
industrial nation undertakes to subdue a small tribal state
of spear-throwing goatherds living at elevations above
15,000 feet in mountain clefts and caves. In brute military
terms, the moderns at first glance appear to have every
conceivable advantage. On further study, however, analysts
note that the goatherds do have a few modest factors in their
favor: they are physically acclimated to working in the cold,
oxygen-depleted environment; their food supply is simple,
at hand, and well-nigh inexhaustible; their hideouts and
caches are impossible to locate from the air; and the
roadless, torturously steep terrain is inhospitable to any
vehicle but the foot.
After returning to their books, maps, and charts a second
time, the analysts arrive at the disconcerting realization
that the “modest” advantages enjoyed by the goatherds are
in fact quite likely to prove decisive, and that it will be
inordinately difficult for the contemporary force to subdue
the primitives at a price anyone regards as politically
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acceptable. In the wondrous calculus of asymmetrics, then,
we find that the advantages accruing to the modern force
are neutralized and the disadvantages enormously
magnified, while the precise converse becomes true for the
backward force in essence only a few decades removed from
the Paleolithic age.
In formal terms, we can define asymmetry as any
militarily significant disparity between contending parties
with respect to the elements of military power broadly
construed. Asymmetrics invites study of the fact that
elements of military power are never applied in a vacuum,
but always in particular political, economic, cultural,
religious, psychological, geographic, and climatic contexts
that qualify the utility of each element of power and
condition the way each acts against the other elements of
power. The process of calculating the resultant of the
various vectors of power wielded by two asymmetrically
related opponents—in order to measure the dimensions of
the threat that each poses to the other—can be quite
problematic. But it is a process that must be undertaken if
we are to give due weight to all the relevant elements of
power.
Because of its deeper level of analysis, the insights
revealed by asymmetrics are not always congruent with
common sense and received wisdom, which usually derive
from surface appearances. For example, there has been a
consistent leaning by Western observers toward the
complacent conviction that great national wealth; large,
technologically advanced forces; and a proud martial
tradition will automatically translate to victory over the
untutored, unwashed warriors of the lesser world. However,
since contemporary forces are trained and equipped to fight
forces much like themselves, when they encounter instead a
markedly asymmetric foe—one judged to be objectively
inferior—they have frequently shown an inability or
unwillingness to make the adaptations, adjustments, and
compromises needed to cope with the unfamiliar modes of
resistance. The French experience in Vietnam, 1946-54, the
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United States in Vietnam, 1959-73, the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan, 1979-89, and the United States again in
Somalia, 1992-94, all reveal to some degree how the
commonsense view of relative military power can lead us
astray.
Since American armed forces are unlikely to encounter a
mirror image (i.e. symmetrical) opponent on the battlefield
in the near to mid term, prudent strategy demands that we
devote substantial attention to the remaining potential
military threat to national security—that posed by an
asymmetric opponent. We begin this process with Part
I—Symmetries and Asymmetries: A Historical Perspective.
Here, we find three studies that explore in detail how
selected armed forces of the past have grappled with the
perplexities of fighting an opponent cast from a markedly
different mold.
From the large catalogue of factors contributing to
military power, Dr. John F. Guilmartin, Jr., in “Technology
and Asymmetrics in Modern Warfare” focuses upon the
factor that commands the lion’s share of attention in
virtually all discussions of the Revolution in Military
Affairs—technology. Dr. Guilmartin first takes care to
distinguish between high tech (a qualitative distinction
based on technological sophistication and capability) and
high end (a quantitative distinction based on size, cost, and
complexity). He illustrates these distinctions, along with
discussion of their implications for success in war, with a
historical tour d’horizon going back to the early 16th
century and even beyond.
The thematic center of the paper is an incisive treatment
of the role of asymmetrical technology in the Spanish
overthrow of the Aztec and Inca empires, 1519-1539 (as
amplified in an appendix). Arguing that the experiences of
Cortés and Pizarro still have relevance today, Dr.
Guilmartin concludes that “the dramatic asymmetry in
weaponry, though a necessary condition for Spanish
victory, was not a sufficient one, and that an understanding
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of the interplay among political, psycho-social, and
technological considerations is needed to explain the
conquistadors’ success.”
In an interesting departure from the usual approach to
asymmetric studies, Colonel Robert A. Doughty in “The
Myth of the Blitzkrieg” revises the long-accepted notion that
the decisive German victory over France in 1940 was the
result of a revolutionary new doctrine of war denominated
as “Blitzkrieg”—one that putatively gave the Germans an
asymmetrical edge over the French. Colonel Doughty
demonstrates that prior to the campaign there was no
coherent German concept of war envisioning lightning-like
deep armor thrusts supported by air that would lead to
quick victory. Instead, the victory was based upon “more
traditional aspects of tactics, operations, strategy, and
leadership,” often relying on infantry rather than tanks or
aircraft and marked by closely contested local encounters
rather than fluid penetrations to distant operational
objectives. In gross terms at least, the forces of these two
modern industrialized nations were very much alike, and if
any asymmetry did exist in favor of the Germans, it lay
within the customary elements of military power. In Colonel
Doughty’s telling, the idea of “Blitzkrieg” as a revolutionary
doctrinal triumph was manufactured after the fact as a tool
of Nazi propagandists and as a device for adding luster to
the reputations of German generals.
In “Asymmetric Response to American Air Supremacy in
Vietnam,” Professor Donald R. Mrozek focuses the lens of
asymmetric study on the effectiveness of America’s vaunted
air power in its confrontation with the guerrilla and
conventional forces of a third world foe in Vietnam.
As preclude to taking up the Vietnam question,
Professor Mrozek surveys America’s own considerable
experience with asymmetric warfare, finding that despite
the cautionary lessons readily available, America
nonetheless cast its lot wholly with the Enlightenment
tradition. Here was emphasized the superiority of a
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rational, universalist, professional approach to waging war,
as opposed to the impassioned improvisation of the
insurgent mentality where concepts of pain, time, and
victory were at stark variance with those of the West.
During the North Vietnamese siege of Khe Sanh in 1968,
for example, U.S. aerial bombardment turned the
circumference of the base into a celebrated killing ground
where loss figures favored the allies by 8 to 1; yet, as
Professor Mrozek points out, this was a mere eddy in a war
that continued its remorseless flow toward North
Vietnamese victory. Much the same could be said for site
defense, interdiction, and sending political messages, in all
of which roles massive U.S. air power was applied to
ambiguous or overstated effect. At best, the United States
used “its asymmetrical air power edge in ways that delayed
but did not change the final outcome.”
It was beyond the bounds of Professor Mrozek’s topic for
him to speculate on the larger question of how the war
would have developed had U.S. political leaders opted from
the beginning to exploit fully their massive asymmetric
conventional edge by eschewing crippling controls on the
pace and scope of air-ground-naval operations throughout
the theater, while launching attacks directly against the
North Vietnamese regime and sealing the borders of the
South.
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TECHNOLOGY AND ASYMMETRICS
IN MODERN WARFARE
John F. Guilmartin, Jr.

Though the term is of relatively recent coinage,
technological asymmetry in warfare has long held a
fascination for military professionals, defense analysts, and
military historians. That fascination has recently been
sharpened by the ongoing debate over the posited existence,
nature, and consequences of the so-called Revolution in
Military Affairs, or RMA, that is generally (though by no
means universally) held to have manifested itself during
the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Though I have some strong views
on the subject, I see little benefit in reviewing the RMA
debate, not least of all because many, if not most of you in
the audience are at least as familiar with the nuances of
that debate as I. Suffice it to say that there is general
agreement that advances in precision-guided weaponry,
target acquisition and tracking devices, avionics, fire
control systems, and secure communications, acting in
combination with the development of stealth technology,
have combined to raise warfare to new levels of lethality.
The advantages of these technologies, of course, accrue only
to those nations that have mastered them and posses the
fiscal wherewithal to produce them in meaningful numbers.
In practical terms, that means the United States, though
certain of our allies share in the benefits.
My purpose in this paper is to identify the key
technologies in question, briefly delineate their salient
operational characteristics, develop a historically-based
analytical framework within which to address and test the
concept of an RMA, and then use that framework as a
vehicle to identify and analyze selected case studies
involving technological asymmetry with an eye to the
future. My topic is not asymmetry in warfare—an enormous
subject which will more than occupy us for the next two
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days—but technological asymmetrics. Let me begin by
offering my working definition of technology:
technology: (1) the application of knowledge to achieve a
physical effect by means of an artifact, object, or thing; (2) the
artifact itself; the class of artifacts to which it belongs; or (3) the
knowledge needed to design, manufacture, operate, sustain and
logistically support the artifact or thing and its user(s).

Note that organizational schemes are technologies
under my definition, the infantry division, for instance, or
the cellular organization of a terrorist group. Note too that
the physical effect might be indirect, as with intelligence
analysis or weather forecasting.
Next, I have found it useful to distinguish between high
tech and high end. While the two concepts overlap, high
tech is a qualitative distinction defined by technological
sophistication and capability, while high end is defined by
size, cost, and complexity. We can apply these distinctions
at the level of individual systems or to entire organizations
and facilities. An example of a high tech, low end system is a
set of state-of-the-art night vision goggles or a Global
Positioning System (GPS) indicator, though the GPS
system as a whole is high tech, high end. An AK-47 or a hand
grenade are examples of low tech, low end systems, while a
third world infantry division would be low tech, high end
and so on. Obviously, these distinctions change with time:
an Iowa class battleship would have been high tech, high
end in 1945 while the same vessel in the 1980s would have
been low tech, high end or perhaps mid tech, high end taking
into account the updated fire control system and missile
armament.
1

With these definitions in mind, let me briefly review the
salient Gulf War high tech systems commonly associated
with the RMA to establish a frame of reference and make
some preliminary observations on technological
asymmetries. Heading the list in terms of operational
impact is the wedding of sophisticated night vision devices
to precision guided munitions and fire control systems. In
2
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the air, that translated most prominently into laser-guided
bombs; on the ground the salient manifestation was the
ability of the M1A1 main battle tank to achieve first round
kills firing at night and on the move, though the
night-capable AH-64 attack helicopter with its laser-guided
Hellfire missiles deserves mention as well. Next comes the
proliferation of secure communications that permitted the
en ormou s a mou nt of ver ti c al c ommuni c ati on
and—particularly in the air war—lateral coordination
needed to link strategy to operations and to make battle
plans work. In practical terms, that meant secure
telephones and facsimile machines, though one might add
color Xerox machines under the general rubric of
communications. Then—and I do not pretend that my
rank-ordering is definitive—come miniaturized navigation
and guidance systems. At sea and in the air, these systems
made the long-range, autonomous, precision-guided Navy
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile TLAM) and Air Force
Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) a
reality; on the ground, GPS indicators allowed U.S. to fire
and maneuver with unprecedented precision and
confidence.
3

4

Next come low observables, aerial attack systems
capable of passively defeating air defense radars, notably
the F-117A stealth fighter, TLAM, and CALCM. One can
make a good argument for bumping low observables up in
the rank ordering, but I would note that stealthiness is a
means to an end, not an end in itself. I would further note
that the F-117’s cutting edge is the infrared target
acquisition and designator system for its laser-guided
bombs and that much of the F-117’s operational value in the
Gulf War stemmed from its superior accuracy, in part a
product of the fact that stealth pilots could afford the luxury
of extended straight and level bomb runs. In short, low
observability is an enabling factor that multiplies the effect of
other technologies. The notion of technological advantage as
a tactical enabling factor is a theme to which I will return.
5
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Next I would list a variety of technologies and munitions
designed for the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)
mission; my primary reference is to the HARM (high speed
anti-radiation missile) and the F-4G “Wild Weasel” fighter
that kills SAMs (surface-to-air missiles), though we should
add EF-111 and EA-6B jammers and decoy drones to the
list. Advanced technologies that played comparatively
lesser roles, but showed promise for the future include the
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
a n d th e n ig h t, ad ver s e- weather , and ad ver se
terrain-capable MH-53J Pave Low III helicopter.
To reiterate my initial point, the argument for the
existence of an RMA stems in large measure from the
effectiveness in the Gulf War of the kinds of systems noted
above. That argument is strengthened by our continuing
development of new systems in all of these categories and by
experiments with more effective means of exploiting them,
particularly those involving the digitized battlefield and its
naval equivalents. I offer two notes of caution at this point.
First, much of our tactical success in the Gulf War was
attributable not just to superior technology, but to superior
training as well, and in many cases it is difficult to say
where one left off and the other began. The TLAM’s success
might appear to be purely technologically determined, but
target selection and route planning, both dependent on user
skill, were important determinants of effectiveness. The
same point applies with even greater force to such systems
as the F-117 and M1A1. Indeed, one might argue, with
seeming perversity, that increased technological
sophistication and capability are more likely to increase
demands on user skill and training than to relax them. The
importance of user skill and training is another theme to
which I will return.
My second cautionary note is a reminder that much of
our effectiveness in the Gulf War depended on low and
medium tech, high end systems. Aerial refueling came of
age as a powerful force multiplier, producing enormous
operational and tactical flexibility far above and beyond
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simple range extension. Again, the value of refueling was
multiplied by aircrew training, and here the advantage was
not just, or even particularly, one of individual skill, but
rather it was a collective phenomenon: the ability of U.S.
tanker and tactical aircrews to quickly improvise refuelings
in response to the unanticipated—adverse weather and
tactical problems or opportunities—gave U.S. unmatched
flexibility and that flexibility was a product of sustained
and realistic inter-unit training.
7

B-52s dropping large numbers of dumb bombs once
again demonstrated their effectiveness against troop
concentrations and industrial complexes. Venerable M-60
tanks in Marine hands proved remarkably effective.
Aircraft carriers were awfully handy to have around,
particularly in the early, nervous, days of DESERT
SHIELD. We could not have done it without sealift. I could
go on, but before moving on to the flip side of the RMA—and
I use the term only as an accepted label—it is worth
remembering that DESERT STORM would have been
impossible without President George Bush’s diplomacy.
The importance of the diplomatic/military interface is
another point to which I will return.
And now for the flip side. Hard on the heels of the wave of
enthusiasm for our mastery of high tech warfare came a
sober appreciation that such methods did not necessarily
lend themselves to conflicts against low tech opponents
lacking the traditional objectives, lucrative targets, and
direct operational methods vulnerable to high tech
weaponry. Indeed, even the Gulf War raised warning flags,
among them our embarrassing difficulty in dealing with the
th reat ca u sed b y an anti quated Sovi et mobi l e
surface-to-surface missile system, the Scud. The warning
flags were raised to masthead level in the wake of the
Mogadishu debacle, in which we lost 18 servicemen to a
decidedly low tech enemy. Those with their hands on the
halyards, unlike all too many high tech enthusiasts, clearly
saw the political dangers arising from an over reliance on
technological advantage acting in combination with our
8
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peculiar social and political sensitivities as a nation. The
ultimate expression of their concerns to date is the
famous—dare I say notorious—article “How We Lost the
High Tech War of 2007.” Its author, Air Force Colonel
Charles Dunlap, explores idea that a ruthless low tech
enemy might exploit our societal squeamishness for
bloodshed and suffering to turn our tactical dependence on
overwhelming high tech superiority into a lethal strategic
liability.
9

With the above points in mind, I turn to the question of
how technological asymmetrics actually play out in war.
Clausewitz believed that a historical example was worth
any amount of speculation, and historical antecedents
should at least provide us with meaningful questions to ask
and hypotheses to apply. In preparing this paper, I was
struck by the realization that the closest historical analog to
the current RMA can be found in the remarkable advances
in the Spanish practice of arms in the early 16th century.
Forced to intervene in Italy in 1495 to thwart the ambitions
of an expansive France, Spanish arms suffered initial defeat
at the hands of Swiss pikemen and French heavy cavalry at
the Seminara River. Under the inspired leadership of
Gonsalvo de Cordova, the Spanish reworked their weaponry
and tactics, adopting the pike and abandoning the crossbow
in favor of increasingly powerful firearms. In remarkably
short order, they had taken the measure of the superior
shock power of Swiss pikemen and French gendarmes,
defeating a French army at Cerignola in 1503. To be sure,
that victory owed much to Gonsalvo’s clever use of terrain
and field fortifications, a point seized on by professional
critics. It also owed much to the brutal effectiveness of
Spanish light horse in pursuit, for ginetes (Spanish light
cavalry armed with traditional weapons) had been sound
from the beginning if not misused for shock action against
heavier opponents.
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The Spanish continued to refine their tactics and adjust
their weaponry mix, and learned to fight in disciplined
formations that combined shock action in the form of
30

pikemen with firepower in the form of arquebusiers and
musketeers. These formations, initially called columnas,
were the first dismounted units, certainly in modern times
and to the best of my knowledge ever, capable of defeating
superior numbers of competent and aggressive cavalry in
open terrain—a point perceptive military professionals
noted with awe. This was a revolutionary change, horse
archers having been slicing up first class infantry in the
open since the Roman Emperor Crassus’ defeat at the hands
of Parthian horse archers in 53 BC. Today’s rough
equivalent would be—or would have been a decade ago—the
seemingly impossible debut of radar-proof aircraft.
13

This was, in fact, the birth of modern infantry, shortly
followed by the replacement of the columna with the larger
tercio, the first permanent tactical and administrative
military formation since the disappearance of the Roman
legion. It is difficult to overstate the importance of these
developments. In the short term, they provided the
wherewithal to halt the westward expansion of the Ottoman
Turks. In the long term, as Geoffrey Parker has
persuasively argued in his seminal work, The Military
Revolution, the Spanish infantry of the 16th century were
the inspiration and prototype for the soldiery of the 17th,
18th and 19th centuries that made European world
dominion a reality.
14
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The parallels with today’s posited RMA are interesting.
In both cases, existing technologies were exploited in new
and innovative ways, gunpowder shoulder arms in the first
in stan ce a n d mi c r o- mi ni atur i zed avi oni c s and
communications in the second. In both cases, the new acted
in synergistic combination with the old when applied within
a novel organizational and intellectual framework. One is
tempted to draw parallels between the operational impact
of low-observable strike platforms and that of the Spanish
musket, and between that of F-16s and A-6s in DESERT
STORM and Gonsalvo’s ginetes after Cerignola! Might the
operational impact of the concentration of tactical,
administrative and logistical functions in the tercio be
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likened to that of the STU-III scrambler telephone and
secure fax machine half a millennium later?
Be that as it may, the Spanish “RMA” of the 16th century
has a sobering epilogue. Spanish infantry retained its
tactical dominance well into the 17th century, humbling the
vaunted Swedish army—beneficiaries of yet another
military revolution—at the battle of Nördlingen in 1634, but
tactical brilliance did not preserve Spain from defeat in the
Revolt of the Netherlands and strategic decline, a reality
that bears reflection.
Setting aside for the moment the relationship between
tactical superiority and strategic success, the 16th century
Spanish RMA has further relevance to the issue of
technological asymmetry. Shortly after their appearance,
the new Spanish methods were unleashed against the Aztec
and Inca empires in an extreme example of technological
asymmetry—I would argue the extreme example of
consequence in the modern era. Indeed, the Spaniards’
enormous qualitative technological advantage and the
seemingly impossible numerical odds against which they
fought make this a limiting case for high tech/low end
versus low tech/high end warfare. Although time and space
permit only a brief synopsis, close examination of that case
yields findings relevant to today’s concerns. I have attached
a more finely-grained analysis in an appendix.
Suffice it to say that raw technological superiority was
vital to Spanish success, but not as a wonder weapon or
“magic bullet.” Rather technological advantage acted
primarily as a facilitator, serving tactically to magnify the
effect of Spanish cohesion in combat, and strategically as a
device for opening up options that would otherwise have
been foreclosed. This facilitating role was pivotal in
providing the military leverage for the forging of alliances
with Amerindian groups critical to Spanish success. The
most important Spanish technologies were not the highest
of high tech available, and all were interdependent in ways
that varied according to geographic, topographical, and
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cultural factors. Horses provided the Spanish with their
most important single technological advantage, but did so
within a tactical context established by steel swords and
lance points. One of the most important tactical benefits of
horses was the effect of their speed on Amerindian security;
charging cavalry were on occasion able to overrun pickets
and reach the main body before news of their coming.
17

Conversely, horses placed significant constraints on
Spanish operational and strategic mobility, for properly
conditioned armies unencumbered by pack and draft
animals moved more swiftly than those with horses. While
gunpowder was essential to Spanish success in Mexico,
particularly in the siege of Tenochtitlan, it was superfluous
in the Andes. The conquistadors made effective use of
crossbows at a time when they had been entirely supplanted
by gunpowder arms among Spanish infantry in Europe ; as
with firearms, crossbows were more important in Mexico;
the greater lethality of Mexia weaponry in hand-to-hand
combat was the primary reason.
18
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Nor did all the technological advantages lie with the
Spaniards. The Aztecs and Incas possessed important
advantages in strategic communications and mobility, a
product of their well-organized empires, and, in the Andean
case, the remarkable Inca road network. Inca hosts,
unhindered by pack animals, possessed unequaled strategic
mobility. Both Aztec and Inca possessed superior
logistical systems, able to deliver weaponry, clothing, and
rations, all suited to the environment, in quantity over
considerable distances, an advantage effectively
neutralized by the ability of the Spaniards’ local allies to do
the same. Both sides used terror, though the effects seem to
have roughly canceled each other out.
21
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The most basic hypothesis to emerge from my limiting
case study is that in even the most extreme case,
technological asymmetry takes effect within a tactical,
operational, and strategic context established and mediated
by such basic factors as geography, topography, climate,
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and culture. What works against one enemy might not
against another for reasons having little to do with the
degree of technological asymmetry. The next is that while
extreme high tech superiority bestows clear tactical
advantages, those advantages tend to assume strategic
importance indirectly as enabling factors for operational
and strategic advantage. The last is that human factors,
both individual and collective, determine the degree to
which technological advantage can be exploited and the
manner in which it is done.
I will proceed by applying these hypotheses to selected
modern cases, organized by degree and kind of asymmetry.
My choices were impressionistic and highly selective,
slanted toward cases that can inform U.S. about the kinds of
opportunities and problems that I see arising from our
current situation and toward cases where I believe I have
something to say. I have deliberately slighted that category
of conflict with which we are most fascinated and in which,
historically, we have been most successful—that between
high tech, high end opponents.
Beginning with gross high tech/low tech asymmetry
with rough numerical parity, the closest we have to our
limiting case is the British Zulu War of 1879 and concurrent
pacification operations in the Sudan. These cases show
striking similarities to those we have just examined,
African steel spearheads balancing the effect of British
repeating rifles. In both cases, superior African tactical
mobility, and in the Zulu case strategic mobility, gave the
British some nasty surprises, as did superior African
exploitation of the terrain. Ultimately, the overwhelming
preponderance of British resources acted in combination
with technological advantage and limited British objectives
to permit the British to leave their former enemies
chastened but essentially in place. The tactical lesson is
that the lowest of low tech weapons used with panache by
skilled and disciplined combatants on their home turf can be
brutally effective. The strategic lesson is that low tech
tactical brilliance is most unlikely to secure outright victory
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over a determined high tech, high end opponent, but may
act in combination with exogenous factors to produce
something less than total defeat: the Zulus, after all, are
still a major political factor in South Africa.
My next category is what I would term low tech, low end
niche advantage, typically fielded by a minor power with
limited resources. The classic example is the Boer War of
1899-1902, in which the Dutch farmers of South Africa
armed with state-of-the-art bolt action magazine rifles
inflicted a series of punishing defeats on British forces,
inflicting some 2,000 casualties for a loss of just over 100 in a
span of just five days, termed “Black Week” by a hysterical
British press. The Boer advantage was not so much superior
technology as superior training. British Lee Enfields were
every bit as good as Boer Mausers and Mannlichers, but the
Boers were able to deliver accurate fire against massed
formations at 1,000 yards while the British were trained for
traditional massed fire at shorter ranges. This is a
particularly interesting example in that the Boers were
anything but disciplined soldiers, suggesting that
appropriate technology can on occasion compensate for
shortcomings in discipline or even cohesion. The Boers were
ultimately ground down by weight of numbers and
resources, but the British learned from them the value of
superior rifle marksmanship, a lesson applied with
devastating effect during combat against the German Army
in 1914. But the lessons that served the British so well in
August and September of 1914 must be qualified, for the
effectiveness of Boer marksmanship at extreme ranges was
a product of the sparse vegetation and long hilltop vistas of
South Africa. Ironically, the military topography of Europe
was very different, and the range and power of Enfield,
Mauser, Mannlicher, and American Springfield rifles were
largely wasted there in both World Wars.
Low tech, low end niche advantage also applied in the
R u sso-F in n ish Wi nter War of 1939- 1940, when
lightly-equipped Finns wreaked havoc on armored and
mechanized Soviet units in the opening stages of the
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conflict. Familiarity with terrain and climate were pivotal
to Finnish success, as was superior tactical skill and
cohesion, but the advantages bestowed by such low tech
items as winter clothing, snow shoes, and skis—plus the
ability to use them—and the marvelously simple and
reliable Suomi submachine gun, were vital as well.
Ultimately Soviet numbers and resources forced the Finns
to sue for peace, but their effective resistance preserved
Finland’s independence. As with the Boer War, the lessons
extracted from the conflict cast long shadows. Though I
cannot establish an explicit link to the Winter War, Soviet
armored forces were appreciably more effective by 1941, the
shock of strategic and tactical surprise and initially
incompetent leadership at the top notwithstanding. The
Red Army proved to be infinitely better equipped for winter
combat than the Wehrmacht. Might Hitler and the
Wehrmacht have been so ready to attribute the Red Army’s
humiliation to Slavic racial inferiority as to remain
uninformed about the Finns’ subtle, but real advantages in
the low tech, low end arena? That would certainly help to
explain Hitler’s sanguine expectations for Operation
Barbarossa.
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The same basic relationships apply to what I would term
medium-tech, low end niche advantage. Examples include
the Egyptian use of Soviet SS-9 Sagger wire-guided
anti-tank missiles in the early stages of the 1973 Yom
Kippur War and, arguably the use by the Afghan
Mujaheddin against Soviet forces of British Blowpipe and
U.S. Stinger shoulder-fired, heat-seeking anti-aircraft
missiles in the recent Afghan war. In both cases, the weapon
in question proved well-suited to the socio-psychological
characteristics of the forces using them, redressing, at least
temporarily, significant tactical liabilities. The use of
Saggers to blunt the initial counterattack by Israeli armor
against Egyptian forces that had breached the Suez Canal is
the key datum. Note, however, that terrain was again a
significant factor.
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A further example involves the use of Soviet SA-7 “Grail”
shoulder-fired, heat seeking missiles by North Vietnamese
forces in the final stages of the Vietnam War, particularly in
the 1975 Ho Chi Minh offensive. In this case, the
effectiveness of the niche weapon was attributable not so
much to the user-weapon fit as to the peculiar
vulnerabilities of the armed forces of the Republic of
Vietnam (ARVN). We had consciously declined to equip the
South Vietnamese Air Force with first-line jet fighters,
providing them instead with a mix of AC-119K side-firing
gunships and AT-37s and F-5s, jet trainers converted to the
attack role. Of the latter, the most effective was the
comparatively slow twin-jet AT-37, on which the ARVN had
become tactically dependent. The low speed that made the
AT-37 an effective ground support aircraft rendered it
h ig h ly v u ln erab l e to the SA- 7 ( the l umber i ng
piston-engined AC-119 was even more vulnerable,
particularly in daylight), and the swift neutralization of a
major component of the ARVN supporting weapons mix
clearly accelerated the collapse of the South Vietnam forces.
The lesson in all three examples is that a modest increment
of technological advantage applied to the right operational
niche can make a major difference tactically and, at least
potentially, strategically. It is worth noting that in the
AC-119K’s sophisticated night vision, target acquisition,
and fire control systems the ARVN had a high tech
advantage that, because of the conditions of combat, proved
strategically worthless.
When the low end niche advantage is high tech, the
results can be even more telling, at least over the short term,
even against a high tech, high end opponent, particularly
when applied by surprise. My first reference here is to the
impact of Syrian-operated, Soviet-supplied mobile
anti-aircraft systems on the early stages of the 1973 Yom
Kippur war, specifically the SA-6 radar-guided missile
system and ZSU 23-4 radar and optically-fired gun
system. By way of background, by 1973 the Israeli air force
had long since taken the measure of the Syrian air force,
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partly due to superior American-designed aircraft and
missile systems and partly—one might argue mostly—as a
result of the superior quality of Israeli pilots and aircrew. I
would add parenthetically that the Syrian qualitative
disadvantage in the pilot arena was partly attributable to
President Hafez al-Assad’s insistence, for political reasons,
on recruiting pilots heavily from the Alawi religious
minority of which he is a member. The percentage of Alawis
capable of becoming first rate fighter pilots is no doubt as
high as that for any other comparable group, but since the
Alawis are few in number quality inevitably suffered.
Having earlier taken the measure of the Soviet SA-2
radar-guided missile, using tactics developed by U.S. forces
over North Vietnam, the Israelis confidently launched their
initial sorties against the attacking Syrian Army only to
receive a shock that must have ranked close to that
experienced by the first macahuitl-wielding Amerindians in
taking on mounted Spaniards. They had learned that they
could handily out-maneuver the SA-2; they could not
out-maneuver the SA-6.
28

In the absence of effective Israeli electronic countermeasures, the SA-6 proved lethal at high and medium
altitudes, and attempts to underfly the SA-6 radars to
attack tactical targets served only to demonstrate the ZSU
23-4’s brutal effectiveness. Israeli ground units defending
the Golan had to do with minimal air support for the first
critical days of the war, and the Israeli air force returned to
the fray in force only after the Syrians had expended most of
their missile reloads. One obvious lesson is that tactical
complacency has no upside; another is that the unexpected,
selective use of high tech weaponry has giant-killing
potential. Another is that a polity that has difficulty
producing skilled fighter pilots may well be able to field
anti-aircraft missile crews with more than enough
competence to make a significant operational difference.
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A more equivocal example of low end/high tech niche
advantage can be seen in the air war over North Vietnam,
1965-1972, in which the North Vietnamese made effective
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use of a mixture of high and medium-tech radar, missile,
gun, and fighter systems to exact a disproportionate toll on
U.S. air forces. The net high tech advantage was clearly
with the US, but the communists were able to effectively
exploit restrictive American rules of engagement, the
weather, and the tactical synergy achieved by the skillful
employment of a dense radar warning and groundScontrolled intercept (GCI) net, radar-guided SA-2 missiles,
anti-aircraft artillery, and manned interceptors. One of
the most interesting aspects of this case lies in the
remarkably different institutional approaches adopted by
the U.S. Air Force and Navy to address the problem of
excessive aircraft losses and poor air-to-air exchange ratios
over North Vietnam. Seemingly instinctively, the Air Force
turned to almost purely technological solutions, developing
sophisticated jamming, target acquisition, and warning
devices while the Navy stuck with the same basic
technologies and thoroughly revamped its air-to-air combat
training program. It was not quite so clear-cut as that, of
course, for the Navy and Air Force shared many of the same
technologies, notably the F-4 as a first-line fighter and
AIM-7 and AIM-9 air-to-air missiles. They also shared the
common goal of reducing aircrew losses, but the case
provides an instructive lesson in the continuities of
institutional mindset.
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Fascinating as it is, I will cut short my discussion of the
Vietnam air war, for it is not so clear-cut as the previous
cases of technological asymmetry, if for no other reason than
that the North Vietnamese possessed quantities of
anti-aircraft artillery and SA-2 missiles such that to
categorize their commitment as low end becomes
misleading, shading over into conflict between high tech,
high end opponents.
There is, however, a category of technological
asymmetry involving high tech, high end opponents that
deserves mention. That is the notion of surprise in the form
of “wonder weapons” consciously designed to overcome a
strategic disadvantage or override a debilitating
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operational problem by pure technology. Almost by
definition, high tech societies seeking to minimize the social
and economic costs of war, of whom we are one, are
particularly prone to pursue this option. Prominent recent
examples include the German use of chlorine gas in early
1915 ; the German use of sophisticated artillery
preparations orchestrated by the famous Lieutenant
Colonel Brüchmuller in conjunction with Stoßtrupp (shock
troop) infiltration infantry tactics in 1917 and 1918 ; the
Japanese naval armaments program prior to World War II;
the German V-2 program ; and the Manhattan Project. Of
these, the Manhattan Project worked. The Manhattan
Project represented a pinnacle of effective staff work,
something at which we as a society are very good, at least
when we let our military institutions take the lead.
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Of the cases cited above, the Manhattan Project aside,
the most extreme and instructive example is the case of the
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) which, looking forward to
war with the United States and keenly aware of its gross
high end inferiority, took unprecedented efforts to achieve
high tech superiority across the board. These efforts,
brilliantly laid out by Mark Peattie and David Evans in
their recent book Kaigun —so central was this effort to the
heart of the IJN that their title is the Japanese word for
Navy—yielded just what was intended. At the initiation of
hostilities in December 1941, the Japanese Navy enjoyed
major qualitative advantages in key performance factors in
a remarkable number of key systems; the Zero carrier
fighter, the Long Lance oxygen torpedo, torpedo-armed
heavy cruisers, and the super battleships Yamato and
Musashi are prominent examples. But the advantages,
though very real tactically, proved illusory, for the resultant
operational instrument was brittle. Instructively, the key
vulnerability node was human. In their determination to
wring the last iota of advantage from superior aircraft
performance, the Japanese Navy embraced a training
program so selective and so demanding that it proved
incapable of providing the replacements needed to sustain
36

40

the war of attrition that was the inevitable result of faulty
strategic appreciations. As in the 16th century, human
factors count.
At least from our American perspective, then, the
wonder weapon approach seems a chimera, but there were
some near misses. Consider the V-2 program, generally
derided as a gross waste of strategic resources, as indeed it
was—as things turned out. From the German perspective,
the Eastern Front was the critical front when the V-2 was
operationally deployed in the summer of 1944, and the V-2
was utterly useless in the east.
But what if the Normandy invasion had been repulsed,
as could easily have been the case? V-2s, fired from mobile
launchers within easy reach of London and the English
midlands, could have wrought havoc on the British war
economy and forced the evacuation of London. Efforts to
suppress the feeble V-2 offensive that, in fact, ensued were
no more effective than the equivalent effort against Iraqi
Scuds in the Gulf War. The lesson here is that we should be
careful not to read too many comforting lessons into our
recent past. Among the comforting lessons that we are wont
to draw from the Gulf War are those involving our
considerable success in minimizing the effects of friction,
and here my case studies suggest the counter-intuitive
finding that friction plays a relatively minor role in conflicts
involving gross technological asymmetry. Both the
conquistadors and the Amerindian empires did a marvelous
job of minimizing friction, and the same point applies to the
British and Zulus. Whether this is an artifact of my data set
or an inherent characteristic of extreme technological
asymmetry I cannot at this point say, but I would certainly
not exclude the latter possibility.
Conversely, qualitative technological niche advantages
would appear to be fertile breeding grounds for friction.
That was certainly the case in the early stages of the Boer
War and the 1939-1940 Russo-Finnish Winter War. The
deleterious effects of friction on the South Vietnamese
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forces in 1975 are self-evident as are the lessons to emerge
from the friction-infested skies of North Vietnam. The point
applies as well to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, where friction
played a major role in driving the tempo and pace of
operations, first to the detriment of the Israeli forces and
then to that of the Syrians and Egyptians.
And so what are we to draw from all this? Is some high
tech enemy likely to smack our macahuitls from our hands
in an unanticipated high tech ambush? Are we likely to stub
our high tech toes against some low tech rocks in the most
miserable reaches of the Third World, or perhaps in our own
back yard? Will clever enemies exploit chinks in our
military armor with low tech, low end niche technologies, as
they are surely attempting to do even as I speak?
I can offer some thoughts. As a nation, we Americans are
very good at developing and deploying high tech systems,
military as well as commercial. We are not so good at
anticipating the cultural, geographic, and political
circumstances under which they will be deployed and used.
My note of caution extends not only, or even particularly, to
the hardware, but mainly to the software, the human user
and his or her live, breathing enemy. In assessing the
problems and opportunities of technological asymmetry, we
must not lose sight of the men and women who will use the
high tech systems we prize so highly, nor should we be
careless in anticipating where those systems will be used,
for what tactical purpose, under what operational
circumstances, and for what strategic objective.
In this context, pedestrian technologies and insights can
be critical. Some years ago an American military pundit,
probably an infantryman—I would love to take credit, but I
can’t—came up with an astonishingly effective law for
predicting the location of our next major military
commitment. I’ve been applying it for decades and it works
beautifully. Closely examine our military footgear, then
identify the country and climate for which it is least well
suited, and that’s where we’re headed. We deployed to
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Vietnam with leather combat boots beautifully suited to
Western Europe; we deployed to the Persian Gulf with
jungle boots tailored for the jungles of Southeast Asia.
Did I say high tech sneakers? Did I say crossbows, or the
21st century equivalent? What’s today’s strategic
equivalent of a Suomi submachine gun or a MiG-17 over
North Vietnam in 1972? Those, I am convinced, are key
questions. If I were in a position of responsibility and could
pull it off, I’d retain Hernando Cortés as a consultant, and
Moctezuma as well. I might even look up the guy who ran
North Vietnam’s air defense system in the autumn of 1967,
or even better his chief of staff and operations NCO.
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APPENDIX
ASYMMETRICAL TECHNOLOGY
AND THE SPANISH OVERTHROW
OF THE AZTEC AND INCA EMPIRES,
1519-1539

From the historian’s perspective, close analysis of the
Spanish overthrow of the Aztec and Inca Empires offers
important insights into the strengths and weaknesses of
Amerindian political and social organization and belief
structures. It also offers a significantly enhanced
understanding of the wellsprings of Spanish military
effectiveness at a time when the superiority of Spanish
arms played a major role in world affairs. From the
perspective of today’s defense analyst or military
professional, the exercise also suggests an approach for the
analysis of the military impact of technological disparity in
general, one that covers the analytical bases better than
most. Precisely because the technological disparity was so
great, pitting Chalcolithic societies that lacked draft
animals against combatants equipped with horses, steel
weapons, and gunpowder, we are forced to consider causal
factors that drop from the equation in less extreme cases or
take effect so subtly as to be all but invisible.
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Study of the overthrow of the Aztec and Inca empires
also produces insights and conclusions, some of them
counter-intuitive, that are relevant to today’s concerns. For
all the stark differences between the Spanish conquistador
of the 16th century and his American equivalent of today or
tomorrow, we are dealing with the same building blocks of
military effectiveness at the cutting edge: the formulation
and implementation of strategy; mobilization of resources,
physical, fiscal and human; effectiveness in exploiting the
capabilities and limitations of weapons systems; cohesion;
and leadership. Perhaps most important, the Spanish,
45

Mexia, and Andean combatants put to the test in these
encounters possessed the same basic physical and mental
equipment as the combatants of today and tomorrow, with
minor variations attributable to diet and, in the case of some
Andeans, adaptation to the rarefied atmosphere of high
elevations. To be sure, there are enormous cultural
differences between the two cases, but my main concern is
with the technological difference between each and its
putative enemy. I can do no more here than summarize
salient observations and conclusions.
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Raw technological disparities on a weapon by weapon
basis were not as important as is generally supposed in
either Mexico or the Andes—forget the stereotypical notions
of Indians fleeing in terror at the mere sight of horses and
the discharge of firearms. To be sure, the Spaniards
amplified the psychological effects of tactical surprise with
unexpected cannon blasts and by hanging bells from the
necks of their charging horses, but such devices were no
different in theory or practice than the Luftwaffe’s use of
wind-driven sirens on Stuka dive bombers early in World
War II; in both cases the novelty soon wore off.
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Both Mexia and Andean military leaders quickly
developed a sophisticated grasp of Spanish tactical
strengths and weaknesses. The steepness of the tactical and
technological gradient that they had to climb inhibited their
ability to exploit their knowledge, but it is clear that a lack of
perceptiveness and tactical agility within the means at their
disposal were not among their problems. Significantly, their
limitations were not individual, but collective. While
individual Amerindian champions were capable of giving
Spaniards a serious challenge on a one-for-one basis, the
Spanish fought in mutually-supporting groups and rarely
gave them the chance. Conversely, the Amerindians had no
experience with fighting in disciplined mass formations and
proved unable to make the socio-psychological adjustments
that this kind of combat required before they were
defeated.
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Recently-introduced European diseases played a role in
eroding Amerindian morale in both cases, though a smaller
one than is popularly supposed. For all the terrors of
epidemic smallpox in a virgin population, the Aztecs
mounted a dogged defense of Tenochtitlan while battling
smallpox and the Spanish at the same time.
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Horses were essential to Spanish success, though within
a tactical context shaped by the greater quickness and
lethality of Spanish swords. A Spanish swordsman with his
thin steel blade could strike with far greater quickness and
lethality than his Amerindian opponents wielding a
macahuitl (Mexia) or stone-headed club (Andeans), and
swords were surely responsible for more Amerindian
casualties than all other Spanish weapons combined, except
perhaps in the siege of Tenochtitlan. But steel swords alone,
however superior, could not have done the job, a point
confirmed by the ease with which the Mexia repulsed the
initial Spanish landings on the coast of Mexico, made
without horses in 1517 and 1518.
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Tactical analysis clearly indicates that the speed,
quickness, and flexibility of mounted shock action was the
conquistadors’ biggest single advantage in determining the
pace and tempo of combat. In short, horses were more
important than steel in determining the conditions under
which combat was joined, enabling the Spaniards to engage
and disengage at will. If we must choose between horses and
steel, horses come first and it is worth noting that the older
technology—by a millennium—was the more critical.
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Gunpowder was an indispensable ingredient of Spanish
victory in the Valley of Mexico, but played a peripheral role
in the Andes. Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that the
conquest of Peru could have been achieved without
gunpowder. The difference between the Mexican and
Andean cases is attributable to the Mexia’s higher level of
technological advancement, but only partly so. The
greater political and psychological robustness of the Aztec
empire was an important factor as well. So too were the
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political geography and military topography of the Valley of
Mexico, where the fortified island city of Tenochtitlan posed
difficult problems for the Spaniards. These forced Cortés to
have small, cannon-armed warships built on the coast,
disassembled, and brought inland to establish control over
Lake Texcoco, cutting Tenochtitlan off from food supplies
and reinforcement. The message here is that the
advantages of technological “magic bullets” may well be
mediated by the cultural and topographical peculiarities of
the theater of operations.
As a subsidiary point, the crossbow played a significant
role in both Mexico and the Andes at a time when, as noted
in the body of the text, it had given way entirely to firearms
among Spanish forces in Europe. As with firearms, the
crossbow was more important in Mexico, clearly because the
greater lethality of Mexia weapons in hand-to-hand combat
placed a greater premium on keeping the Amerindian
warriors at a distance. To put the point in perspective, the
surprisingly high ratio of horses wounded to horses killed in
combat in the Andes is testimony to the relative
non-lethality of Andean weapons of close combat.
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The advantages of steel swords over stone-edged wooden
macahuitls in Mexico and stone-headed clubs in the Andes
were important, but the one essential ingredient to the
conquistadors’ success was cohesion in combat. Although
the Amerindians quickly developed an accurate
understanding of the advantages of Spanish weaponry, a
generation was required for them to understand and begin
to replicate the socio-psychological and tactical framework
within which those weapons were employed. The key
tactical problem was how to deal with a cavalry charge, and
th at req u ired massed f or mati ons of d i sc i p l i ned
pike-wielding infantry. Certain of the Andeans were
stockpiling pikes in preparation for revolt within 25 years of
the fall of the Inca Empire. Though the rebellion was
forestalled by aggressive Spanish action, it seems clear that
the Andeans had grasped the socio-psychological essentials
of the problem, for the pike, unlike traditional Andean
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weapons, is effective only when used by disciplined masses
of infantry. Within a generation of the conquest, the
Araucana Indians of southern Chile had mastered the full
panoply of European warfare, including pike formations
and mounted combat, and proceeded to fight the Europeans
to a standstill, giving way only to demographic pressure
that sedentary agrarian civilizations inevitably bring to
bear on horse-nomad societies. Finally, the conquistadors’
technologically-derived tactical advantages were very real
indeed and formed the cutting edge of conquest, but they
would have gone for naught, as least in the short term, had
Cortés, Pizarro, and their lieutenants not been superb
diplomats, capable of forging effective coalitions with
Amerindian allies.
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There being no evidence that we have changed
physiologically or in mental capacity since early Neolithic
times, I would argue that findings like those above have
relevance to the here and now. In other words, technological
asymmetry affects war similarly regardless of time or place.
That having been said, the single most significant
conclusion to emerge from my 16th-century case study is
that the dramatic asymmetry in weaponry, though a
necessary condition for Spanish victory, was not a sufficient
one, and that an understanding of the interplay among
political, psycho-social, and technological considerations is
needed to explain the conquistadors’ success.
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MYTH OF THE BLITZKRIEG
Robert A. Doughty

Numerous battles have occurred in the 20th century, but
perhaps no other military operation has had a greater
influence upon our perceptions of war in this century than
the 1940 campaign in which the Germans defeated the
French. Whether in broad political and sociological analyses
seeking to examine war in general or in more narrow
polemics aiming to convince readers or decisionmakers,
analysts and historians have often used the example of the
1940 campaign to hammer home their points or portray
their ideas about military strategy or operations. In recent
years, the example of the 1940 campaign has been
particularly evident in publications pertaining to the
so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs.” Its theorists have
argued frequently that a dramatic change in warfare
occurred between 1918 and 1939 and have used the example
of this change to suggest a model for the future. Some have
insisted that Germany exploited the technological
opportunities more readily than the Western democracies.
Others have associated Blitzkrieg with a “RMA” because of
“tactical, operational, conceptual, [and] organizational”
advances. Still others have seen Blitzkrieg emerging from a
combination of technological and conceptual advances; and
a few have argued that the Germans developed Blitzkrieg
because they recognized they could not win a war with their
existing military capabilities. Whatever the theorists’
explanation—the unleashing of a new way of war, the
disintegration and defeat of a major power, or the
apparently decisive role of new technologies—aircraft and
tank often fit nicely into their explanations or models of how
the waging of war can change swiftly and affect
dramatically the destiny of world powers.
1
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Despite the wealth of information about Blitzkrieg,
much of our common knowledge pertaining to the 1940
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campaign and to the concept of a Blitzkrieg is pure myth.
“[A]s an operational design,” Michael Geyer has said, “it was
a make-believe spectacle that was put together in hindsight
for public consumption.” Sam Lewis has added, “Contrary
to popular belief, there was no ‘Blitzkrieg Era’ in the history
of the German Army.” In reality, the 1940 campaign had
more modest goals than the swift, overwhelmingly decisive
victory the Germans achieved. Though the Germans
entered battle in May 1940 hoping for a quick victory, they
had no expectations of a Blitzkrieg-like campaign and
ultimately owed their success to the favorable outcome of
several encounters won only by slim margins. Moreover,
they owed much of their success to the infantry, not the tank
or aircraft, and achieved victory by relying more on
traditional aspects of tactics, operations, strategy, and
leadership than on any revolutionary new ones. The
crushing nature of the victory nonetheless enabled the
Germans to manufacture and advertise for political and
military purposes a “make-believe spectacle” that bore little
resemblance to their actual experience. Ironically, the
Germans fell victim to their own myth when they failed to
examine rigorously the 1940 campaign and invaded the
Soviet Union in June 1941 expecting to replicate their
relatively easy victory over the French.
5
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The myth of the Blitzkrieg begins with misconceptions
about the origins of the term. For some time historians
have believed the term came from an article published in
Time magazine about the time of Poland’s fall in which
Commander-in-Chief of the Army General Walther von
Brauchitsch was tagged a “Blitzkrieger” and the “Lord of
the Lightning.” William J. Fanning, Jr., recently
demonstrated in an article in War & Society, however, that
the word “Blitzkrieg” appeared occasionally between 1936
and 1937 and stemmed from the widespread use—in several
languages—of the term “lightning” to describe the speed
and power of modern armies in the late 1930s. European
officials and analysts often used the term “lightning” during
that decade to describe the “knockout blow” favored after
7
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the dreadful experience of the long total war from 1914 to
1918. In German publications, for example, writers
sometimes used such words as Blitzartig (lightning-like),
Blitzfunken (lightning sparks), or Blitzschlag (lightning
blow). Though the Germans used the term Blitzkrieg, they
used it infrequently and associated it primarily with the
concept of a short war.
10
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Despite significant interest in avoiding a long war, no
theorist linked the word “Blitzkrieg” to a quick, knockout
blow with closely coordinated tank and air forces. What the
Germans did instead was develop advanced concepts for
mobile warfare, many of which provided the foundation for
the successful 1940 campaign. As James Corum has
demonstrated, the Germans, led by General Hans von
Seeckt, conducted a careful and rigorous analysis of their
experiences in World War I and used the results of this
assessment as the foundation for their efforts to develop
methods and equipment for mobile warfare in the interwar
period. When the Panzer division appeared in 1935, its
creation was, as Corum has observed, less a revolutionary
step than a “natural evolution” from the methods developed
in World War I and the 1920s. Moreover, though Guderian
was a leader in the development of armored warfare, he was
not alone in an oasis of ignorance and conservatism. A
lively debate occurred in German military literature in the
1930s over the role of armored and air forces, and the
General Staff was well aware of the opportunities afforded
by the tank and airplane. In reality, the inadequacy of the
German economy and the consequences of Hitler’s rapid
expansion in the late 1930s retarded or disrupted the
development of motorized and mechanized forces more than
the conservatism of the German military.
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Even the notion of General Erich von Manstein’s selling
to Hitler the idea of a Blitzkrieg across France fades when
examined carefully, as does the notion of Hitler’s having
developed almost by himself the strategy and tactics
enabling the Germans to race across France. Though
Manstein started flooding the headquarters of Chief of the
16
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General Staff General Franz Halder in late October 1939
with self-serving suggestions for Marshal Karl von
Rundstedt’s Army Group A, of which he was Chief of Staff,
to make the main attack, Hitler had asked about the
possibility of attacking through the Ardennes long before he
learned of Manstein’s proposal. Despite Hitler’s interest,
an energetic assessment of an offensive through the
Ardennes did not begin in earnest until the French obtained
portions of the German plan from a downed German aircraft
in Belgium on January 10, 1940, and preparations for such
an offensive began only after extensive war games revealed
the strategic possibilities.
17
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In the final analysis, German strategy in May 1940
emerged after a long and careful assessment and planning
effort, not from a prophet of armor convincing Hitler at a
dinner party to seek a breakthrough at Sedan. The
combination of Hitler’s dabbling in questions of military
strategy and operations, Brauchitsch’s and Halder’s doubts
about trying a variant of the disastrous Schlieffen Plan,
Rundstedt’s and Manstein’s seeking a more ambitious role
for their army group, and France’s serendipitously
obtaining a copy of the earlier draft of Fall Gelb—led the
Germans to choose the risky solution of attacking through
the Ardennes. And their choice was based more on
considerations of strategic and operational possibilities
than on notions of a new method of warfare or on the
outcome of a cautious, step-by-step staff assessment. As
Karl Frieser has observed, the campaign ultimately was “an
operational act of desperation to get out of an unfavorable
strategic situation.” The 1940 campaign also bears little
resemblance to the jaunty gallop across France sometimes
suggested by historians, particularly in the years
immediately following World War II. The experience of
XIXth Panzer Corps illustrates this clearly. Beginning on
the first day of the attack, May 10, the Germans
encountered unexpectedly strong resistance from 2nd
Battalion, 1st Regiment of the Belgian Chasseurs
Ardennais. A light infantry force relying on bicycles as its
21
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main means of transportation, this battalion occupied the
area around Martelange and Bodange on the border
between Belgium and Luxembourg. On the first day of the
campaign the combination of difficult terrain and some
particularly valiant resistance from one Chasseurs
Ardennais company at Bodange delayed 1st Panzer
Division and placed the entire campaign at risk.
25

Though Guderian’s XIXth Panzer Corps subsequently
raced across Belgium and encountered little resistance from
the French, the Germans confronted numerous difficulties
when they attempted to cross the Meuse River at Sedan.
With the French defending with hardly more than two
regiments along the river where XIXth Corps crossed, only
one of the six main German crossings met immediate
success, and one other managed to get sizeable forces over
the river only after several attempts. Both of these crossings
occurred in 1st Panzer Division’s sector. As for 2nd Panzer
Division to the west of Sedan, both its crossings failed; its
infantry managed to get across the river only after soldiers
from 1st Panzer Division cleared the river bank on the far
side. As for 10th Panzer Division east of Sedan, both its
crossings were stymied, but two squads, one led by a
German engineer staff sergeant, succeeded in getting across
and then carving out a small bridgehead against more
numerous French forces. Were it not for the remarkable
success of these two squads, as well as that of Lieutenant
Colonel Hermann Balck’s 1st Infantry Regiment of 1st
Panzer Division, the course of the entire campaign would
have been substantially different. The French rushed large
reinforcements to the threatened Sedan sector, and the loss
of only one day in the pace of the campaign could have
spelled disaster, but not necessarily defeat for the Germans.
While the Germans probably would have achieved victory,
they may have lost many more lives before XIXth Panzer
Corps established a bridgehead south of the Meuse River.
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Subsequent portions of the campaign also bear little
resemblance to the popular notion of a jaunt across France.
On the morning of May 14, for example, the Germans had
61

few tanks across the Meuse at daylight. Guderian’s three
panzer divisions had managed to complete only one bridge
across the river during the night, and movement of tanks to
the bridge proved difficult. The 2nd Panzer Regiment, the
first tank unit to cross the Meuse, did not complete its
crossing until 0800 hours. Prior to these tanks crossing the
Meuse, an antitank company—accompanied by an engineer
battalion—acted as the spearhead of the XIXth Corps’
attack. Similarly, a particularly interesting action bearing
no resemblance to the common perception of the campaign
occurred on May 15 at Chagny when a single French rifle
company, reinforced by horse cavalry and several antitank
guns, turned back an assault by the bulk of the tanks of 1st
Panzer Division. The Germans had unwisely separated
their tanks and infantry, and while Balck’s 1st Infantry
Regiment fought against fierce French resistance at La
Horgne, the German tanks found themselves unable to
push through French infantry on the heights above Chagny,
20 kilometers southwest of Sedan. The Germans succeeded
in breaking through French defenders only after Balck’s
infantry pushed through La Horgne, advanced toward
Chagny, and threatened the defenders’ rear. Much like the
encounters at Bodange and along the Meuse, the encounter
at Chagny turned in the Germans’ favor because of their
infantry, not because of their tanks. Beyond a doubt, the
Germans owed their success at Sedan more to Balck’s 1st
Infantry Regiment than to any other unit. In short, the
tanks were important, but without key support from the
infantry, their accomplishments would have been much
more problematic.
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Airpower also played a role different than that
commonly credited to it, particularly by those believing
German aircraft functioned as “flying artillery.” In
addition to gaining and maintaining air superiority
throughout the campaign, the Luftwaffe played a
particularly important role early in the campaign when it
maintained an impermeable umbrella over German
columns advancing across eastern Belgium and when its
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attacks across Northern France confused French military
leaders about the location of the enemy’s main attack. The
Luftwaffe also provided crucial support to German infantry
on May 13 during the assault across the Meuse. In
particular, the famous provision of limited air support for an
extended period on the morning of May 13, rather than
heavy support for a brief period, eroded the French
infantry’s will to fight and contributed significantly to the
collapse of the French 55th Division, Guderian’s main
opponent along the Meuse.
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Though these contributions were important, German
airpower did not prevent the French from reinforcing the
threatened Sedan sector and destroyed very little on the
ground. Despite the French High Command’s slow
recognition of the threat along the Meuse, they succeeded in
moving 2nd Armored, 3rd Armored, 3rd Motorized, 14th
Infantry, 36th Infantry, 53rd Infantry, 71st Infantry, 1st
Colonial, and 2nd Light Cavalry divisions, as well as
numerous artillery units, into the expanding breach.
Second Army reported only two tanks destroyed by German
aircraft. Adding to the negative side of the column, the
accidental killing by German air of the commanders of the
German 1st Armored Brigade and 43rd Assault Engineer
Battalion demonstrates the tenuous link between German
air and ground forces. In short, German ground forces could
not have succeeded without air support, but the Luftwaffe
was hardly the decisive factor in the campaign, and its
contributions did not mark the opening of a new age in the
history of warfare.
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The hazardous and fragile nature of the campaign was
reflected in the nervousness of the German High Command,
particularly of Hitler. In an attempt to avoid interference
from Berlin, Guderian’s superior, General Ewald von
Kleist, was less than forthright with his superiors and did
not inform them fully of the meager number of German
forces across the river late on May 13, the first day of the
crossing. Instead, he reported to Army Group A that all
three of Guderian’s divisions had crossed the Meuse River
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and that sizeable forces would cross the Ardennes Canal the
following day. Since his message omitted any mention of the
difficulties encountered by 2nd and 10th Panzer divisions,
his superiors were unaware of the vulnerability of the
German bridgehead near Sedan. Despite von Kleist’s
having painted a more optimistic picture than the situation
merited, the German High Command remained extremely
nervous. On May 17, General Franz Halder, the Chief of the
German General Staff, observed in his diary, “Rather
unpleasant day. The Fuhrer is terribly nervous. Frightened
by his own success, he is afraid to take any chance and so
would rather pull the reins on us.” The following day
Halder recorded in his diary, “The Fuhrer unaccountably
keeps worrying about the south flank. He rages and screams
that we are on the best way to ruin the whole campaign and
that we are leading up to a defeat.” By May 19, however,
Halder could record in his diary, “I am certain of success.”
Though Hitler later acknowledged his concern about the
French repeating the 1914 miracle of the Marne, neither
he nor virtually anyone around him expected such a rapid
and easy victory.
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Perhaps more than anyone else, Guderian recognized
the slim margin by which the Germans had succeeded. In
his memoirs he describes his visit to the heights overlooking
the Meuse River on May 14 and his surprise that French
long-range artillery had not caused larger German losses.
He wrote, “At this moment, as I looked at the ground we had
come over, the success of our attack struck me almost as a
miracle.” In addition to having favorable luck, the
Germans won because of their better doctrine and
leadership and because of their ability to concentrate
overwhelming combat power at the decisive point.
Additionally, as James Corum has noted, “superior
training” gave the Germans an important advantage. In
essence, the Germans outfought the French tactically and
outsmarted them strategically, but their victory stemmed
as much from French weaknesses as from German
strengths. French doctrine was inadequate for the mobile
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fighting Germany thrust upon them in May 1940, and
French strategy was particularly vulnerable to a thrust to
the Ardennes.
44

Despite Guderian’s realistic assessment, neither
Guderian nor other German leaders subsequently acted as
if the 1940 campaign were “almost a miracle.” Ironically, the
Germans themselves fell victim to the myths surrounding
the campaign and to their own propaganda about the
effectiveness of the Blitzkrieg. Instead of acknowledging the
slim margin of their victory, the military concluded that
they had accomplished something extraordinary against
France and that they had begun the campaign with the
intention of winning victory through what became known as
a Blitzkrieg. As Michael Geyer has observed, “[T]he officers
got their ideas about the new ‘strategy’ where everybody
else got them as well. They saw themselves in the newsreels
and in the movies doing the right thing.” Thus, myth
outweighed reason, and the Germans confidently expected
the whole world to share their unshakable faith in their
invincibility and in the Blitzkrieg.
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With regard to the influence of the 1940 Blitzkrieg on
German thinking, Hitler had his eyes on eastern Europe
long before he ordered his armed forces to begin
preparations for an attack. In his first meeting with the
senior leaders of the German military only days after he
first came to power, Hitler emphasized his intention to build
up the armed forces and, after decrying Germany’s
insufficient room, declared his intention to use the
resurrected armed forces to conquer “new living space in the
East.” At a meeting on May 23, 1939, with several senior
military leaders including General Wilhelm Keitel and
General Franz Halder, Hitler emphasized obtaining living
space in the East, securing food supplies, and solving the
problems of the Baltic Sea and states. In other meetings
with senior military officials on August 22 and November
23, 1939, Hitler again revealed his intentions to move
east. In the latter presentation, he addressed the question
of a multi-front or two-front war, emphasizing that
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Germany could engage Russia only when it was “free in the
West.” An invasion of the Soviet Union was thus an
essential part of Hitler’s quest to rule Europe and his plan to
gain new room in the East. As one German officer, however,
later wrote, “The real background to his decision
undoubtedly lay in his permanent, deep-rooted, and deadly
hatred of Bolshevism.” Consequently, the capability to
launch a Blitzkrieg attack was not what convinced Hitler to
charge eastward; instead, the capability only added to his
confidence and encouraged him to launch such an attack
earlier than he might otherwise have done so.
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Though the precise steps in Hitler’s thinking remain
uncertain, he apparently made the decision in late July
1940—barely a month after the defeat of France—to invade
the Soviet Union. An important step in his decision-making
process occurred on July 19, 1940, when he addressed the
Reichstag in what the German propaganda machine called
“An Appeal for Peace.” Preceded on the previous day by a
victory parade through the Brandenburg Gate, an event of
enormous propagandistic and political significance, Hitler
assembled the senior officials of the Third Reich and
showered the leaders of the 1940 campaign with praise and
promotions. In his memoirs Keitel described the
“memorable” July 19 session in glowing terms, observing
“Never before and never again were the generals of the
German armed forces represented in such strength on the
rostrum.” William Shirer, who attended the presentation
as a foreign correspondent, noted in his diary,
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It is not to be a Blitzkrieg against Britain. At least not yet. In the
Reichstag tonight, Hitler “offered” peace. He said he saw no
reason why this war should go on.56

After the assembly, one German officer shouted to Shirer,
“Can you make it out? Can you understand those British
fools? To turn down peace now?” The officer concluded,
“They’re crazy.” Despite the staged performance at the
Reichstag and despite the release of much movie footage
showing tanks charging across Belgium and France,
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Winston Churchill and the British refused to yield. Halder
observed in his diary, “The Fuhrer is greatly puzzled by
Britain’s persistent unwillingness to make peace.”
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As the probability of an invasion of Britain decreased in
the weeks after the fall of France, Hitler’s interest in
attacking east increased. On July 22, one month after the
fall of France, Halder recorded in his diary a summary of a
meeting with Brauchitsch, who had met with Hitler the
previous day. According to Halder, the Fuhrer believed that
“Britain’s position is hopeless. The war is won by us.”
Crossing the Channel, however, appeared “very hazardous”
to him. An invasion would occur only if Germany had no
other way of dealing with Britain, and Halder expected
Hitler to decide within a week whether the planned
invasion would occur. “Our attention,” Halder wrote in his
diary, “must be turned to tackling the Russian problem and
prepare planning.” In a reflection of his confidence in the
Blitzkrieg, Halder noted that the objective in an operation
against the Soviets would be to “crush [the] Russian Army
or slice as much Russian territory as is necessary to bar
enemy air raids on Berlin and Silesian industries.” Halder
had begun preliminary preparations for such an operation
as early as July 3, and by July 27 his staff presented him
the outline of their study of operational possibilities in the
East. Halder observed in his diary, “Total strength
req u ired 1 0 0 Divs .”
Al most si mul taneous l y a
memorandum from the Navy revealed the difficulties of
transporting troops across the English Channel, and Halder
observed, “[W]e can throw away the whole plan of an
invasion [of Britain].”
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Meanwhile, Hitler had decided to invade the Soviet
Union and had informed General Alfred Jodl, Chief of
Operations in the Armed Forces High Command (OKW), on
July 29. That same day Jodl revealed Hitler’s intentions to
a few officers of the OKW. While sitting in a train station
near Berchtesgaden, Jodl first ensured the windows and
doors were closed and then told his compatriots that Hitler
had decided to launch a surprise attack against the
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Soviets. Two days later, July 31, Hitler addressed this
important issue more formally with Germany’s senior
military leaders. Halder’s diary summarized Hitler’s main
point:
With Russia smashed, Britain’s last hope would be shattered.
Germany then will be master of Europe and the Balkans.
Decision: Russia’s destruction must therefore be made a part of
this struggle. Spring 41. The sooner Russia is crushed, the
better. Attack achieves its purpose only if Russian State can be
shattered to its roots with one blow.68

Clearly, Hitler as well as Halder expected that “one blow” to
come from another Blitzkrieg. Prior to the crucial days at
the end of July, Hitler’s great confidence led him to boast,
“Now we have shown what we are capable of [doing]. . . . [A]
campaign against Russia would be like a child’s game in a
sandbox by comparison [to the campaign against France].”
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Hitler’s decision by no means was set in concrete on July
31. Directive Number 12, which formally initiated
preparations for a war against the Soviet Union, was not
published until December 18. Meanwhile, the Army High
Command (OKH) and OKW staffs worked separately to
analyze strategic and operational alternatives for a
campaign against the Soviets. Following some preliminary
work by the operations section of the general staff, Major
General Erich Marcks, Chief of Staff of 18th Army, worked
alone—beginning in late July—to analyze the prospects of
an Eastern campaign. While the OKH and general staff
conducted their planning, the OKW also prepared a plan.
Under the direction of General Walter Warlimont, Section
“L” (Landesverteidigung) of the Operations Department
almost simultaneously completed a plan that became
known by the name of its main author, Lieutenant Colonel
Bernhard von Lossberg, as the “Lossberg study.” Then, on
September 3, Major General Friedrich Paulus was ordered
by General Halder to prepare another study—without
reference to the other ongoing studies—of operational
possibilities in the East. Though the recommendations of
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these studies varied considerably, all assumed the
Wehrmacht was far superior to the Soviet Army, and none
evinced any doubts about a German victory in a short, swift
campaign.
Throughout the fall of 1940, the concept of a Blitzkrieg
dominated planning and preparations even though the
Germans rarely used the term. Marcks’ study noted, “As in
Poland and the West, success must be sought by means of
surprise and speed. The conduct of operations is so
conceived that in all armies mobile formations in the first
wave will break through the Russian troops in front of the
river and forest defenses and, supported by the Luftwaffe,
continue the advance to seize corridors through the forests
and river crossings.” Similarly, Lossberg’s study asserted,
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The aim of a campaign against Soviet Russia is to destroy the
mass of the Soviet Army in western Russia, to prevent the
withdrawal of battleworthy elements into the depth of Russia,
and then, having cut western Russia off from the seas, to
advance to a line which will place the most important part of
Russia in our hands and on which it will be easy to form a
shield against Asiatic Russia.75

Hitler’s Directive No. 21 on December 18 stated, “The
German Armed Forces must be ready to crush Soviet Russia
in a rapid campaign, even before the termination of the war
with Britain. . . .” The directive added,
The bulk of the Russian Army deployed in Western Russia is to
be destroyed in daring operations with deep penetrations of
tank spearheads; no [enemy] units should be permitted to
remain intact and retreat into the wide Russian spaces.76

According to Karl Frieser, German confidence in the
Blitzkrieg led them to seek a “super Cannae” in Russia.
Though Brauchitsch and Halder believed Germany should
defeat Britain before turning east, both nevertheless
believed victory against the Soviets could be achieved in a
relatively short campaign. In the July 22 meeting between
Brauchitsch and Halder, the two generals agreed that
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80-100 German divisions could easily defeat the 50-75
“good” Russian divisions out of the 147 they expected to
encounter. Rejecting the notion of anything other than a
relatively brief, intense war, they expected to avoid the
failures of World War I and the demands, which Germany
could not meet, of a long total war. In avoiding a long war,
the Germans hoped to avoid a massive mobilization of their
economy. Though Alan S. Milward’s notion of a “Blitzkrieg
economy” exaggerates the connection between military
and economic planning, production of goods for the civilian
economy nonetheless continued at a remarkably high level
as the Germans dawdled at initiating economic
preparations for the terrible demands they were about to
encounter. Failing to recognize completely the huge
increase in scale required for a war against the Soviet
Union, the Germans also failed to prepare logistically for a
demanding campaign in the vast area of Russia. Here, too,
assumptions of a short campaign—from 9 to 17
weeks —overruled special measures in obtaining,
transporting, or accumulating massive stockpiles of
supplies. Oblivious to extraordinary demands about to be
placed on the logistics system and confident of a quick
victory, Halder ignored glaring vulnerabilities such as the
expectations for supplies to be transported by trucks twice
the distance regarded as feasible by logisticians. Rarely in
history has any campaign been based on such pervasive
myths and empty hopes.
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Ironically, in the crucial months between the fall of
France and the invasion of the Soviet Union, German
military leaders displayed few of the professional qualities
that had led them to conduct a thorough assessment of the
Polish campaign. Driven by a strong sense of urgency in the
tense months before May 1940, they had rigorously
identified and addressed the shortcomings in the
September 1939 battles, but they displayed little interest
in such an assessment after May-June 1940. Meanwhile,
German commanders and staffs remained busy preparing
an invasion of Britain, considering operations in Romania
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and the Balkans, observing Italian actions in Africa,
analyzing German interests in northwest Africa, and
designing “amphibian” tanks. In late October 1940, Halder
studied a drive from Bulgaria across the Bosporus Straits to
northern Syria to close the Mediterranean, and as he
worked himself into a “Blitzkrieg mania” he contemplated a
huge operation across three continents against the strategic
route between the Nile and the Euphrates. Intoxicated by
his success, Hitler thought in even grander but not
necessarily clearer terms, dreaming of what Andreas
Hillgruber has called a “world-wide Blitzkrieg.” German
forces would push deep into Asia via Afghanistan to India
and thereby threaten the British Empire. Disconnected
from reality, German strategy, which was more an ad hoc
scheme than a formal Blitzkrieg strategy, remained hastily
conceived and poorly designed.
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Not until January and February 1941 did the
approaching Russian campaign return the dreamers to
solid ground and absorb the efforts of the entire Wehrmacht,
but their attention was again diverted in April and May
1941 when German troops overran Yugoslavia, Greece, and
Crete. Despite these distractions, most German leaders
remained confident of success and agreed with Jodl when he
said on January 18, “[T]he Russian colossus will be proved
to be a pig’s bladder; prick it and it will burst.” Few
German leaders saw any need to doubt Hitler’s comparison
of a campaign against the Soviets to “a child’s game in a
sandbox.”
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Though blind arrogance and poor intelligence explain
much of the Germans’ subsequent failure in the East, many
of the disasters that befell their military forces stem from
their distortions of the 1940 campaign and subsequent
reliance upon those distortions in preparing for the 1941
invasion of the Soviet Union. In one of the greatest ironies of
military history, the Germans fell victim to their own myth,
or perhaps more correctly to their own disinformation
campaign. They came to believe their press releases,
movies, and propaganda, concluding that since they had
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intended to use the Blitzkrieg against the French and had
done so successfully, they could be just as successful against
the Soviets. Recognition of the awesome difficulty of the
task they had willingly accepted, however, came slowly to
the German High Command. Halder recorded in his diary
on July 3, the 12th day of the offensive,
On the whole, then, it may be said even now that the objective to
shatter the bulk of the Russian Army this side of the Dvina and
Dniepr, has been accomplished. . . . It is thus probably no
overstatement to say that the Russian Campaign has been won
in the space of two weeks.96

The “make-believe spectacle,” however, proved impossible
to replicate against the Russians, and the Germans
eventually fell victim to the myth of the Blitzkrieg. Despite
Hitler’s confidence and the German military’s arrogance,
the sand box proved to be an ice box, and the child’s game the
most demanding and self-destructive campaign in
Germany’s history.
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ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE TO AMERICAN AIR
SUPREMACY IN VIETNAM
Donald J. Mrozek

INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States enjoyed an
abundance of power and a broad range of military
capabilities. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. government
sought to use that power asymmetrically, sometimes
substituting technology for manpower, at other times using
its military capabilities to alter the conditions of the war
and the means for its prosecution. Yet it was unable to
achieve a military victory—even a military stalemate—
despite a spectacular application of military force in the
longest war that the United States ever fought. Enjoying
overwhelming superiority in air power against Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese forces, the United States ultimately
proved unable to convert its power into enemy compliance
with its policy.
A key source of frustration throughout the war was the
sense that the enemy was not playing fair, refusing to follow
rules taken for granted among technologically and
organizationally superior states. Guerrilla tactics,
assassination, terrorism—these were methods that
Americans found difficulty in describing as truly “war” at
all. At the same time, to the extent that the North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) seemed to be the more important
enemy force, counterinsurgency seemed a distracting waste
of human and material resources. How could the United
States make its enemy—or, operationally, its enemies—
respond on American terms to asymmetrical applications of
military power? How could the United States be “in the war
but not of it,” forcing the enemy to accede to American will
without adopting the enemy’s way of war?
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In addressing this challenge, we expected air power to
play many important roles—but roles reflecting competing
strategic visions. U.S. officials were quick to agree that air
power should be used in Vietnam to take advantage of an
American strength, but they did not agree on precisely what
“air power” meant or on a theory and strategy for its
employment. Could “air power” address the spectrum of
conflict from guerrilla through conventional action in the
difficult environment of Vietnam? Or was this just the
piecemeal application of specific “air assets” in ways that
diminished true air power? Could asymmetrical use of air
power substitute for unattractive options such as protracted
operations and occupation on the ground? Could
asymmetrical use of air power achieve the goals of policy, or
could it merely achieve specific tasks that, taken together,
offered no guarantee of a larger result? In the end, the
Vietnam War gave Americans dramatic and painful
evidence of the limitations of military power and of the fact
that, in the end, military power is not abstract or generic.
1

ASYMMETRY IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY
EXPERIENCE
Asymmetry in the conception and conduct of American
military affairs dates back at least to the arrival of
European settlers. At Jamestown (1607), transplanted
Englishmen offset their tiny numbers by firing cannon to
“overawe” the local Indians, seeking to turn technological
asymmetry into long-term strategic advantage in a
pre-emptive act of deterrence. In King Philip’s War
(1675-1676), New England colonists revised their way of
war in the midst of the conflict, adopting tactics largely
symmetrical with those of their Indian enemies while newly
espousing systemic attrition and annihilation instead of
mere victory in discrete battles. The Seven Years’ War
(1754-1763), also called the French and Indian War, saw
both symmetry and asymmetry—with Edward Braddock,
his British regulars, and American auxiliaries decimated at
the Battle of the Wilderness by a French and Indian force
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differently composed and uncommitted to the current
customs of warfare in Europe, while on the Plains of
Abraham, late in the war, James Wolfe’s forces battled
those of Louis Joseph, Marquis de Montcalm, with both
combatants operating on essentially the same military
assumptions and conventions. Indeed, colonial American
military experience may be viewed as a dialogue between
those settlers who sought to create an armed force as much
like those of the European powers as possible and other
settlers who came to see irregular forces as having unique
virtues explicitly suited to American circumstances.
This tension continued to characterize American
military affairs after 1789. Throughout the 19th century,
civilian and military leaders of the U.S. armed forces sought
to build military institutions based on European models
that were deemed scientific, intrinsically superior, and
“state of the art” while, often at the same time, conducting
wars in which adversaries did not share the same ideas
about the “conventions of war.” In the First Seminole War
(1816-1818), Andrew Jackson led a campaign into Spanish
Florida, pursuing a generally conventional strategy of
seizing Spanish strong points by generally conventional
means. The causes of the war had to do with African
Americans and Native Americans who were engaged in
irregular fighting, but the larger structure of the conflict
and the military means used for its resolution conformed to
conventional European models. This was possible because,
in the end, it was a conflict between the United States and
Spain rather than a conflict between U.S. regulars and
indigenous insurgents. But in the Second Seminole War
(1835-1842), the U.S. Army faced an elusive enemy that did
not share the commitment to Napoleonic strategy and
tactics displayed by U.S. generals such as Winfield Scott. As
Russell Weigley put it, while “attempting to trap the main
body of hostiles in their lair . . . , [Scott’s] heavy columns of
slow-moving troops and much impedimenta marching
noisily through the Florida hammocks merely served to
scatter the Seminoles, so that Scott’s blows landed in the
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air.” All the more pertinent for its resonance with events
130 years later was the asymmetry of situation, vision, and
valuation of consequences that Weigley summarized this
way:
The standard strategic objectives of European war,
strategically located fortresses, lines of communication, and
political centers, could not be pursued because they did not
exist. For seven years, from 1835 to 1842, one general after
another damaged his military reputation in Florida in the
frustrating pursuit of enemies who seemed solid only when they
were striking out in ambush, but who apparently changed into
ghosts as soon as they were struck in turn.3

In the end, the announced object of the war—removing
all Seminoles from Florida—was not achieved, and what
was eventually achieved came by means that Weigley has
described as “treachery and brutality,” including, for one,
the repudiation of a truce by Brevet Major General Thomas
S. Jesup to take advantage of the ill-gotten opportunity to
capture Seminole Chief Osceola and, for another, the
pursuit of a scorched earth policy of burning Indian villages
and crops. In the end, what allowed U.S. forces to exact some
su b stitu te for the d es i r ed vi c tor y was nei ther
asymmetrically superior numbers, asymmetrically
advanced technology, nor asymmetrically elevated
stra teg y , b u t rather a r ad i c al —and hi ghl y
controversial—resort to methods widely deemed inhumane,
inappropriate to a civilized society, and opposed to core
values of American military professionalism.
Later in the century, American wars often hinged on
asymmetrical advantages that were exploited within
largely symmetrical visions of warfare shared by both sides
to each conflict. In its War with Mexico (1846-1848), the
United States benefitted from an asymmetrical edge in
organizational skills. In the American Civil War
(1861-1865), Union success ultimately depended not on
“decisive victory” in battle between two similarly organized,
similarly manned, and similarly armed forces but on the
adoption of an asymmetrical strategic vision, originally
5
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foreseen by Winfield Scott and eventually executed by
Ulysses Grant and William Sherman, which looked beyond
specific battles to the decisiveness of a grand campaign
mobilizing long-term economic superiority and other
distinctive advantages. In the Spanish-American War
(1898), too, U.S. victory depended on such asymmetrical
advantages as more modern warships and superior training
and élan.
But matters were fundamentally different wherever the
United States faced adversaries who did not share current
conventional thinking as to the character and customs
suitable to warfare in the modern age. Much of the history of
the U.S. Army’s fight with the Indians of the Great Plains
and the West exemplifies this phenomenon. The extension
of military and political dominance over independentminded Native American tribes depended not only on the
superior resource base and technology of the European
Americans. It hinged also on applying to the transMississippi West the Civil War conceptual breakthrough
that Weigley has called a “strategy of annihilation.” This
change facilitated the adoption of an offensive strategy,
enabling the U.S. Army to operate with greater localized
weight and effectiveness. So, then, a mutation in grand
strategic thought in Washington triggered a change in how
the Army operated, with the result that its asymmetrical
technology, training, and other advantages could be
exploited. Even so, full security in what had been the
frontier sometimes came at the price of approximating the
Indians’ own tactics and manner of warfare, as George
Crook did against the Apaches in the 1880s. In such cases,
success required reducing the asymmetry between the
opposing forces and in their manner of operation.
6
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Another case in point was the fight against the Filipino
“insurrectos” led by Emilio Aguinaldo, whom the United
States had brought back from exile in 1898 specifically for
the purpose of conducting an insurgency to subvert Spanish
control of the islands. In the end, only the sanctioning of
techniques that Americans had first dismissed as
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unprofessional and dirty—with guerrilla and counterguerrilla action that became scandalous enough to trigger a
major Congressional investigation—allowed a favorable
compromise that promised, but delayed, Philippine
independence. Still less successful was the U.S. effort
against the Moros on Mindanao, where resistance to
American rule remained vigorous long after it had been
accepted on Luzon. Here U.S. forces fought a frustrating
counterinsurgency for another dozen years, without having
achieved the subjugation of the Moros. Asymmetrical
advantages in weapons helped to limit U.S. casualties and
to protract the American presence but did not suffice to
achieve the real objective. In the end, the Americans settled
for a redeployment that was not officially recognized as
failure.
10

The American military experience is rich in cases where
asymmetry in technology, resources, strategic vision, and
oth er critica lly i mp or tant el ements have been
determinative, whether accounting for victory or defeat. At
the same time, Americans have been slow to treat
asymmetrical conflict as an inevitable fact in the life of the
United States as it moved through expansionism to global
power, instead dismissing it as anomaly and error. The U.S.
achievement and retention of great power status in the 20th
century has obscured the fact that specific military
failures—indeed, defeats—punctuate the national military
record and that ill-appreciated asymmetries go far toward
explaining them.
THE ROOTS OF U.S. MILITARY “UNIVERSALISM”
The belief that, at any given time, there is one right way
to organize an armed force and, basically, one right way to
use it has had persistent appeal throughout most of U.S.
history. On the other hand, Americans have sometimes
found themselves forced to yield to exigent circumstances,
departing from the way deemed right. The desire for the
explanatory simplicity of a “one size fits all” military policy
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has stumbled over the distinctive conditions and different
mentalities encountered in specific conflicts.
Cultural, intellectual, and political history suggests how
this problem emerged and why it has endured. In essence,
the fundamental political institutions of the United States
have been shaped by the ideas and instincts of the
Enlightenment. Central to Enlightenment thought is a
profound universalist bias. The statement that “all men are
created equal” is just one rhetorical example of the belief
that human nature dictates one ideal form of government,
which in turn suggests one ideal way of making war and
securing peace. The Enlightenment spirit, then, is all about
the application of one set of rules and one set of expectations
to all peoples and all situations. At first, Americans
experimented with new organizational models and new
strategic ideas that presumably derived from the
revolutionary implications of democratic politics. The
democratic decentralism of the coastal gunboat system of
Thomas Jefferson and the plan for a militia navy are failed
manifestations of that idea. Eventually, commitment to a
militia sy stem yi el d ed to the i d ea of mi l i tar y
professionalism, but the concept of professional expertise
preserved the illusion that universal principles and criteria
applied to all institutions. The earlier notion of universal
political truths was now linked with that of universal
technical imperatives. In short, the ever more scientific
character of war supposedly canceled out local preferences
and distinctiveness.
A second force—Social Darwinism—imposed a
“dog-eat-dog” competitive dynamic that ultimately exalted
a hierarchy among nations ultimately based on power,
certainly including social and economic power but finally
ensured by physical force. Victory went to the biggest dog
with the sharpest bite, and some breeds were seen as
distinctly better than others. The universalism of the
Enlightenment survived in Social Darwinism, but shorn of
its egalitarian aspirations, and, in place of that, specialized
expertise—and professionalism—became the mark of
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excellence. Bigger was better than smaller, intricacy was
superior to austerity, order was preferable to intuition, and
ardent devotion to authority displaced passionate
commitment to one’s own beliefs. This kind of thinking
carried two prospectively fatal flaws. First, it tended to
obscure the highly specific nature of military power—the
fact that it is not “generic.” Second, it masked the great
capacity for resistance enjoyed by a people inferior in
technology and in many other areas, provided that they
rejected the underlying social theory on which Western
imperial dominance depended.
The modern era, characterized by industrialization, a
global system of nation states, and the predominance of the
Western organizational ethos, has been built on the
assumption that a world order can be created on the basis of
universal principles. It has also been coincident with
“universalist” military thinking. More specifically,
military theories of air power and nuclear warfare after
World War II fostered a taste for escalation so as to deny the
enemy the choice of weapons, a belief that disproportionately great application of force would overwhelm any
enemy, and the conviction that something bad in the
present could be stopped by threatening something worse in
the future. Although the nuclear competition between the
United States and the USSR was following a largely
symmetrical track, this did nothing to undercut the
expectation that asymmetrical use of military power, using
much the same forces in substantially the same ways in just
about any conditions, would deter an enemy and, if applied
too late for deterrence, would make the enemy desist. But
Vietnam-era Americans had difficulty believing that the
“weaker” the enemy as judged by conventional standards,
the harder the challenge of defeating it.
11

EXAMPLES OF 20th-CENTURY INSURGENT
THOUGHT
During the 20th century, nationalist leaders in countries
under foreign imperial control or in colonial status
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developed theories of resistance that recognized the
inferiority of their armed forces and sought ways of
maximizing the impact of whatever powers they did
possess. All these theories ultimately saw time as the great
advantage disproportionately enjoyed by the conventionally
weaker force, largely because of the great costs, both
material and moral, entailed in sustaining a modern
military presence and in seeking to pacify entire
populations. It was not that democracies could not fight long
wars—rather, it was modern industrialized warfare itself
that was seen as carrying the potential for its own
frustration. The longer the war and the wider the
distribution of forces in pursuit of an elusive enemy, the
weaker the modern industrialized force would become and
the more vulnerable it would be to such force as its enemy
possessed.
12

Perhaps the strongest statement of this case was made
by Mao Zedong. Although written from a Chinese
perspective and overtly focused on East Asian conditions,
the military works of Mao created a scenario of
“empowerment” that depended primarily on exploiting
asymmetry in operational assumptions and tactics so that a
seeming weakness would become an unbeatable strength.
Commitment to resist indefinitely coupled with the idea of
“trading space for time” was to exhaust the Japanese by
spreading them too thin, by exposing lines of supply and
commu n ication s, by c r eati ng op p or tuni ti es f or
counterattack first at the guerrilla level but eventually by
conventional means, and by demoralizing the enemy at
home. Mao developed this formula for resistance in
response to the Japanese invasion of eastern China in 1937,
but it was still at work a quarter century later in Vietnam.
13

At the same time, insurgent forces recognized that a
conventionally superior opposing force could be made to act
in ways that entailed great political costs for the
government it served. In the pacifist vision of Gandhi, for
example, non-violent civil disobedience might be met by
violent action on the part of the conventionally armed force,
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but this would cause a transforming revulsion among the
conventionals at the violence they were inflicting on a
peaceful, though non-compliant, population. In The
Wretched of the Earth (1965), Frantz Fanon took a less
promising view of human nature but still saw the escalation
of violence by one’s enemy as advantageous. The more
violently a government could be made to act against an
insurgent element, the more the government’s legitimacy
would be compromised.
14
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Theories such as these clearly put priority on political
conditions over military ones. The lens of politics
determines how military action is understood. In this sense,
military action itself does not produce political change,
although it may produce conditions and opportunities in
which political change can be enforced. Earlier American
experience, as already noted, had given evidence of this
relationship and had revealed both the strengths and the
limits of an asymmetrical dynamic. For example, there was
a great difference between the dynamic of the so-called
insurrectos of the Philippines and that of the Moros, the
former of which were ultimately brought to accede to
long-term U.S. authority over the Philippines and the latter
of whom never really were. To the extent that U.S. forces
were effective, especially with the Moros, it was because
they adapted substantially to the “way of war” of their
enemy. Exclusive reliance of the Americans on the
asymmetrically superior organization, weaponry, and other
assets could not have yielded such broad objectives as
enduring pacification. Even with Aguinaldo and his
followers, moreover, it was a framework of U.S. political
concession to the Filipinos that allowed for a cessation of
hostilities.
Theories of insurgent resistance, in which local
conditions predominate and in which one’s own seeming
weaknesses are to be converted into strengths, conflicted
sharply with the modernist ideas of air power theorists
whose vision of future wars was focused on large scale and
high technology. Concepts such as pinpoint strategic
16
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bombing of vital elements of an enemy’s industrial
infrastructure made sense in an environment where
symmetry of strategic aspiration prevailed even in the face
of asymmetry in resources and their development. But could
such action change the will of the enemy—especially the
will of a technologically less sophisticated country? What if
the enemy had already psychologically written off the assets
threatened by air attack? Was it the threat of air attack that
was expected to produce the political change, or was it that
direct material effects of air attacks were expected to so
greatly change material conditions as to force a different
political result regardless of the enemy’s intentions?
One of the great ironies in the American effort to use air
power to oppose insurgency in Vietnam is the extent to
which it corresponded to guerrilla theorists’ predictions of
what would occur. As with Mao, so with Ho Chi Minh and Vo
Ngyuen Giap, the presumptive unpopularity of the
purposes of the adversary—whether Japan, France, or the
United States—would leave it with only material
advantages to exploit. Strategic, political, and moral force
rooted in local conditions would remain the strength of the
resistance. Even allowing for the quasi-religious appeal to
asceticism and service that characterizes Che Guevara’s
writings, for example, the faith in the political commitment
of local groups was not mere romanticism. The fundamental
presupposition was the universal validity of dialectical
materialism playing itself out through time in undeniable
“objective conditions”—a distinctly modernist and
universalist vision. In this sense, it is precisely the
modernist, universalist pretension of communism that
ensured its unsuitability to a host of contexts upon which it
was imposed and, in retrospect, that now seems to have
ensured its ultimate failure on the world scene, even though
it served nationalist purposes in several local settings. At
the same time, however, the modernist, universalist
impulse in the American experience fostered a belief in the
generic quality of military force—for example, that more is
apt to be better and that successive advances in weapons
18
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would allow those employing them to address not only the
greatest military challenges but the great array of lesser
military problems as well. In essence, a sufficient
qualitative advance as embodied in an advanced weapon
system would obviate qualitative differentiation of military
problems at lesser levels.
CONCEPTUAL ASYMMETRIES AND VIETNAM
In retrospect, the most radical asymmetries of all in the
decades after World War II were those related to “subjective
conditions” rather than “objective” ones. The myth of
modernist “scientific” uniformity in the Soviet Union itself
and in the communist bloc in Eastern Europe was shown
false as soon as the authoritarian elite lost its grip.
Nationalist passions of a most unscientific sort—left
unattended for decades and, in some instances, for
generations—not only accelerated the collapse of the old
Soviet system but, after its collapse, continued to complicate
security planning in such places as the former Yugoslavia.
But these same nationalist passions had driven
developments in Southeast Asia after World War II. The
great difference, easier to see several decades after the fact,
was the comparative autonomy of communist nationalisms
in Asia, especially when judged against the authoritarian
oppression of Stalinism in Eastern Europe.
18

A second conceptual asymmetry pertained to the
meaning given to escalation and de-escalation—or, more
generally, to tempo and intensity. Intentionally or not, most
U.S. leaders came to see the movement to higher levels of
escalation as enhancing the possibility of decisive outcome,
as if a higher level of warfare, once reached, could not be
abandoned by a combatant without fatal damage to the
capacity to resist. Only a few Americans theorized—as Walt
Rostow did as early as 1961—that the fighting in Southeast
Asia might never be formally called off but merely subside to
comparative insignificance. By contrast, typical of U.S.
leaders, General Westmoreland saw the movement from
20
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guerrilla action to mobile warfare in 1964 as “the beginning
of the final phase of the war.” This conventional thinking
conflicted completely with what Mao, Giap, and others had
always allowed—namely, that the manner and intensity of
warfare did not need to go steadily upward for the
insurgency to succeed. A downturn in intensity, or a return
to guerrilla action after a period of mobile warfare, could
also be a legitimate step toward final victory. As long as the
political base—the “sea of the people” in which Mao’s
guerrilla “fish” swam—remained secure, the war could go
on without end. This conceptual asymmetry goes far to
explain why U.S. officials could have hoped for so much from
air power and why, in the end, it could have produced so
much less than had been expected.
21

The dynamics in the use of air power in Vietnam also
owed much to prevailing views of what strategic armaments
had accomplished in the global confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Presumably, the
credible threat to use U.S. strategic nuclear forces in
massive retaliation had deterred the Soviet Union from
expansionist adventurism. A well calibrated threat had
presumably changed their minds. If so, then why couldn’t
the threat of retaliation—not nuclear but disproportionately great compared to the actions of the enemy—
change the minds of North Vietnamese leaders? Part of the
problem was that the Vietnam War was, in a sense, not one
war but several successive and overlapping wars—
internally inconsistent and asymmetrical, the balance of its
elements changing over time. In the early 1960s, for
example, both civilian and military leaders in the United
States widely recognized the insurgency in southern
Vietnam as indigenous, even if they were also keenly aware
of Hanoi’s supporting and coordinating role. In this more
complicated version of the war, calculating the political
results of military action was essentially a matter of
perspective. Specific symmetrical battles in which the Viet
Cong and NVA were technically defeated still contributed to
strategic victory because, even when battles themselves
22
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were fought in a largely symmetrical manner, they served
asymmetrical strategies so that a string of “defeats” really
constituted a victory in the making.
23

In reality, the imposition of a nuclear bipolar model onto
regional conflict was inappropriate to the situation. In the
g loba l con fron ta ti on, the op p os i ng f or c es wer e
symmetrically structured, broadly speaking, and strategic
operational expectations were largely the same. But in
Southeast Asia, this was not the case. Forces were
asymmetrically composed and, more important, guided by
asymmetrical strategic rationales. Holding Soviet assets as
“hostage” to Soviet good behavior was echoed in holding
valuable North Vietnamese targets in reserve as “hostage”
to anticipated changes in Hanoi’s war policy. But this
ignored the fundamental differences in strategy between
Moscow and Hanoi as well as between Hanoi and
Washington.
Another line of thought concerning Vietnam is that
much of its baseline asymmetry was illusory and, bluntly
put, that it would have been better to treat the Vietnam War
more like the Korean War. In his influential study On
Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (1981) , Colonel
Harry G. Summers, Jr., criticized U.S. leaders of the
Vietnam era, alleging that they had directed too much
attention to counterinsurgency and had credited insurgents
in the south with too much autonomy. Viet Cong action was
a sideshow or even a deception, with U.S. leaders taken in
by it. Yet many key figures, such as Walt Rostow,
emphasized the link between Hanoi and the Viet Cong from
the start. What changed was not the perception of ties
between the Viet Cong and Hanoi but the results expected
from the use of American air power and other assets. They
were first intended as a statement of U.S. determination
and as a “message” that Hanoi should change its policy, and
then increasingly were meant to interdict the flow of
supplies regardless of enemy intentions. Viewed from
another vantage, what precluded an approach in Vietnam
more like the one taken in Korea was the weakness of the
24
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Saigon regime. Arguably, there was much success in
developing the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN)—but much less in forging an effective and unifying
political force in the south. In fact, it is arguable that the
piecemeal U.S. escalation in the early- through mid-1960s
conformed more to political deterioration in the south than
to military adventurism in the north. If the United States
was not its own worst enemy in this matter, perhaps its ally
was.
ASYMMETRICAL USES OF AIR POWER26
Among the most salient characteristics of the Vietnam
War was that the United States enjoyed air control over
South Vietnam and air superiority throughout Southeast
Asia during the entirety of the conflict. One can only
imagine the excuses for the failure of the American venture
that might have been offered if air operations, especially
over the South, had been seriously contested and impeded.
One essential fact, then, is that the United States pursued
this war while enjoying what has been perceived as a huge
asymmetrical advantage—air superiority and, in some
times and places, even clear air control. Enemy
anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles were
serious problems, to be sure, but the pre-eminence of U.S.
air power in the region created a special context that
encouraged its asymmetrical use. Let us discuss four of
these asymmetrical uses: aerial firepower, site defense
(gravitating to interdiction), interdiction (gravitating to
“sending messages”), and air mobility.
27

Aerial Firepower.
The asymmetrical advantage in air power possessed by
U.S. forces allowed President Johnson and General
Westmoreland to rely on aerial firepower in defense of the
U.S. Marine base at Khe Sanh in 1968. Indeed, without air
power, the decision to establish the base, let alone to defend
it, would have been militarily questionable and politically
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implausible. Nor was defense of this specific location the
main point. Westmoreland’s purpose at Khe Sanh was to
draw the interest of the enemy and to do what he had
wanted to do all along—in Bernard C. Nalty’s words, “to
engage the enemy so that America’s awesome firepower
(everything from M-16 rifles to B-52 bombers) could be
brought to bear. His objective was not to capture a hill or
ridge line, but to destroy enemy soldiers and hostile units.”
Like the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the Americans at
Khe Sanh in 1968 were luring the enemy with the hope of a
dramatic victory, thereby trying to bring them to battle on
terms that would best exploit the technological and other
advantages held by U.S. forces. Unlike the French, who had
just 200 planes per day on which to rely in the best of
circumstances, the Americans “could draw upon a
Southeast Asian armada of 2,000 planes and 3,300
helicopters.”
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According to General Westmoreland, the purpose of
massed aerial firepower was to guarantee “our ability to
preempt or blunt . . . a concerted attack.” In 1967, when the
enemy was besieging Con Thien, tactical aircraft and B-52s
had been brought to bear in close coordination with naval
gunfire and artillery. The great volume of fire and its
withering effect on the enemy convinced Westmoreland
that “massed firepower was in itself sufficient to force a
besieging enemy to desist, a demonstration that was
destined to contribute to my confidence on a later occasion”
(Westmoreland’s emphasis). Westmoreland expected the
encounter at Khe Sanh to claim large numbers of North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong and to cost few U.S. and South
Vietnamese men. He later claimed that loss were 8 to 1 in
favor of the United States and South Vietnam. Senator J.
Strom Thurmond expressed the view that 75 percent of the
Viet Cong killed in the war had fallen to artillery fire and air
assaults, including bombs dropped from B-52s. To
Thurmond as to Westmoreland, aerial firepower
contributed to the safety of U.S. fighting men on the
ground. Between mid-January and late March 1968, the
30
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contribution at Khe Sanh included some 10,000 Air Force
fighter strikes, more than 5,000 Navy and 7,000 Marine
strikes, and more than 2,500 B-52 strikes—upwards of
24,500 in all. Cells of three B-52s left their bases on Guam
and in Thailand every three hours, putting B-52s over Khe
Sanh every hour and a half. Arc Light, Mini-Arc Light, and
Micro-Arc Light strikes were designed to meet different
target demands and time constraints, with Mini-Arc Lights
taking roughly 45 minutes to plan and execute and
Micro-Arc Lights merely 10 minutes. Finally, the siege was
broken, and the enemy disengaged. U.S. officers claimed a
great success, General Westmoreland calling the whole
enterprise “an awesome display of firepower . . . one of the
heaviest and most concentrated in the history of warfare.”
Historians Peter B. Mersky and Norman Polmar suggest
that the B-52 Arc Light strikes were ultimately the single
most critical element in the firepower delivered, concluding
that they “finally evidently broke the enemy’s resistance.”
34
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But just what was the accomplishment? To be sure, air
crews had performed brilliantly, and, even allowing for
overlapping air control systems and other problems, there
was cause for pride in the support given to the men at Khe
Sanh. Indeed, the resistance was “broken” if resistance
meant the coordinated siege of Khe Sanh itself. But the
enemy was by no means finished. In discussing Khe Sanh
and other aspects of the Vietnam War, military officers
often described the same event as both offensive and
defensive. For example, they talked of the “defense” of Khe
Sanh, the “siege” of Khe Sanh, and the “relief” of Khe Sanh.
Such terms suggested that the North Vietnamese had the
initiative. But Westmoreland wanted to call it an “offensive
in place,” asserting that the United States was winning a
genuine victory by grinding down enemy forces with
firepower. The common understanding of an “offensive” as
incorporating positive geographical movement was being
challenged by the belief that air assets could conduct an
“offensive” in one place. It is important to note that this
interpretation of Khe Sanh and air power’s role in its
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defense permitted General Westmoreland to maintain his
understanding of the Vietnam War substantially intact.
Whether this result was a positive one is open to dispute.
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General Westmoreland’s optimism might well have been
tempered by events at the special forces camp at Kham Duc
in April and May 1968, where North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong were active building roads and other infrastructure of
precisely the sort that an American presence in the region
was intended to prevent. One after another, Kham Duc’s
seven outlying posts were attacked, falling to enemy assault
despite the use of U.S. aerial firepower. B-52 attacks failed
to stop the enemy, and resupply of Kham Duc quickly
became problematic. The evacuation of Kham Duc
prevented a massacre, preserving the cherished notion that
the Americans never lost a battle to the North Vietnamese
and the Viet Cong. But it also made quite clear that air
power was no cure-all. The Tet Offensive was put down, Khe
Sanh was relieved, and Kham Duc was evacuated—but
where was the plan for victory? Where was the U.S.
offensive? Was the offensive “in place” anywhere but in the
hopes and the imagination of U.S. leaders?
From Site Defense to Interdiction.
The case of fixed-wing gunships provides an example of
innovative application of asymmetrical force in tactical
situations that improved the chances for successful
operation on the ground, but it also illustrates how
application of this same asymmetrical element for quite
different purposes could produce ambiguous or even
negative results. The idea of using relatively slow
fixed-wing aircraft with side-mounted guns to provide
aerial fire support for support of ground forces was proposed
to the Tactical Air Command (TAC) in 1961. Basically, it
orig in ated among i nd i vi d ual s c onc er ned wi th
counterinsurgency, then moving through experimentation
and testing as through a thicket of bureaucratic indifference
and suspicion in a process historian Jack S. Ballard has
38
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called “crablike.” Against opposition views that the C-47
gunship (later AC-47) was too vulnerable, TAC was charged
with using the gunships in combat, notably in support of the
counterinsurgency effort.
39

The special effectiveness of the gunships in night
operations made them popular with the units they
supported. According to Air Force Captain Ronald W. Terry,
a strong advocate of fixed-wing gunships, operations to
defend forts and hamlets at night were so successful that
this became “the only thing we ever got to do.” On
December 23, 1964, for example, a gunship on airborne alert
was sent toward Thanh Yend, which was under heavy Viet
Cong attack, while another was sent to aid Trung Hung. In
the latter case, defenders attested that the Viet Cong broke
off the attack as soon as the gunship opened fire. Hope rose
that areas designated as safe by the Saigon government
might actually become so. Operations at Ngai Giao on
December 28, 1964, and in the Bong Son area on February 8,
1965, gave further evidence that gunships might be
changing the balance on the ground. At Bong Son, some
20,500 rounds were fired and about 300 Viet Cong were
killed. Now convinced of the value of the gunships, the Air
Force determined to send a squadron of gunships to
Vietnam on a permanent basis with deployment to be
completed by November. Seventh Air Force’s Operations
Order 411-65 specified the mission: “to respond with flares
and firepower in support of hamlets under night attack,
supplement strike aircraft in defense of friendly forces, and
provide long endurance escort for convoys.”
40

Despite this early success with gunships in support of
ground combat, however, attention soon shifted to using
them to interdict Viet Cong supply, particularly if the
gunships’ night capabilities could be enhanced. It was
estimated that 80 percent of Viet Cong supplies were moved
at night. But the changes made to the gunships with this
important problem in mind turned the gunship program
from site and convoy defense, where it seemed to be
working, to interdiction, where it was unproven. Air Force
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officers who had opposed the gunship program because of
the operational limitations of the AC-47 now sought to
enhance or replace it, either with the AC-119 favored by
Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown or with the AC-130
advocated by the Air Staff. The Air Staff wanted AC-130s
deployed in Southeast Asia for around-the-clock
interdiction of enemy supply routes through Laos.
Secretary Brown regarded the AC-119 as useful for “more
localized support and [a] protective role” and the AC-130 as
serving “the predominantly search-and-destroy concept.”
Nonetheless, by 1969-1970, evaluators from U.S. Air Force,
Pacific rated the AC-119 as effective because “it was capable
of destroying trucks and attacking targets as assigned,”
while noting that the AC-130 had always had as its primary
mission “night interdiction and armed reconnaissance to
destroy wheeled and tracked vehicular traffic on roads and
sampans on waterways.”
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The movement toward interdiction became an
irrepressible theme in gunship operations. Ironically,
however, the impact of gunships diverted from interdiction
to their original purpose was clear at the end of the 1960s,
even as doubts about the overall effectiveness of gunships in
the interdiction effort rose sharply. On August 23, 1968, for
example, a Civilian Irregular Defense (CIDG) and Military
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) compound at Duc
Lap in Quang Duc province was convincingly supported.
The withdrawal from Ngoc Tavak, a forward outpost of the
Kham Duc base, depended on AC-47 Spooky gunships,
recalling their earlier principal purpose. Yet another case
occurred in mid-1969 when AC-130s were diverted from
Commando Hunt interdiction action and AC-47 were
shifted from operations in South Vietnam to counter North
Vietnamese and Pathet Lao attacks on Lima Site bases used
by friendly forces in northern Laos. Both ground and air
observers credited the gunships with going far to frustrate
the attackers, but it was hard to quantify. Yet, in the end, it
was also shown that interdiction, too, was hard to quantify
with any accuracy. In April 1971, the Air Staff told Air Force
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commanders in Southeast Asia that there was concern over
the accuracy of bomb damage assessment (BDA):
Seventh Air Force is really concerned about the validity of the
BDA reported by the AC-130 gunships in their truck-killing
operations. They stated all aircraft BDA for this hunting
season indicates over 20,000 trucks destroyed or damaged to
date, and if intelligence figures are correct, North Vietnam
should be out of rolling stock. The trucks continue to roll
however.

In May 1971, Seventh Air Force Commander General
Lucius D. Clay, Jr., had tests run at Tan Son Nhut Air Base
which showed that a direct hit from an AC-130 had left one
truck immediately operable with several others needing
only limited repair. What had started out as a program
with clearly beneficial consequences was turned into one
with results that were limited, ambiguous, and misleading.
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Interdiction and “Sending Messages.”
The effort to interdict supplies going from North
Vietnam to support the war south of the demilitarized zone
(DMZ) became caught in the toils of concern over showing
American resolve. A salient case was the effort to destroy
the Thanh Hoa and Paul Doumer bridges, the later on the
outskirts of Hanoi and the former some 70 miles to the
south. Although General Westmoreland believed air power
would have been better used “by supporting ARVN
operations and by hitting the enemy’s infiltration route
through Laos,” the task of interdiction near the source
went forward. But difficulties abounded, and benefits were
suspect. Early on, when the Thanh Hoa Bridge was weakly
defended, an F-100 flak suppressor and an RF-101 were lost
in the first attack, three F-105s in the second, and one F-105
in the third (all being Air Force missions). By May 1966,
defenses at the bridge had hardened with more SAM sites
and more frequent MiG activity in the area. On May 31, a
C-130 departed from its base never to be seen again and one
F-4 aircraft was lost. The longer the bridge remained
47
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undestroyed, the more it came to symbolize the limits of
U.S. capabilities—and so, too, the more its destruction
became more a psychological than a military matter. The
destruction of the bridges became necessary to meet several
different concerns—showing American resolve, “sending
messages” to the government in Hanoi and its operatives,
and defending a self-image of competence within the U.S.
military. But what message was really sent? Was it that
technology can eventually be brought to bear to solve all
problems, or that the United States might be counted on to
complete tasks at costs too high for their value? The risk was
that “victory” would be Pyrrhic.
But the results of interdiction even where General
Westmoreland thought it should be attempted were also
disputed. Brigadier General Soutchay Vongsavanh of the
Royal Laotian Army, writing in 1981, concluded that
“despite the full weight of American bombing operations, Ho
Chi Minh Trail truck traffic increased day by day and the
NVA continued to improve the road network, keeping
passages open and making roads suitable for high-speed
traffic.” The Sihanouk Trail through Cambodia was
improved at the same time. On top of this, the U.S. air effort
pu sh ed th e comm uni s ts f ar ther i nto Cambod i a,
accelerating its political destabilization and, in essence,
spreading insurgents rather than containing and
destroying them.
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As with other aspects of the war, the completion of a task
testified only to the efficiency of service personnel—not to
the effectiveness of the completed task. Were there times
when it would have been preferable for America’s “can do”
military to have taken a “won’t try” stance?
Airmobility.
Even some tasks that could clearly be accomplished did
not have equally clear beneficial consequence. Some
distinguished Americans sought relief from the war’s
frustrations by seeking to change the Army to a significant
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degree. General James A. Van Fleet, for example, called for
greater airlift capability, “compensating for lack of numbers
and firepower through increased mobility and concentrated
shock action.” In essence, Van Fleet wanted to rely more on
large special forces units.
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But others were less sanguine. General Robert R.
Williams later reflected: “I guess it’s really a question of the
American way of fighting.” Williams recalled evidence that
overflights by helicopters were no counter to Viet Cong
presence in villages. Even if one drove the Viet Cong away
with air power, how long would they stay away unless men
on the ground forced them? “You have to fight it down in the
muck and the mud at night, and on a day-to-day basis,”
General Williams said. “That’s not the American way and
you are not going to get the American soldier to fight that
way.” For observers such as General Williams, reliance on
technology was “the best way to go, short of reversion to
true, massive, dirty, low-down guerrilla warfare.” Were
the conditions of the war itself, then, the primary
determinant of the approach to be taken to tactics,
technology, and strategy? Or was it the American
temperament?
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CONCLUSION
Although willing to accept the occasional tactical gain,
all the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong really needed to
accomplish while U.S. forces remained in Vietnam was to
avoid catastrophic loss while ensuring political instability
throughout the south. By contrast, the United States and its
South Vietnamese allies needed an affirmative victory that
would produce lasting change on the ground, replacing
conflict and terror with a cooperative political and social
order. The political weaknesses of the Saigon government
added to the Johnson Administration’s sense of crisis in
1964 and 1965. But, as CIA Director John McCone told
President Lyndon Johnson, it might well be a problem with
no solution. On April 2, 1965, he wrote to the President:
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I have reported that the strikes to date have not caused a change
in the North Vietnamese policy of directing Viet Cong
insurgency, infiltrating cadres and supplying material. If
anything, the strikes to date have hardened their attitude.
With the passage of each day and week we can expect increasing
pressure to stop the bombing will come from various elements of
the American public, from the press, the United Nations and
world opinion. Therefore time will run against us in this
operation and I think the North Vietnamese are counting on
this.
What we are doing is starting on a track which involves ground
operations which in all probability will have limited
effectiveness against guerrillas, although admittedly will
restrain some Viet Cong advances. However, we can expect
requirements for an ever-increasing commitment of U.S.
personnel without materially improving the chances of victory.
In effect, we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the
jungle in a military effort that we cannot win and from which we
will have extreme difficulty extracting ourselves.

The asymmetrical “superiorities” of the American side
actually carried with them certain enlarged vulnerabilities,
and not the least of these was the chance of becoming
“trapped by success.” The ability to carry out tasks eclipsed
the difficulty in demonstrating their worth. Unwilling to
lose an ally, even an admittedly weak one, the U.S.
government took increasing control of a war it could not win,
using its asymmetrical air power edge in ways that delayed
but did not change the final outcome.
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PART II: THREATS
INTRODUCTION
Lloyd J. Matthews

With the historical context thus established, we turn to
Part II, dealing with various asymmetric military threats to
the United States posited for the period out to the Army
After Next. Perhaps the most unsettling of the six
presentations is the apocalyptic vision of Mr. Robert D.
Steele as portrayed in “Takedown: Targets, Tools, and
Technocracy” (including a complementary piece
“Information Peacekeeping: The Purest Form of War”).
The gravamen of Steele’s case is that the United States is
susceptible to being “taken down” owing to its naked
vulnerability in four categories: physical, cybernetic, data,
and mind-set. Our technological apparatus has far
outstripped our ability to secure it, while government and
public complacency is endemic. Just as disconcerting, the
details of America’s vulnerability are available to all
national enemies through open-source intelligence.
Another complicating factor is that the matrix of
in forma tion wa rfar e i n the U ni ted States—our
“information commons,” as Steele calls it—lies in the civil
sector and is thus outside the Defense Department’s
traditional sphere of resource mobilization and control.
T h e solu tion ac c or d i ng to Steel e l i es i n new
appropriations of $2 billion a year—half for electronic
security and counterintelligence, half for creating a virtual
intelligence community able to execute information
peacekeeping operations. As described in detail in his
second paper, information peacekeeping is “the active
exploitation of information and information technology so
as to achieve national policy objectives.” It is based on the
revolutionary premise that intelligence can be a virtual
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substitute for such modalities as violence, capital, labor,
time, and space.
From the heady realm of virtual reality, we enter the
more prosaic but no less problematic world of terrorism as
treated in Professor Stephen Sloan’s “Terrorism and
Asymmetry.” Political terrorism, almost always an
asymmetric form of armed conflict, has been defined in
many ways, but all definitions include these two elements:
(1) the threat or use of violence against a small number of
immediate victims, and (2) having the purpose of coercing a
larger target group through fear to accede to the political
demands of the perpetrators. Against a nominally
impregnable superpower like the United States, terrorism
will always be the option of first resort for small desperately
aggrieved groups that otherwise remain powerless and
impotent. Noteworthily, possibilities of “virtual terrorism”
now coming into view ally well with certain forms of
information warfare to which, as we saw in Mr. Steele’s
presentations, the United States is becoming increasingly
vulnerable.
In his cinematically imagined scenario “FiveDimensional Warfare: Can It Defeat the Army After Next?”
(not included in this volume, but published as a separate
U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
monograph, dated March 10, 1998), Dr. Robert J. Bunker
synthesizes several elements of the likely threat
environment over the next 25-plus years to conjure a
plausibly competitive opponent of the U.S. BlueFor. This
opponent, christened BlackFor, employs a so-called
five-dimensional approach (land, sea, aerospace, temporal,
and cyber) designed to exploit BlueFor weaknesses as seen
emerging from the Army After Next, while exploiting
BlackFor’s own significant technological capabilities.
Black, born in the growing failed-state environment of
the future where political power has shifted from legitimate
states to mongrel political-criminal entities, is defined
territorially by heavily urbanized coastal zones that cross
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national boundaries and contain sprawling, densely
populated slums. BlackFor is manned by members of the
new warrior class. It is augmented by mercenaries,
specializes in terror, and flouts such effeminacies as laws of
war, rules of engagement, and public opinion.
Doctrinally and in certain technological niches such as
advanced nonlethal weapons and robotics, BlackFor aims to
overleap BlueFor exponentially, putting itself on a more
than equal footing. Conceptual innovations deriving from
five-dimensional battlespace, though smacking of Star
Wars and Star Trek, are soundly based. For example,
spatial expansion can occur through stealth-masking; a
BlackFor soldier in civilian garb standing next to a BlueFor
soldier is effectively a 1000 miles away. Spatial contraction
effectively occurs, for example, when a BlackFor
speed-of-light laser beam disables a BlueFor tank at long
range in an instant.
The non-linear concepts and technologies that underlie
BlackFor are the source of its asymmetric advantage. They
may outstrip by a quantum leap the U.S. Army’s present
linear extrapolations into the future based upon soon-to-be
outmoded Newtonian and Clausewitzian modes of thinking.
If the present institutional mind-set is not overcome,
according to Dr. Bunker, “it will potentially set up the Army
After Next and the American public for a strategic defeat
many magnitudes greater than anything ever before
experienced in our nation’s history.”
In “Metaphors and Modern Threats: Biological,
Computer, and Cognitive Viruses,” Mr. Edmund M. Glabus
employs the virus metaphor as a heuristic device for
shedding light on three asymmetric threats to U.S. national
secu rity th at m i ght other wi s e be d i f f i c ul t to
visualize—biological warfare, computer network attack,
and memetic warfare. In some forms of biological warfare, of
course, viruses might be used literally as the agent of
attack, but the metaphor of the spreading virus as deadly
contagion is ideal for imaging forth all agents of biological
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attack, the bacteria anthrax and botulism toxin being prime
examples.
The metaphor of attacking computer systems through
the introduction of software “viruses” is now fairly
well-understood by an increasingly computer-literate
American public, many of whom have confronted this
exasperating phenomenon directly on their personal
computers at home or work. Mr. Glabus, however, extends
the metaphor to include the “infectious” and far more
serious activities of hackers, who gain unauthorized access
to computer networks to alter or extract information or to
introduce viruses. Thus virus becomes a metaphor for cyber
attacks in general, covering the entire range of potential
attacks on America’s computers and computer networks
and systems.
Memetic warfare is the least understood and perhaps
most problematic of the threats treated by Mr. Glabus.
Conceptually, it lends itself well to elucidation through the
viral metaphor. Think first of traditional psychological
warfare, whereby the perceptions of the U.S. political
leadership, populace, or military are manipulated
purposefully by the enemy in ways that threaten our
security. Now think of a certain subset of psychological
warfare, a particularly insidious one in which the harmful
perceptions are self-replicating. Copies (“memes”) of the
harmful perceptions are passed from one mind to another in
a continuing process, so that eventually the entire group
psyche is “infected.” Soldiers in combat talk to one another,
and when a bad idea is lodged in the mind of a few by a clever
enough enemy—the nirvana of surrender and quick
passage home?—the idea might multiply quickly through
an army.
Though we cannot know now the extent to which
memetic techniques will prove to be effective additions to
the practice of psychological warfare over the next 25 years,
certainly, as Mr. Glabus demonstrates, we must be alert to
the developing threat. To enemies who cannot match us on
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the conventional battlefields of land, sea, and aerospace, the
battlefield of the psyche will be a tempting alternative. For
such enemies, one good bad idea could well be worth a
thousand bombs.
From asymmetrics of technology, wealth, doctrine,
information, and organization—all group traits attributed
generally to larger populations—Ralph Peters, in “Our New
Old Enemies,” descends to the level of individual
asymmetry: how will our soldier sons and daughters differ
from the new warriors that inhabit the enemy’s ranks
tomorrow? This is not an inconsequential question, for all
serious study of war leads to the inescapable conclusion that
the ultimate discriminator between contending forces is the
character of the individual soldier.
In his sermon on the human heart, Ralph Peters
explores to a level that makes us squirm the essential
nature of Homo sapiens. He finds, like the author of Genesis,
that man is fallen, that his essential nature is emblematized
by the “massacre, genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape, plunder,
kidnapping, assassination, ineradicable hatred, and
endless warfare” that are chronicled in the Old Testament
and indeed throughout secular history.
Our warrior enemies of the future—once the hopeless,
the dispossessed, the alienated, now the fanatic, the zealot,
the true believer with nothing to lose and all to gain—are
the perfect embodiment of all the evil potential that lies at
the heart of man. Our sons and daughters, fallen and
imperfect like all humans but ameliorated by the balm of
Western humanism, will be sent out to fight the legions of
darkness. If in the name of human goodness we tie their
hands unnecessarily, we risk tipping the asymmetries in
favor of the enemy. In Ralph Peters’ relentlessly honest
vision, our sons and daughters “will still win when allowed
to do so. But more of them will suffer and die for lowered
returns because of our stubborn unwillingness to face the
complexity of mankind.”
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The conference presentation by Dr. Steven Metz titled
“Trans-National Threats” (not included in the present
volume) addresses the general category of potential danger
to U.S. security posed by enemies unaffiliated with or not
confined within particular states. Glancing back to
America’s vulnerability on the cyber front as portrayed by
Robert Steele, to certain forms of international terrorism as
treated by Stephen Sloan, and to Robert Bunker’s concept of
coh eren t
a rmies
ar i si ng
f r om
p ar ti c ul ar
cultural-geographic breeding grounds lying athwart
established national boundaries, Dr. Metz focuses on an
increasingly important slice of the total threat
spectrum—transnational enemies.
Such enemies—diverse blends of political, ideological,
ethnic, and religious groups, as well as criminal
networks—would wage indirect warfare, often contracting
out the technical dirty work, with the aims of weakening
A merica ’s socia l f abr i c and d i sr up ti ng i ts
security-information infrastructure. Such means of conflict,
so fundamentally different from traditional state-on-state
warfare under the Westphalian system, will require
profound adjustments in U.S. security philosophy.
Those who scoff at the threat of future transnational
warfare might want to ponder the great interest shown in
Unabomber Ted Kaczynski’s anti-industrial manifesto,
recently displayed on the Internet. Anarchists,
antitechnologists, radical environmentalists, and other
primitives were drawn to it as a bee to honey (Scientific
American, April 1998).
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TAKEDOWN:
TARGETS, TOOLS, AND TECHNOCRACY
Robert D. Steele

ABSTRACT
This paper is a “primer” which attempts to place
national security and national intelligence in a larger
context, one which must be understood if America is to
survive and prosper at the dawn of the 21st Century. The
targets are too numerous to discuss in detail, but they can be
grouped into four large categories: physical, cybernetic,
data, and mind-set. The tools are also too numerous to
discuss in detail—tools as elementary as paperclips and
pick-axes can inflict grave damage on very complex and
inherently fragile systems. Of gravest concern in
considering the tools available to wreak havoc on our
national infrastructure is the simple fact that we remain
our own worst enemy—we actively open the door to insider
abuse, out-sourced code, and naked data. Our technocracy
and its culture will continue to impede change. If we are to
succeed in the future at our given task of defending the
Nation against all enemies, “domestic and foreign,” then we
must redefine national security and national intelligence to
focus on data and knowledge and national intelligence writ
small but wide. We must fund, from within the existing
budget of the Department of Defense, both the $1 billion a
year for electronic security and counterintelligence oriented
toward our true center of gravity, the private sector; and we
must at the same time ask of the Department of Defense a
matching amount, an additional $1 billion a year. This
latter amount is needed to fund an extended “Virtual
Intelligence Community” which comprises a new “order of
battle” able to execute “Information Peacekeeping”
operations at home and abroad, in order to deter and resolve
conflict at the local, state, national, and regional levels.
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INTRODUCTION
This is not a technical paper—there are many of those,
each delving into the minutia of taking down power,
financial, transportation, or general communications
systems. Instead, this paper seeks to provide a general
overview of target categories and potentially catastrophic
outcomes; a review of the range of tools by which these
targets can be taken down; and a brief discussion of the
technocracy and its culture which perpetuate our
vulnerability to cybernetic melt-down. All this, however, is
but a preamble to a larger discussion of national security
and national information strategy.
1

In particular, the paper explores a redefinition of
national security and national power. Our information
“order of battle,” and in particular our ability to protect and
harness data in the private sector, and our ability to
continue to exploit data across human generations, must be
recognized as the most critical factors contributing to
national security and national competitiveness. The
brittleness of our existing complex systems, with multiple
embedded points of failure, is the lesser vulnerability. The
large vulnerability is at the data and knowledge level.
Under these circumstances, “continuity of operations” takes
on a whole new meaning, and indeed merits the scale of
funding that once characterized the same term during the
Cold War. In brief, we need to worry less about deliberate
externally-sourced attacks, and much more about inherent
embedded cancers of our own making. This paper reviews
targets, tools, and technocracy in that larger context.
Let’s begin with the following observation from a
knowledgeable observer:
As far as vulnerability in the medium term goes, it looks to me
like American digital tech is taking itself down via its severe and
accelerating self-obsolescence problems. The brittleness, like
the underlying tech, is autocatalytic. The Y2K problem is a
wholesome first sniff of the carnage to come. No enemy made all
the early NASA satellite data now unreadable. We did. It’s one
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of those Pogo moments. This in no way depreciates the
external threat, just adds another—temporal—dimension.2

Our nation is strong, and many rural areas can survive a
meltdown, but most urban areas will not degrade
gracefully. They will “crash,” and in their crashing we will
see tolls of dead and wounded greater than we suffered
during the Vietnam war. We have to ask ourselves: are the
right people in charge of national security? do we really
understand the threat? do we have what it takes to change?
As we consider the targets and tools that can be used to
effect a “takedown of America, we must do so in the context
of a refreshed understanding of what constitutes “national
security.” In this regard, note Figure 1.
3

WAR
LONG TIME

THERE

HERE

SHORT TIME
PEACE
Figure 1. Redefining National Security.
This paper will not focus on the Information Warfare or
Information Peacekeeping elements illustrated in the
figure. Instead, it will focus on the fact that the President’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP)
report of October 1997, while successful in beltway terms,
did not provide a credible and comprehensive threat and
vulnerability assessment, a list of specific problems,
statistics, and detailed case studies, and a coherent plan for
4
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5

constructive change. As Winn Schwartau has put it, we had
the wrong people asking the wrong questions, and now we
have the wrong people in charge of securing our home
front—and with no real authority or money to spend. Also
in the classified arena, the same has been said of the
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the subject of U.S.
vulnerabilities to information warfare attacks—with the
passing comment having also been made that the author of
that NIE did not know who to talk to outside of a few beltway
bandits. In Virginia, a well-conceived plan by a Navy
admiral to sharpen his information warfare capabilities by
conducting a vulnerability assessment of all systems in the
state of Virginia, was set aside for fear of public reactions.
The bottom line: we still don’t know how vulnerable we are,
and we have no idea how to go about the long-term process of
creating self-healing systems rather than—as Stewart
Brand aptly labels them—“self-obsoleting systems.”
6

7

The “pyramid of vulnerability” for developed nations,
and most especially for the United States —which owns,
uses, and is severely dependent on the bulk of the
communications and computing resources of the world—is
illustrated in Figure 2.

INTEL
COMMUNITY

FINANCIAL DATA
LOGISTICS DATA
CIVIL INFRASTRUCTURE
MILITARY ACHILLES’ HEELS
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Figure 2. Pyramid of Vulnerability.
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This pyramid of vulnerability seeks to distinguish
between four distinct kinds of vulnerability:
1. The vulnerability of major physical infrastructure
elements, such as:

•

Bridges, levees, and dams—such as the 2800 readily
mapped for the public of which 200 or so are of
strategic consequence in isolation
8

•

Canals—such as the Panama Canal, with very
vulnerable locks

•

Pipelines—such as the Alaska Pipeline

•

Critical railway switching points.

2. The vulnerability of obvious military Achilles’ heels,
as well as obvious civilian infrastructure, such as:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and
aerial tankers (anti-tank missiles, or plastique on
landing gear—tend to be concentrated in one place)
Submarine communications antennas (e.g.,
Annapolis golf course)
Charleston channel (major sealift departure area)
Civilian power and communications nodes supporting
command centers and key facilities (Falcon AFB
Study, Kansas City payroll)
Major power grid nodes (both transfer and
generation)
Major telecommunications nodes, including
microwave towers.

3. The vulnerability of core data streams vital to national
security and national competitiveness, such as:
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•

Historical, environmental, and other critical planning
data

•

Civilian fuel stock data

•

Military logistics stock data

•
•
•

Transportation status data (induce rail crashes,
cripple airports)
Financial accounts data (incapacitate procurement,
induce panic, impose costs of alternative accounting)
Financial transfers data (corrupt transfers, place
international and regional transfers into grid-lock,
induce panic).

4. The vulnerability of our Intelligence Community (IC)
to both external attacks against its systems as well as its
perceptions, and internally-perpetuated misperceptions
and gaps in understanding, such as:

•

Attacks against down-links (Area 58, NSA, CIA,
Suitland, Bolling)

•

Attacks against Joint Intelligence Centers

•

Internal lack of global geo-spatial data

•

Internal lack of integrated analysis model

•
•

Internal lack of foreign language and foreign area
expertise
Internal lack of access to international experts and
open sources.

In summary, this rough depiction seeks to drive home
the point that a “takedown” of America is not simply a
matter of electronic attacks against electronic systems, but
rather a much more comprehensive range and scale of
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vulnerability which encompasses everything from key
geo-physical nodes to our intelligence mind-sets, and which
can be attacked with a range of tools that includes: pick-axes
and chain saws against selected cables; anti-tank missiles
against AWACS and aerial refuelers and satellite dishes;
18-wheeler trucks with and without explosives against
specific transformers or other key nodes; electrical attacks;
and, finally—the area least considered today—data and
mind-set attacks and self-generated vulnerabilities.
“Top Ten” lists cannot possibly capture the full extent of
the nation’s vulnerability, but they are a helpful means of
highlighting the diversity and the imminence of our
vulnerability. They can help accelerate constructive
change.
TAKEDOWN: TARGETS AND TOOLS
John Perry Barlow, lyricist for the Grateful Dead and
co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, once said
that “the Internet interprets censorship as an outage, and
routes around it.” Exactly the same can be said for any
strategy that seeks to “harden” or protect specific nodes.
Like Internet censorship, it simply will not be effective.
9

We are at a point in time where, as Steward Brand has
noted, the Year 2000 problem is but “a wholesome first sniff
of the carnage to come.” Our system of systems is internally
vulnerable from the first line of code on up, and externally
vulnerable at every single switching point that relies on
either software or electronic transfer. Figure 3 illustrates
this larger discussion.
On the left of the figure, we have a column of possible
targets, ranging from the process-oriented (secret
decisions), down through data links and data stocks, into
computers and power stations, and finally to larger physical
infrastructure features which can be attacked by physical
and electronic means. On the right we have a column of
attack categories ranging from the mundane hand-held
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instrument, passing through foreign code embedded in
major U.S. systems, and culminating in the inherent
weaknesses of our national electronic engineering training
and our existing decision mind-sets.
HUMAN DECISIONS
IC DOWNLINKS
FEDERAL RESERVE
FUEL STOCK DATA
DATA COMPUTERS
POWER TRANSFORMERS
CULPEPPER SWITCH
CINCINNATI RAIL YARDS
ALASKA PIPELINE
BRIDGES, LEVEES, DAMS

EXISTING MIND-SETS
EXISTING EE SKILLS
CALCUTTA CODE
PAID INSIDERS
ANGRY INSIDERS
INFO-MAURADERS
RANDOM VIRUSES
18-WHEELERS
PICK-AXES/BACK-HOES
MOTHER NATURE

Figure 3. Targets and Tools
for Taking Down America.
Representative Targets.
Bridges, Levees and Dams. In the United States, the
Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, natural wonders in their
own right, are also natural obstacles of monumental
proportions. There are exactly six mainstream railway
bridges across these great rivers, across which the vast
majority of U.S. grains must go from the plains to the East
Coast cities, and the vast majority of manufactured goods
must in return go from the Northeast and the South. As the
natural flooding in 1993 demonstrated, when these
bridges are closed, whether by accident or intent, there are
severe repercussions for trade, and especially for the
stockage of food and fuel. Recent breaks in levees in the
South have demonstrated our vulnerability to the
assumption that man can contain nature without regard to
human attack. This bears emphasis: all insurance and risk
calculations today assume natural causes of disaster. There
are no calculations for risk and damage associated with
deliberate human attack of any normal civil structure.
Dams, in contrast, present computer controlled physical
10
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infrastructures which can be taken over either to release
flood waters, or to avoid the release of flood waters with the
intent of weakening if not destroying the dam.
Alaska Pipeline. This pipeline, going across vast
stretches of unoccupied territory, carries 10 percent of the
domestic oil for the United States.
11

Cincinnati Rail Yards. As of 3 years ago, and very likely
still today, the entire East-West railway architecture
depended on exactly one major turnstile for redirecting
railcars. It is located in the Three Rivers area, and
represents a significant vulnerability.
12

Culpepper Switch. A lucrative target, this simply
represents the kind of critical communications node (voice
and data, especially financial and logistics data) that can be
attacked in both physical and electronic ways. The Internet
has various equivalent nodes, two of which merit special
attention—MAYEAST and MAYWEST. Taking out
MAYEAST disconnects the U.S. government from the rest
of the Internet world, and not incidentally does terrible
things to all of the Wall Street capitalists who are
“tunneling” their Intranets across the larger Internet.
Power Generators. Power generators and the grids they
support can be browned out, burned out, and confused.
Altering the computer readings can cause them to draw
more power than they can handle, or less power than they
need. Burning out the generators or melting core lines
creates the interesting challenge of replacement in the
absence of mainstream power. There are exactly 18 main
power transformers that tie together the entire U.S. grid,
and we have only one—perhaps two—generators in storage.
Interestingly, all of these come from Germany, where there
is a 6- to 18-months waiting period for filling orders—
assuming the German generators have not been burned out
at the same time by someone attacking the Western powers
in a transatlantic cyber-war.
13
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Data Computers. Any computer holding large quantities
of critical data, especially parts inventories and data
associated with either the transfer of funds or the
operational effectiveness of critical equipment, is
vulnerable to data distortion—this is a far more insidious
and dangerous problem than the more obvious denial and
destruction attacks.
Fuel Stock Data. Fuel stock data are isolated because of
their implications in terms of overloading large tanks, with
the fire storm hazards of large spillage, or of failing to
channel fuels because of false readings.
Federal Reserve. Until a couple of years ago there were
12 regional computing centers, one for each of the Federal
Reserve regions. Then we went to a single national system
with a single hot back-up computing system, and an
additional cold back-up alternative.
IC Downlinks. Past surveys have focused on buildings,
but the more capable attackers will focus on downlinks. All
of the main satellite downlinks—for NSA, CIA, Area 58, key
other government departments, are out in public sight and
reachable with a hand-held anti-tank missile fired from
outside the fence line.
Human Decisions. “We have met the enemy, and he is
us.” This often quoted line from Pogo is complemented by
another observation, this one anonymous, to wit, “A nation’s
best defense is an educated citizenry.” This “target” is listed
to bring out both a vulnerability and an opportunity for
“hardening” our national defense. Just as “commander’s
intent” is used in planning for complex operations where
communications may be lost, it is essential that there be a
larger national decision-making architecture in which there
are few secrets and the public is fully engaged. In this way,
when disasters do happen and many communications
channels do break down, the public will be less likely to
panic and more likely to use common sense and good will to
see the crisis through. A thorough public understanding of
our vulnerabilities and our plans for dealing with those
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vulnerabilities is essential to our progress. This “target” is
also intended to make the point that the weakest link in all
systems is not the system itself, but the humans associated
with the system.
Representative Tools.
Pick-Axes and Back-Hoes. Paperclips have burned out
strategic warning computers. Pick-axes can cut critical
cables in strange places that are difficult to discover.
Back-hoes easily take out cables—perhaps the most
famous, popularized by Winn Schwartau, is the back-hoe
that took out Newark Airport’s primary communications
and air traffic control and also—right there running
alongside it, the “redundant” cable intended to serve as a
back-up for the primary cable. Across America, at every
cable crossing, we post large signs saying in essence, “Cut
Here.”
Eighteen Wheelers. Eighteen wheelers, whether or not
loaded with explosives, are a useful intellectual construct.
Any critical node should be subject to the 18-wheeler test—
what will happen if an 18-wheeler crashes through at full
weight and speed at any one of various points; or
alternatively, what will happen if an 18-wheeler “melts
down” at a specific point and needs to be taken apart or lifted
out piece by piece?
Random Viruses. The recent spate of Windows-NT
melt-downs is simply another step down the path started by
the Robert Morris virus a decade ago. This situation needs
to be taken very seriously because many of the viruses are
encased in shrink-wrapped hardware and software coming
directly from the production facilities. Until software is
self-healing (and code is encrypted at levels above what is
presently available), this will continue to be a serious
vulnerability. All of the problem tool areas discussed below
will exacerbate this situation.
14

127

Info-Marauders. As has been noted by one prominent
wag in this area, “hacker tools are now in the hands of idiots
and criminals.” A single individual, empowered by
hacking software freely available on the Internet, is now
able to cause the kind of damage to corporate and national
systems that was previously in the province only of Great
Nations. Disgruntled, dishonest, crazy, and zealot
individuals and gangs are now is a position to damage data,
deny access, and extort funds from hapless system owners
who did not realize that they were buying into a “naked
Emperor” environment.
15

Angry Insiders. The losses to external penetrations and
externally sourced viruses are much over-rated. As Dr. Mich
Kabay, Director of Education for the International
Computer Security Association (ICSA), has noted in his
seminal work on computer losses, the largest losses after
fire and water problems are caused by insiders—dishonest
or paid insiders (roughly 10 percent) and angry insiders
seeking revenge (roughly 9 percent). These are people with
authorized access who are able to do unauthorized things
that are not detected because the systems are all designed
under the assumption that insiders can be controlled
through a few simple (and often very poorly administered)
control measures.
16

Paid Insiders. Paid insiders can be simply dishonest
employees who seek to exploit access for financial gain, or
insiders who have been recruited by outsiders for a price.
There are also former insiders who return to their place of
employment (e.g., selected Wall Street firms with marginal
physical access controls and worse computer access
controls) to take internal actions that are not authorized
a n d for wh ich author i zed ac c es s has exp i r ed
administratively but not technically.
Calcutta Code. Also called Moscow code, this refers to
computer code written by the legions of off-shore coding
houses. Computer code in the United States is notorious for
its lack of documentation, with the result that older systems
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tend to have millions and millions of lines of code that are
completely incomprehensible even to the most skilled
examiner, and replete with patches from a variety of
sources, all also undocumented. As the Year 2000 problem
takes on greater urgency, many organizations are being
forced to provide intimate access to their code for legions of
external programmers, generally without any assurance at
all as to their criminal and psychological history, and also
without any ability to audit their access or their code.
17

Existing EE Skills. Our electrical engineering education
is abysmal, despite the wealth of opportunity in the field
and the shortage of skilled professionals. For reasons that
escape the author, the electrical engineering discipline
decided to completely ignore electronic security and
counterintelligence issues after the demise of the
mainframe (and even those standards were mediocre).
Entire complex systems have been built from the ground up
without any embedded security at all. In fact, some systems
require or choose to turn off those rare security features
provided in some software and hardware. Until national
legislation establishes “due diligence” standards for the
protection of intellectual property, communications, and
computing products and services, this severe and pervasive
vulnerability will prevent any substantial success in
hardening individual targets or constraining the utility of
other attack tools.
Existing Mind-Sets. Winn Schwartau, author of
Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway,18 deserves full credit for bringing this situation before
the public. Without his efforts, it is highly unlikely that the
PCCIP would have been created. Its report has many flaws
and oversights, to include a lack of understanding of the
valid and useful perspectives of international authorities as
well as the hacker underground, but it is a good start and we
are in agreement on one important fact: $1 billion a year is
needed to create a survivable electronic environment. This
is the amount the author proposed in 1994 in testimony to
the National Information Infrastructure working group.
19

129

Unfortunately, the U.S. government continues to drag its
feet in bringing order and security to cyberspace. This has
been cited by many in the private sector as the reason they
continue to ignore computer security issues.
20.

TECHNOCRACY
This brings us to the technocracy. Figure 4 is an
authoritative depiction of the sources of damage to
computer systems and data. Although the originator, Dr.
Mich Kabay, likes to use the words “rough guesses” with
this chart, it is as authoritative as any major study
anywhere, and should be carefully considered in that light.
Fire
Errors and
Omissions

Water

Dishonest
Insiders
Disgruntled
Insiders
Outsiders
Viruses

Figure 4. Estimated Sources of Damage to
Computer Systems and Data.
The bottom line here is that fully 70 percent of our losses
can be attributed to poor design—poor data entry and data
management programs that induce major errors and
omissions (and that cannot audit or flag possible errors and
omissions in passing) and poor system design and system
back-up practices that permit fire and water to wreak
irreversible damage to important data. Only the last 30
percent have anything to do with humans. Insiders do
roughly 20 percent of the damages. Roughly 5 percent of the
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remaining damages are done by outsiders, and a final 5
percent by viruses from various sources.
In the immortal words of Robert Stratton, one of the
most capable of international hackers (and one of the few
never to be indicted or considered for indictment), “If houses
were built like computers, the first woodpecker to come
along would bring down civilization.”
21

The technocracy—the culture of technocracy—is the
major impediment to change today, and we now know that
all the money in the world is not going to heal our rapidly
atrophying system of systems unless we first come to grips
with the intellectual cancer that permeates this element of
our society—which is at once so very important, but also so
very dangerously vulnerable.
Among the sins of the technocracy are the following:
1. Blind faith in technology
2. No legal liability for failure (by permission of
Congress)
3. No requirement for inherent security at the code and
data level
4. No requirement for data integrity and survivability
5. Marginal adherence to existing back-up and access
control standards
6. Elitist (largely ignorant) attitude about cryptography
and privacy
7. History of ignoring detailed warnings
8. Recent record of lip service and tail chasing.
The point is that both the people and their government
must accept responsibility for designing and protecting the
future system of systems upon which every aspect of
national security and national competitiveness must
depend. It is we as individuals, willing to accept
self-obsoleting technology with built-in hazards to our data,
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who have permitted this gross externally imposed
diseconomy to persist, and it is we the people—not the
profit-tak in g b el tway band i t c r eator s of thes e
systems—who will ultimately pay the final price for failure:
individual poverty, scattered catastrophe, and national
weakness.
The PCCIP was at once a small sign of hope and a large
symbol of despair. It did not talk to any of the serious
professionals outside the beltway, and even more so, outside
the nation, professionals who actually know in detail the
vulnerabilities and solutions the Commission was supposed
to address. The PCCIP also neglected to provide the public
and the private sector with an authoritative unclassified
work that addresses the critical issues of data integrity,
data privacy, and the use of unencumbered encryption in
order to secure electronic commerce. No doubt the PCCIP
marched to its secret drummer and gave its masters exactly
what they wanted—unfortunately, it did not give the nation
what it needed, and we are left—as we were left in the
aftermath of the Report of the Commission on the Roles and
C apab ilities of the Uni ted States Intel l i genc e
Community—with no clear-cut direction, no one clearly in
charge, and no basis on which to mobilize the private sector
as the first line of national defense against cyber-attack and
self-destructive electronic systems.
CIVIL CENTER OF GRAVITY
Apart from the failings of the technocracy, there is
another element that makes it difficult for America to
secure her computing foundation from attack— the fact that
the vast bulk of the critical data and the critical electronic
pathways and storage facilities are all in the private sector.
It is literally impossible for the government to control and
protect the most vital targets in traditional ways, nor is it
even possible for the government to regulate this arena in
detail. This is why the PCCIP—for all of its good
intentions—must be regarded as a distraction if not a
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failure. It did not address the threat or the solution in terms
that could be executed by the ultimate responsible party,
the private sector and the public.
Every aspect of Information Operations—from offensive
in forma tion war f ar e to p r oac ti ve Inf or mati on
Peacekeeping; from electronic security and counterintelligence to protect intellectual property on the home
front to education as the foundation for a truly “national”
intelligence community—the “center of gravity” is solidly
within the “information commons” defined and dominated
by the private sector. In this regard, see Figure 5. The
Department of Defense cannot defend this critical
terrain—nor should it—using traditional methods.
Private Sector!
22

Information
Warfare

Information
Peacekeeping

Open Source
Intelligence
Figure 5. Civil Sector Center of Gravity.
In contemplating the takedown of America, and in
considering a few representative targets and tools as well as
the technocracy that spawned our pervasive national
vulnerability to information apocalypse, we are forced to
acknowledge that America has passed from one world to the
next—from the physical world to the virtual world—and
this requires that America’s concepts of national defense
and government operations all be subject to sharp and
urgent redefinition.
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VIRTUAL INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION
PEACKEEPING
Several points regarding these two topics are worth
highlighting:
1. Roughly 80 percent of what we need to know to defend
the nation is in the private sector, presently outside of
federal control. Roughly 95 percent of what we need to know
to assure national competitiveness is in the private sector,
again beyond federal control.
2. The greatest obstacle our government faces today in
assuring national security and national competitiveness—
the cause of causes for conflict and economic loss—is the
growing gap between those with power and those with
knowledge.
3. Our concept of information operations must—
absolutely must—come to grips with this reality.
Information warfare and electronic security and
counterintelligence are anemic if not counterproductive
endeavors if they are taking place in isolation from this
larger construct.
4. In order to be effective in the 21st century, especially
during the first half of the century when we continue to live
in the largest of glass houses and our enemies—be they
individuals, gangs, corporations, or states—have the most
rocks, we must adopt three concepts as fundamental to our
national security:
a. National intelligence must evolve rapidly to become
the core of a larger “virtual intelligence community” in
which we are able to fully harness and exploit private sector
data from multi-lingual sources.
b. Electronic security and counterintelligence must
become pervasive; this is possible only if we release the
private sector from artificial constraints on encryption, and
if we return to our democratic foundation, the respect for

134

personal privacy. We cannot regulate this arena; we can
only nurture this fundamental national security principle.
c. Information peacekeeping must become our first
line of defense in dealing with enemies both domestic and
foreign. This will require new concepts and doctrines, a
completely new order of battle, new relations between
elements of the government and between the government
and the private sector, and—most importantly—a
completely new attitude about how to deal with such
problems and threats.
5. All of the above—the full integration of a national
electronic security and counterintelligence capability which
protects and harnesses down to the data and code level—
requires a national information strategy and a
reconstruction of the administrative, legal, financial, and
operational relationships among civilian, military, and law
enforcement elements of government. Once we have our
own act together, then we can contemplate setting
standards and requesting collaboration in kind from other
states.
CONCLUSION
We are at war today. It is a total war, yet we have failed
to mobilize the nation, and we have therefore left ourselves
without sanctuary, without a defendable rear area, and
without any plan for recovering from the catastrophic
consequences that can be brought about so very easily by
individuals, gangs, or other nations who choose to hurt us
where we are least able to respond.
Everything we are doing today, from the PCCIP to the
Information Operations activity at Fort Meade to the
billions of dollars being spent on the current and planned
force structure, ignores the reality that pioneers Alvin
Toffler, Martin Libicki, and Winn Schwartau have been
trying to articulate. It is out of touch with the reality that
Eric Bloodaxe, Emmanuel, Phiber Optic, Dark Angel, Andy
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Mu eller-Mag u h n and other s have been ac ti vel y
demonstrating. It is out of touch with the efforts of Marc
Rotenberg, David Banisar, and others associated with
responsible computing. Sadly, it is also out of touch with the
American people and with the global community that
actively seeks open intellectual engagement with
responsible electronic security.
Today, the United States is again an unbalanced giant,
again a paper tiger, again at the mercy of forces it does not
understand and is not willing to engage in unconventional
ways. We have seen the enemy, and he is us (Figure 6).

USA
C31
Virtual
Hammer

Figure 6. We Have Seen the Enemy, and He Is Us.
There is, however, good news. The price tag for all of this
is authoritatively estimated at $2 billion a year (half for
electronic security and counterintelligence, half for creating
the virtual intelligence community able to execute
information peacekeeping operations). This is a price that
DoD can afford to pay, and a price that—if paid by DoD—
will permit us to reinvent the concept of national defense,
deter cyber-war, and surprise friends and enemies alike
with our ability to adapt to the chaotic environment we have
ourselves created. DoD can solve this problem, but only if it
pays up, and lets go.
23.
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8. Establish a C4 Security Testing and Certification Program
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9. Establish an Electronic Security and Counterintelligence Division (in FBI)
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50,000,000

11. Reorient Military C4 Toward Open Systems

100,000,000

12. Establish a Joint Military IW Research
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13. Influence Civilian Information Technology
Research (re embedded security)

100,000,000

See concluding section of speech in Montreal, note 4. In 1997 the author
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to meet DoD and USG needs; $250 million to meet NATO/Partner for
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“Intelligence and Counterintelligence: Proposed Program for the 21st
Century,” OSS White Paper, April 14, 1997, at http://www.oss.net/
oss21>.
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INFORMATION PEACKEEPING:
THE PUREST FORM OF WAR*
Robert D. Steele

Information Peacekeeping is one of two neglected
aspects of Information Operations, a new concept that up to
this point has focused almost exclusively on Information
Warfare, and avoided dealing with the substance of
All-Source Intelligence, or the proactive possibilities of
Information Peacekeeping. Information Peacekeeping is
the active exploitation of information and information
technology so as to achieve national policy objectives. The
three elements of Information Peacekeeping, in order of
priority, are open source intelligence; information
technology; and electronic security and counterintelligence.
Information Peacekeeping is the strategic deterrent as well
as the tactical force of first resort for the 21st century.
Virtual Intelligence, a supporting concept, is the foundation
for informed policy-making, judicious acquisition
management, effective contingency planning and
execution, and timely public consensus-building. By its
nature, Information Peacekeeping must rely almost
exclusively on open sources and services available from the
private sector; this requires the crafting of a new doctrine of
national intelligence that places the critical classified
contributions of the traditional national intelligence
communities within the context of a larger global
information community. Information Peacekeeping is the
purest form of war, but most traditional warriors will be
reluctant to accept its most fundamental premise: that
intelligence is indeed a virtual substitute for violence, for
capital, for labor, for time, and for space. Information
Peacekeeping is in effect both a strategy for government
operations and a national security strategy with global
* In Alan Campen and Douglas Dearth, CYBERWAR 2.0: Myths,
Mysteries, and Realities, AFCEA Press, June 1998, pp. 277-293.
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reach; consequently it has profound implications for how we
train, equip, and organize our government and our military.
Introduction: Intelligence as Munition.
Time and time again, the U.S. defense and intelligence
communities rush to spend billions on technology, while
routinely ignoring the challenges and opportunities
inherent in human collection, open-source collection,
foreign area expertise, and human all-source analysis. We
do it in mobility systems, in weapons systems, in
command-and-control systems and in intelligence systems.
Sadly, leaders in all corners of the Department of Defense
(DoD), at all levels, continue to abdicate their responsibility
for thinking at the strategic, operational, tactical and
technical levels, and have surrendered their forces to the
mindless flow of self-generated bits and bytes.
1

2

A majority of the U.S. military leadership still does not
“get it.” The Revolution in Military Affairs is a joke. It is
nothing more than lip service, substituting astronomically
expensive systems with no sensor-to-shooter guidance nor
any relevance to three of the four warrior classes, for
outrageously expensive systems with no sensor-to-shooter
guidance and dated relevance to one of the four warrior
classes. The three warrior classes we must confront in this
new era are: the low-tech brutes (transnational criminals,
narco-traffickers, terrorists); the low-tech seers (ideological,
religious, and ethnic groups unable to accept conventional
relations among nations); and high-tech seers (a
combination of information terrorists or vandals, and
practitioners of economic espionage). Most of our training,
equipment, and operational doctrine are completely
unsuited to meeting the threat from these three warrior
classes. Perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that our
national “order of battle” must now fully integrate our
government civilian agencies and our private sector
information reserves, but we have no one in a leadership
3
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position who is willing or able to deal with this harsh and
urgent reality.
The real revolution is being led by a few original thinkers
who have yet to be heard on Capitol Hill and whose thoughts
are a decade from effecting fruitful changes in how we train,
equip, and organize our nation for war. Alvin and Heidi
Toffler were among the first to articulate the fact that
information is a substitute for wealth and violence, for
capital, labor, time, and space. Pilots and ship drivers may
never forgive Martin Libicki for reframing their platforms
as delivery vehicles for intelligence-driven operations.
Winn Schwartau overcame his Hollywood and rock-and-roll
past ultimately to inspire a Presidential Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection. Colonel James Clark
blew past the naysayers, with support from the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Air Force to bring EAGLE VISION in as an
operationally effective means of putting real-time
commercial imagery into tactical service—something the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) refused to
contemplate and still resist at every level.
4

5

6

7

8

Information Peacekeeping, the subject of this paper, is
the purest form of war. It shapes the battlefield, it shapes
the belligerents, and it shapes the bystanders in such a way
as to defeat the enemy without battle—in such a way as to
achieve U.S. policy objectives without confrontation and
without bloodshed. Sun Tzu would approve.
9

At the strategic level Information Operations (Figure 7)
must be seen as a triangle in which all-source intelligence,
information warfare, and information peacekeeping are
seamlessly integrated and inherent in all aspects of military
and civilian operations. Perhaps the most important aspect
of information operations in the 21st century is that it is not
inherently military; instead, civilian practitioners must
acquire a military understanding and military discipline in
the practice of information operations, if they are to be
effective.
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All-Source Intelligence
(Spies, Satellites, and Secrets)

INFORMATION
OPERATIONS
Information
Warfare

Information
Peacekeeping

Figure 7. Strategic View of Information Operations.
Information Operations tend to be viewed as a strategic
form of Information Warfare, but this is a much too narrow
view which deprives the policymaker, acquisition manager,
and commander of two-thirds of the “firepower” represented
by a more accurate and well-rounded understanding of
Information Operations.
All-Source Intelligence is the critical classified element
of Information Operations which assures all parties being
supported that they are receiving essential indications and
warning intelligence, current intelligence, and estimative
intelligence, to name just a few kinds of all-source
intelligence.
Information Peacekeeping is the active exploitation of
information and information technology so as to achieve
national policy objectives. The three elements of Information
Peacekeeping, in order of priority, are: open-source
intelligence; information technology; and electronic security
and counterintelligence.
Information Peacekeeping is a strategic deterrent that
radically increases the ability of the practicing nation to
avoid or resolve conflict in relation to all four warrior classes
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and across the complete spectrum of government operations—not only military but diplomatic, commercial,
agricultural, etc.
All three aspects of Information Operations—the
obvious one of Information Warfare and the two less obvious
aspects of All-Source Intelligence and Information
Peacekeeping—share one critical component: open-source
intelligence (Figure 8). No aspect of Information Operations
can be conducted effectively without full access to a
cooperative private sector that controls the vast majority of
national knowledge resources—the “information
Once thought of in this light, it becomes
commons.”
evident that the center-of-gravity for Information
Operations is in the civil sector—the private sector.
10

Interestingly, this perspective also makes it clear that
the importance as well as the presence of secrecy declines
dramatically as one moves from the left “warfare” side of the
equation to the right “peacekeeping” side of the equation. In
fact, fully 80 percent of the intelligence “solution” comes

Private Sector!

Information
Warfare

Information
Peacekeeping

Information
Warfare

Figure 8. The Center of Gravity for Information
Operations.
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from open rather than classified sources, and it is
incumbent on the consumers of intelligence—not the
producers—to harness these open sources.
11

Consumer Communities: Getting Back to Basics.
For those tempted to question the substantial
depreciation in the value of secrecy, a glimpse into the
cognitive battlefield—the mind of a typical consumer—is
instructive (Figure 9). The four consumer communities—
the policymakers, the acquisition managers; the
commanders and their staffs; and the public—each require
tailored intelligence which is largely unclassified in nature,
collected and delivered in very short time-cycles, and often
most valued when it is least cumbersome (i.e., concise and to
the point). The public must be treated as a real-time
partner to decision making in foreign and defense policy.
The policymaker needs, and must use, tailored open-source
intelligence products to ensure that the public is informed

Cognitive Battlefield:
Influences Upon the Combatant
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Citizens
Pollsters
Individuals
Media
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Radio/TV
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Messages
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POLICY
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Family & Friends
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Authors
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Figure 9. Understanding the Cognitive
Battlefield.12
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enough about a situation to support administration
decisions both during and after the fact.
This boils down to two major facts in the world of
Information Operations:
1. Ninety percent of the information reaching a typical
consumer—at whatever level—is unclassified and
unanalyzed; and
2. Neither the consumer nor the producer of intelligence
h as y et dev eloped a c ap abi l i ty f or d i sc over i ng,
discriminating, distilling, and digesting intelligence within
this overwhelming information environment replete with
multiple sources of conflicting information.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Information
Operations is the defensive aspect. Our highest priority,
one we must undertake before attempting to influence
others, is that of putting our own information commons in
order. We must be able to assist and support our consumers
with knowledge management concepts, doctrine, and
capabilities, such that they can “make sense” of the
information chaos surrounding them. This is perhaps most
vital within the policy-making community.
Accepting the larger definition of Information
Operations proposed in this paper, there are distinct
benefits for each major constituency group:

•

•

Policymakers will have significantly improved
intelligence that fully appreciates cultural, economic
and regional nuances not well covered by classified
sources, and will have open-source intelligence
products that can be readily shared with both home
and host-country counterparts, press, and public.
Acquisition Managers will be able to obtain
strategic generalizations that accurately evaluate the
threat in their respective mission areas at each level
of analysis, while also establishing regional
generalizations upon which to make sounder
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decisions about logistics and C4I supportability as
well as countermeasure requirements.

•

•

Commanders and Staffs will have access to
unclassified open-source intelligence, including
commercial imagery, that are essential to begin the
con tin g en cy p l anni ng p r oc ess, to exec ute
humanitarian assistance operations, to guide
classified collection management, and to place
classified reporting in context. Open source
intelligence will provide cover for communicating
critical battlefield information to coalition and
civilian partners including non-governmental
organizations, and in general will provide for the
common view of the battlefield or issue area essential
to complex command and control. As will be noted in
the section on global geospatial shortfalls, for this
constituency group the most vital benefit is the ability
of commercial imagery to address the 90% of the
requirements for image maps that have not been met
and will never be met by classified sources.
Publics will have access to relatively straightforward
and reliable explanations of foreign and domestic
conditions and perceptions that are causing
policymakers to take action, or requiring the
acquisition of certain capabilities, or requiring the
preparation of forces for employment. In the world of
global information, the first three constituencies
cannot rely on the media to do an accurate job of
reporting; the public must receive a level of
“intelligence support” which heretofore has not been
necessary but which is now vital to the smooth
transition from peace to war, or vital to reasonable
popular understanding of particular crisis response
options.
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Net Assessments: An Operational View
of Knowledge.
The acquisition community has a different sort of
problem: the absence of an effective model for providing
sophisticated threat assessments in relation to both the
levels of analysis and the real-world conditions under which
the systems are to be used.
Absent such a model, our intelligence analysts have no
alternative but to continue doing what they do today:
concluding that every threat is a “worst case” threat to be
evaluated strictly on the basis of its maximum technical
leth a lity , wh ile avoi d i ng c omi ng to gr i p s wi th
generalizations about the environment which should, but
do not, influence acquisition decisions.
13

In fact, the threat changes in relation to both the level of
analysis and the geographic-civil context within which
friendly and enemy military capabilities are deployed
(Figure 10). We will focus only on the first aspect here.
Taking Libyan tanks in 1990 as an example:
STRATEGIC
Integrated
Application
OPERATIONAL
Selection of
Time and Place
TACTICAL
Application of
Finite Resources
TECHNICAL
Isolated
Capabilities

Military Sustainability
Geographic Location
Civil Allies

Over time and space
Channels & Borders
Of strategic value

Military Availability
Quantities & Distribution
Internally available for use
Geographic Resources
Volatility of sectors
Civil Stability
Military Reliability
Training & Maintenance
Mobility Implications
Geographic Terrain
Cohesion & Effectiveness
Civil Psychology
Military Lethality
Military Systems One by One
Climate Manipulation
Geographic Atmosphere
Civil Power, Transport,
Civil Infrastructure
Communications,
& Finance

Figure 10. Net Assessment and Open Source
Intelligence.
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•

•

•
•

At the technical level (lethality), since they are the
best tanks that Soviet money can buy (at the time, the
T-72), they must be evaluated as a very high threat.
This is where existing practices start and stop.
At the tactical level (reliability), once one appreciates
the lack of training for the crews, the long-term
storage of many of the tanks in the open, and the
cannibalization of some tanks to keep others
operational, the threat drops to low.
At the operational level (availability), given the
number of tanks scattered around, the threat rises to
medium.
At the strategic level (sustainability), the threat drops
again to low for obvious reasons associated with both
command and control and logistics supportability
deficiencies.

The United States cannot pretend to have a viable
Information Operations doctrine so long as this travesty of
analytical impoverishment is allowed to continue. There is
not a single intelligence report in existence today (nor
available from the past) which reflects this level of
sophistication and distinction, and that is something that
must change soon. We continue to design and acquire
systems in isolation from the real-world threat and the
real-world environment in which they are to be employed.
This robs the nation of scarce resources which could be
applied much more effectively in other pursuits, including
the pursuit of Information Peacekeeping Operations.
There is one other major deficiency in U.S. intelligence
doctrine: its rather naïve focus on just three major areas of
interest: the traditional two areas of political-military
intelligence and scientific and technical intelligence; and
the more recently activated area of economic intelligence.
Despite the good efforts of some leaders in the past, notably
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the United States
14
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continues to give short shrift to the critical intelligence
challenges associated with sociological and ideo-cultural
intelligence; demographic intelligence; and environmental
intelligence. In order to plan and execute Information
Operations that are precise and likely to have the desired
outcome, the United States must radically expand its
concepts and doctrine for national intelligence so as to be
able to comprehend the full range of intelligence challenges
across both domains of interest and nations of interest. It
cannot do this if it relies primarily on the classified
intelligence community and secret sources.
Information Peacekeeping: The Heart of
Information Operations.
Information Peacekeeping is the active exploitation of
information and information technology—in order to modify
peacefully the balance of power between specific individuals
and groups—so as to achieve national policy objectives. The
three elements of Information Peacekeeping, in order of
priority, are: open-source intelligence (providing useful
actionable unclassified information); information
technology (providing “tools for truth” that afford the
recipient access to international information and the ability
to communicate with others); and electronic security and
counter-intelligence (a strictly defensive aspect of
Information Operations). (See Figure 11.)
Open Source Intelligence

OVERT
INFORMATION
PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS
InformationTechnology
(“Tools for Truth”)

Electronic Security &
Counterintelligence

Figure 11. Elements of Overt Information
Peacekeeping Operations.
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To understand what this means, it is useful to specify
what Information Peacekeeping is not. Information
Peacekeeping is not:

•

•

•
•

Application of information or information technology
in support of conventional military peacekeeping
operations, or in support of United Nations, coalition,
or diplomatic operations.
Dev elopmen t and exec uti on of tr ad i ti onal
psychological operations or deception operations that
strive to manipulate perceptions in order to achieve
surprise, or to cause actions to be taken that would not
have been taken if the true circumstances were
known.
Covert action media placement operations, covert
action agent of influence operations, or covert action
paramilitary operations
Clandestine human intelligence operations or overt
research operations.

Although Information Peacekeeping is not to be
confused with clandestine or covert methods, there are gray
areas. Information Peacekeeping may require the
clandestine delivery of classified or open source intelligence,
or the covert delivery of “tools for truth” such as the
traditional radio broadcast equipment, or the more recently
popular cellular telephones and facsimile machines.
Information Peacekeeping may also require covert
assistance in establishing and practicing electronic security
and counterintelligence in the face of host country
censorship or interference.
On balance, then, Information Peacekeeping is by its
nature most powerful and effective when it relies
exclusively on open sources of information, the delivery of
open-source intelligence, and on overt action. Under these
conditions, it is incontestably legal and ethical under all
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applicable rules of law, including host country and
non-Western cultural and religious rules of law and custom.
Information Peacekeeping is the tactical “force of first
resort” for 21st century operations, and every theater and
every major command, must have an order of battle able to
conduct overt Information Peacekeeping Operations in all
three of its major aspects.
Existing staff functions are not adequate to this
challenge at this time. Taking each of the major staff
elements for a theater command in turn:

•

•

•

J-1 (Administrative). Generally includes handling of
refugees and prisoners of war. No concepts, doctrine,
or “order-of-battle” for treating information as either
a munition or a critical logistics elements. Of most
immediate concern: no J-1 (or G-1 or S-1) appears to
have at hand an approved Table of Organization
and/or Table of Equipment for handling humans who
are placed under military care in a tactical
environment.
J-2 (In telligenc e) . Gener al l y r eac ti ve and
apathetic—takes whatever it can get from classified
national intelligence systems. Does not have the
concepts, doctrine, funding, security permissions, or
“order-of-battle” for going out and getting open-source
intelligence with which to provide direct support to
theater operations.
J-3 (Operations). Focuses strictly on placing
munitions on target, positioning troops, and planning
movements. Does not have concepts, doctrine, or an
“order-of-battle” with which to use information as a
substitute for munitions or men. Note that the
execution of Information Warfare attacks, or the
conduct of Psychological Operations, do not count and
do not have the same effect as Information Peacekeeping Operations.
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•

•

J-4 (Logistics). Focuses on beans, bullets, and
band-aids. Not responsible for evaluating or
con siderin g how f ul l or emp ty the var i ous
constituencies are with respect to information
essential to their mission. Imagine how effective a
comma n d m i ght be i f i ts i nf or mati on
requirements—and those of its coalition partners and
civilian agency counterparts—were treated with the
same seriousness as fuel stocks or critical spare parts
for fighter aircraft.
J-5 (Plans/Other). Focuses on plans in isolation. Is
not held accountable for declaring specific plans to be
unsupportable due to a lack of intelligence or maps.
The fact is that most theater contingency plans have
made no provision for acquiring the necessary
open-source intelligence—including commercial
imagery—because everyone is assuming that
national capabilities will suffice and will be made
available. This is fiction.
15

•

J-6 (Communications). Focuses on administration of
limited bandwidth and assignment of limited
communications and computing resources, as well as
subsequent oversight of the entire architecture. Is not
held accountable for considering how the theater will
communicate with coalition and civilian partners who
are not equipped to U.S. standards. Is burdened by a
vast and very expensive C4I architecture designed by
the military services, all of whom assumed that the
United States would always be fighting a unilateral
military action in which all parties have the necessary
clearances to be part of the largely classified theater
command- and-control system. In particular, the J-6
is not held accountable for ensuring that externally
acquired data, including maps, and external nodes,
including non-governmental groups, can be fully
integrated into the larger Information Operations
environment within which the CINC must operate.
156

Others can focus on the information technology and
electronic security aspects of Information Peacekeeping—
this article will conclude with an examination of the most
important aspect of Information Peacekeeping: the use of
open source intelligence to understand, shape, and
dominate the knowledge terrain in the “battle area.”
Virtual Intelligence: The Brain of Information
Operations.
In the words of Richard Kerr, speaking in late 1997:
“The Intelligence Community has to get used to the fact that
it no longer controls most of the information.” What this
really means is that the United States can no longer rely
exclusively on classified sources for the bulk of its intelligence, nor can the intelligence consumer communities—
including the very important military operational and
tactical consumers—assume that all of its intelligence
needs will be met by the U.S. Intelligence Community as it
has traditionally operated.
16

The Commission on Intelligence, a bi-partisan endeavor
that included members appointed by both parties of the
House and Senate, as well as members appointed by the
Administration, offered two pertinent recommendations:
17

•

•

•

The U.S. Intelligence Community is “severely
deficient” in its access to open sources, and this should
be a “top priority” both for the attention of the Director
of Central Intelligence and for funding.
The consumers of intelligence should not refer
requirements to the U.S. Intelligence Community
when they can be answered predominantly through
open sources, but rather should create their own open
source intelligence.
The Commission on Intelligence made these two
recommendations because its investigations clearly
documented that in the Information Age, the vast
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majority of usable, relevant information necessary to
support policymakers, acquisition managers, and
commanders is available in unclassified form from
private sector sources—open sources are by definition
sources which are legally and ethically available to
anyone.
18

The greatest obstacle to improved use of open sources is
not that of access, which is freely or inexpensively available
to all, but rather that of acceptance. The two most erroneous
perceptions among experienced professionals who should
know better are that open sources are “merely a collection of
newspaper clippings” (in the words of a senior Intelligence
Community official) or “the Internet” (in the words of a
general officer). Figure 12 shows an illustrative, but by no
means comprehensive, range of open sources, software, and
services.
SOURCES

SOFTWARE

SERVICES

Current Awareness
(e.g. Individual Inc.)

Internet Tools
(e.g. NetOwl, Web Compass)

Online Search & Retrieval
(e.g. NERAC, Burwell Enterprises)

Current Contents
(e.g. ISI CC Online)

Data Entry Tools
(e.g. Vista, BBN, SRA)

Media Monitoring
(e.g. FBIS via NTIS, BBC)

Directories of Experts
(e.g. Gale Research, TEL TECH)

Data Retrieval Tools
(e.g. RetrievalWare, Calspan)

Document Retrieval
(e.g. ISI Genuine Document)

Conference Proceedings
(e.g. British Library, CISTI)

Automated Abstracting
(e.g. NetOw., DR-LINK)

Human Abstracting
(e.g. NFAIS Members)

Commercial Online Sources
(e.g. LN, DIALOG, STN, ORBIT)

Automated Translation
(e.g. SYSTRAN, SRA NTIS-JV)

Telephone Surveys
(e.g. Risa Sacks Associates)

Risk Assessment Reports
(e.g. Forecast, Political Risk)

Data Mining & Visualization
Private Investigations
(e.g. Visible Decisions, TASC Textor) (e.g. Cognos, Pinkertons, Parvus)

Maps & Charts
(e.g. East View Publications)

Desktop Publishing &
Communications Tools

Market Research
(e.g. SIS, Fuld, Kirk Tyson)

Commerical Imagery
(e.g. SPOT, Radarsat, Autometric)

Electronic Security Tools
(e.g. SSI, PGP, IBM Crytolopes)

Strategic Forecasting
(e.g. Oxford Analytics)

Figure 12. Illustrative Range
of Open Source Niches.
Also to be noted is the distinction between those
resources which are readily available within the U.S.
Intelligence Community; within the rest of the government;
within the nation (i.e., in the private sector with its
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universities, information brokers, businesses, media, and
other information activities); and within the larger global
information community. It is absolutely essential that each
intelligence producer and consumer have a “map” of this
larger knowledge terrain, and a strategy for assuring their
ability to discover, discriminate, distill, and digest critical
open-source information and intelligence.
Those familiar with the existing security and
procurement practices of both the U.S. Intelligence
Community and the military operations environment will
recognize that there are enormous obstacles to progress in
this area. An ignorance of what is available in the private
sector and a reluctance to reveal our rather obvious
interests cause many to eschew the benefits of open-source
intelligence. Simultaneously, our procurement system is
biased in favor of multi-million dollar contracts with
beltway bandits whose expertise is largely in how to win
procurements that focus predominantly on providing
technology solutions, rather than the direct ability to
harness world-class expertise. We must move rapidly
toward a more open intelligence environment in which
individual analysts and individual desk officers are
empowered with the knowledge and the procurement
authority to obtain “just enough, just in time” open source
information and intelligence support.
19

Geospatial Gaps: The Achilles’ Heel of Information
Operations.
In the over-all scheme of information operations, there is
no greater debility than the almost total lack of global
geospatial mapping data at a scale of 1:50,000.

•

This is the level necessary for tactical movement of
troops u n der f i r e, f or the c oor d i nati on of
combined-arms support, for the targeting of precision
munitions, and for the simulation of threedimensional nape-of-the-earth approaches for
sensitive aviation missions.
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•

It is also the level at which automated all-source data
fusion (the Holy Grail for all intelligence technocrats)
and automated multi-source data visualization
become “real.”

The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
acknowledges that it has less than 10% of the world at this
level, and has no plans for acquiring commercial imagery in
order to create a global geospatial database at this level.
As the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) discovered during
the Gulf War, NIMA is also incapable of creating 1:50,000
maps—even with full support from commercial imagery
sources—in less than 60-90 days.
20

21

The broad nature of the deficiency can be defined as
follows:

•

•

•

•

For Africa, where many of our unexpected contingencies occur, we do not have acceptable mapping
data for 13 countries including Ethiopia, South
Africa, and Uganda.
For Asia and the Pacific, an area many consider
central to our economic future and also highly subject
to regional disturbances, we do not have acceptable
mapping data for 12 countries, including China,
Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea, nor for the four
major island groups including the contested Spratly
Islands.
For Europe and the Mediterranean, Greece and
Turkey remain completely uncovered, despite their
importance to NATO, their traditional rivalry, and
the role of Turkey in relation to the former Soviet
Republics, Iraq, and Iran.
For the Western Hemisphere, our own “back yard,” we
lack acceptable mapping data for 13 countries,
including Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and
Paraguay.

160

This deficiency will continue to exist for the next decade
or two—and beyond—unless there is a deliberate decision
made at the Presidential level, with full support from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to resolve this deficiency immediately.
The cost for resolving it has been estimated by
knowledgeable senior leaders of NIMA at between $250
million and $500 million a year in commercial imagery
procurement for the next five to six years. This cost would
cover, among other important projects, complete 1:50,000
coverage of China, the Amazon, and Africa. In combination
with the planned shuttle mission in 2002 to collect precision
points (Digital Terrain Elevation Data) for the entire Earth,
this will allow the United States to have a phenomenal
intelligence and Information Operations advantage, as the
only country in the world with a complete accurate map of
every significant portion of the Earth at the 1:50,000 scale.
22

In the absence of such geospatial data at the 1:50,000
level, policy options are severely constrained. Precision
munitions cannot be used until the imagery and mapping
data are collected and processed; Special Operations units
and drug interdiction teams are at a major disadvantage;
conventional military and law enforcement operations
cannot be properly planned and executed; humanitarian
a ssista n ce a n d other c oal i ti on op er ati ons ar e
handicapped—the list goes on and on.
There is no one today, at any level of the military and
certainly not within the White House or any other Cabinet
department, who is willing and able to make this case before
the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United
States—hence we continue to plan for the future with our
“eyes wide shut.”
23.

Conclusion: New Doctrine for a New Era.
Information Peacekeeping is in effect both a strategy for
government operations and a national security strategy with
global reach; consequently it has profound implications for
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how we train, equip, and organize our government and our
military (Figure 13).

National
Economic
Council
Transnational
and Domestic
Law Enforcement
Operations

White House
Conventional
Military
(High Tech)
Information
Driven
Government
Operations

Special
Operations
(Low Tech)

Diplomatic and
Information
Other Operations
Warfare Corps
National Electronic Security
and Counterintelligence Program
Figure 13. New Government Operations Doctrine.
In the final analysis, we must come to grips with the fact
that our government today is an industrial-era government,
woefully inadequate in all respects as to the management of
internal information and the acquisition and exploitation of
external information. This in turn renders us wastefully
ineffective in the planning and execution of global influence
operations, both those that use information and those that
use violence or other means.
24

We can, however, remedy this situation. The following
steps are recommended:
1. Provide the Director of Central Intelligence with the
centralized program management authority over all
classified collection and production programs, as envisioned
in the National Security Act of 1992 (which was not adopted
by Congress).
25

2. Create a new Director of National Intelligence within
the existing National Security Council (NSC) structure,
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responsible for oversight of government information
operations from a substantive point of view.
a. Elevate the National Intelligence Council by
moving it to this new office, and expand it modestly by
creating National Intelligence Officers corresponding to
each of the major consumer groups in government and in the
private sector. The existing geo-functional NIO’s would
become Associate NIOs and would continue to serve as the
focal points for regional and topical intelligence
management.
b. Provide $1 billion a year for a Global Knowledge
Foundation, modeled after the National Science
Foundation, but responsible for nurturing (but not
regulating or overseeing) distributed centers of expertise
world-wide, all of which can comprise the “Virtual
Intelligence Community,” or, in traditional terms, a truly
national intelligence reserve.
c. Subordinate both classified intelligence and
Departmental intelligence endeavors to a larger national
intelligence community that uses open sources of
intelligence as the source of first resort, while restoring
the classified intelligence community to its rightful place as
the source of last resort, authorized to use whatever means
necessary to acquire critical information not available
through other means. Fence the existing classified budgets
for a decade, specifically precluding the Secretary of
Defense from reducing those portions of the intelligence
budget concealed within Department of Defense budget
lines.
26

d. Subordinate the existing Electronic Security and
Counter-intelligence Program, for which funding on the
order of $1 billion a year has been recommended by the
President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection, to this larger office, but leave executive
authority for its execution with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. This is essential, because the “Virtual
Intelligence Community” cannot exist without national
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electronic security and counter-intelligence guarantees to
the private sector.
Among the first steps a new Director of National
Intelligence might take would be:
1. Establish a National Net Assessments Center to
apply net assessment methods to domestic issues as well as
non-military international issues. The existing military
Net Assessments Office could, with some significant
changes in focus and the integration of representatives from
the other Departments of government, serve as the cadre for
this broader national center.
2. Establish a National Open-Source Consortium to
transfer knowledge of open sources, software, and services
to all levels of government, as well as all elements of the
private sector.
3. Establish four small Threat Assessment Centers
corresponding to each of the four warrior classes, and
modeled after the DCI Centers now in existence for
terrorism and “crime and narcotics,” but with a major
emphasis on the collection and exploitation of open sources.
Alternatively, these could be small five-person oversight
cells within the office of the DNI/NSC.
4. Establish a commercial imagery fund able to procure,
at substantial discounts, all commercial imagery needed by
the civilian departments, the military, law enforcement,
and the NATO/Partners for Peace program. Rather than
entrust NIMA with these funds (NIMA may not be around
in the near future), the funds would be maintained by the
DNI and allocated to the CINCs and Departments for
expenditure as they each deem appropriate.
27

5. Establish a Presidential Commission on National
Intelligence to examine how best to create an integrated
information “order-of-battle” which fully harnesses the
knowledge and information management skills of both the
federal and state governments, and the private sector. The
Commission would have as a specific objective defining a
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new national intelligence reserve concept that facilitates
the inclusion of civilian experts (including international
experts), on an “as needed” basis.
Finally, then, we come to “who cares?” and “why should
we?” What do we gain? We gain a swift, smart, sleek
government able to provide for a “360 ” or—in more modern
terms—a “spherical” defense at home and abroad, with
revolutionary improvements in both our ability to influence
others, and our ability to spend money wisely—fewer
“hangar queens” and more “just right” stilettos. If we do not
do this, if we continue to muddle through, then low-tech
brutes will continue to slip through our crude defenses,
low-tech seers will continue to be invisible to our warning
networks, and high-tech seers will spend the next 20 years
freely practicing information terrorism and vandalism, or
plundering our electronic intellectual property and digital
storehouses of wealth.
o
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Only DoD has the mix of talent, resources, and influence
to make the necessary things happen, and only DoD has the
budget flexibility to permit realignment of the needed
funds. It is not only DoD that must defend our nation from
all enemies, domestic and foreign—this responsibility must
fall evenly on every element of the government, including
state and local governments. It is, however, DoD that must
first rise to the challenge and lead us to a thinking about,
and funding, a future where Information Peacekeeping is
recognized as the purest form of war, and the only path to
sustained peace and prosperity.
ENDNOTES
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U.S. Intelligence Community since technical solutions came into vogue
in the 1960’s. For a fine summary of the “Seven Sins of Strategic
Intelligence” identified by the Church Commission in 1975, see the
article by Dr. Loch Johnson, in World Affairs, Fall 1983. Dr. Johnson’s
many books, including his most recent, Secret Agencies: U.S.
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From Oxford Analytica, a series of two-page executive
reports drafted for their global clients at the Chief Executive
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of the Burundi situation;
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stress again and again that open sources are not a substitute for spies
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imagery comes with enormous bandwidth, storage, time of
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24. Paul Strassmann, former Director of Defense Information and
former Chief Information Officer of the Xerox Corporation, among
others, has published widely in the information management arena. He
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TERRORISM AND ASYMMETRY
Stephen Sloan

Introduction.
The profound changes in the international political
arena coupled with the equally significant transformation
of warfare created by technological change have forced
military strategists and planners to reassess the future
conflict environment. The accompanying revolution in
military affairs (RMA) has called for the development of
doctrine that can anticipate and therefore effectively react
to future conflicts. At the same time the RMA seeks to
develop doctrine that is proactive and can take the
operational initiative against present and future
adversaries.
The problem of adjusting to new realities is endemic in
the long history of warfare. Therefore, an assessment of new
challenges and concomitant innovations must not only be
viewed in terms of change, but also continuity. For doctrine
associated with future warfighting should not be grounded
solely on what appears to be the unique elements of
contemporary and future warfare. The quest for
understanding what appears to be unique may ignore the
valid benefits of hindsight gleaned from an understanding
predicated on recognizing and applying the lessons that can
be learned from the past and modifying and applying them
to present and future realities.
The present focus on asymmetric warfare is a
manifestation of a desire of military thinkers to label and
identify major characteristics in the changing conflict
environment and develop the capabilities to take the
initiative or respond to it. As one author notes,
asymmetric warfare is a set of operational practices aimed at
negating advantages and exploiting vulnerabilities rather
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than engaging in traditional force-on-force engagements. The
incentive to engage in asymmetric warfare is usually greatest
for the weakest party in defense against a stronger (and often
extra-regional) foe. Asymmetric concepts and moves seek to use
the physical environment and military capabilities in ways that
are atypical and presumably unanticipated by more established
militaries, thus catching them off-balanced and unprepared.1

It is the purpose of this paper to relate the current
concern with major characteristics of asymmetric warfare
to a continuing, but also evolving form of armed
conflict—terrorism. While there are many definitions, the
following three encapsulate the major elements of the
threat and act:

•

Terrorism can be defined as a purposeful human
activity directed toward the creation of a general
climate of fear designed to influence in ways desired
by the protagonist, other human beings, and through
them some course of events.
2

•
•

Terrorism is the threat of violence and the use of fear
to coerce, persuade and gain public attention.
3

Political terrorism is the use, or threat of the use, of
violence by an individual or group, whether acting for
or in opposition to established authority, when such
action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or
fear inducing effects in a target group wider than the
immediate victim with the purpose of coercing that
group into acceding to the political demands of the
perpetrators.
4

The following discussion will focus on the relationship
between a asymmetric warfare and terrorism by addressing
four areas of inquiry: (1) Similarities and continuities
between asymmetric warfare and terrorism, (2)
Discontinuities created by the impact of a transforming
international conflict environment and technological
change, (3) Implications of both continuity and change as
they relate to doctrinal development and the operational
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art, and (4) Implications of the relationship between
asymmetric warfare and terrorism in the formulation of
U.S. security/military policies and strategies.
Similarities and Continuities Between Asymmetric
Warfare and Terrorism.
In addressing continuities and changes of terrorism, it is
first important to identify the major characteristics of
terrorism. By so doing one can then address how these
characteristics have both remained constant and changed
as a means of understanding the present and future threats
of terrorism as an aspect of asymmetric warfare.
In its long history, terrorism has often been viewed as
the weapon of the weak directed at a stronger adversary.
Thus for example, the
zealots, also known as the Sicarii (dagger-wielders), were 1st
century A.D. Jewish religious nationalists in the Roman
province of Judea who carried out terrorist attacks on Roman
officials and Jews considered to be Roman collaborators as
well as waging an open insurgency against Rome from 66-70
A.D.5

The use of terrorism as the part of the strategy of the
underdog has throughout the centuries been employed to
justify acts and campaigns of terror based on the view that it
is often a weapon of last resort employed by the powerless.
This mythology continues as today’s terrorists proclaim
that they have no choice but to engage in their acts against
superior forces, be it a military police force, the state or a
more vaguely defined international order. Viewed in this
manner, terrorism has and will continue to be utilized and
justified as an asymmetrical response to superior force. But
this mythology of terrorism often ignores the fact that far
more people have been subject to terrorism when the full
coercive capabilities of the state are used against its own
people. In these instances, “enforcement terrorism” has
been far more destructive than the “agitational terror”
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directed against the established order. Thus, while the
focus of the threat is still largely on “terror from below,” the
rise of modern totalitarianism has refined with murderous
efficiency the capabilities of a state to engage in mass
terrorism. But with the development of “state-sponsored
terrorism” as contrasted to “state terrorism,” the line
between “agitational terror” and “enforcement terror” has
been increasingly blurred.
A second aspect of the historical continuity of terrorism
as an aspect of asymmetrical warfare relates to be ability of
terrorists in the terminology of modern warfare to employ
their acts as a force multiplier, to amplify and maximize
their outwardly limited resources against a stronger enemy.
This ability is part of a conscious strategy particularly
related to central characteristics of terrorism that often
differentiate it from other forms of violence. That is, “Terror
is a natural phenomenon, terrorism is the conscious
exploitation of it.” Or, as one authority succinctly notes:
“Terrorism aims, by the use of violence or the threat of
violence, to coerce governments, authorities, or populations
by inducing fear.” As we shall see, the ability of the modern
terrorist to engage in a form of fear generation, as
contrasted to his predecessors, has been greatly expanded
as a result of modern technology.
7

8

Those who have engaged in asymmetrical warfare have
customarily maximized their often limited resources by
seeking to intimidate and test the resolve of the stronger
adversary. To the terrorist, the threat or act of violence is
not only a form of fear generation, it is often a strategy or
tactic which places heavy emphasis on the use of purposeful
violence as a form of psychological warfare. As one authority
noted,
terrorism is a form of psychological operations (PSYOP) . . . .
Many other characteristics of terrorism are argued by the
drafters of competing definitions, but virtually all include words
to the effect that acts of terrorism are directed at a target
audience and not just the immediate victim. Without this
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provision terrorism would be indistinguishable from other
acts of violence.9

The systematic and purposeful use of fear is therefore a
central objective of terrorists as they seek to use both
threats and the use of violence to create a sense of
vulnerability and alter the attitudes and values of the
targeted adversary and its population. Psychological
operations have also long been in the arsenal of those who
have, for example, practiced asymmetric warfare in an
insurgency directed against a more powerful enemy.
Particularly in a protracted war, such actions have
weakened the resolve of the people on the homefront, often
thousands of miles away from the physical battle, but such
actions can also physically bring the war home and breach
the security of a dominant power. Unfortunately, because of
technological changes in the current and future conflict
environment, the terrorists now, as we shall see, have the
capability to intensify their psychological attacks on a mass
audience in ways undreamed of by the most skillful and
dedicated terrorists of the past.
In addition to its psychological impact, terrorism has
proven to be a very effective form of communication. As in
the case of asymmetric warfare in general, terrorism
remains a powerful tool to convey a message to an
intimidated audience. The Russian anarchists who
practiced propaganda by the deed have been replaced by
new merchants of disorder who now have the capacity to
spread their message to a global audience almost
instantaneously.
10

Finally, the use of agitational terror or terror from below
has been associated with the long history of insurgency,
where such terrorism is essential in the asymmetrical
positions of the insurgents compared to the threatened
government. Terrorism is therefore a central element in a
particular type of warfare, a form of warfare that has been
effective not only against powerful nations. Moreover, as we
shall see, it is a form of conflict which does not fit the
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American ideal of waging war, particularly now that we face
the challenges inherent in being the sole military
superpower in a very ambiguous conflict environment.
Furthermore, since terrorism is often an aspect of a
protracted war, those who employ it test the ability of
democratic governments to develop and implement
necessary long term counterterrorism policies and
associated strategies since continuity may be difficult to
achieve as one administration replaces another. Moreover,
in the war against terrorism decisive victories are unlikely.
Also, the pain threshold of the population to endure
casualties of any appreciable numbers may now be limited
in a democratic political order. Such considerations raise
serious questions concerning the ability of the United States
and other open societies to persevere against adversaries in
a protracted conflict.
11

Differences and Discontinuities Between
Asymmetric Warfare and Terrorism.
The challenges created by the historical characteristics
of terrorism, particularly to democratic political orders,
have been exacerbated by the transformational conflict
environment and the impact of technological change. The
end of the Cold War has destroyed the arbitrary coherence
created by superpower competition. The balance of nuclear
terrorism, with limits on direct confrontation by Moscow
and Washington as a result of the Cuban missile crisis, and
with some degree of control by the superpowers over the
states they employed to engage in proxy warfare, has been
replaced by a disequilibrium created by the emergence of
rogue states and would-be regional powers. In the case of
the former, there has been a rejection of the rules of the
game as practiced by what they perceived to be the
remnants of a discredited political order that had been
initially imposed by the Western imperial powers. In the
case of the latter, the arbitrary boundaries of existing
nation-states have been rejected by those who wish to create
their own hegemony over a strategic region, motivated by
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both revolutionary and religious fervor. Furthermore, there
are many new significant players in this more ambiguous
international area, all seeking to maximize their
capabilities now that they do not feel restrained by the
limits placed by the competing superpowers during the Cold
War. In addition, the ambiguity has been heightened by the
emergence of a wide variety of new actors who have rejected
the centrality of the state in international politics. These
non-state actors, include
. . . universal and regional intergovernmental organizations
(IGO’s), transnational guerrilla and terrorists groups,
multinational organizations (MNC’s), and a rapidly growing
number of nongovernmental organizations in a wide variety of
functional areas.12

One would also add the very significant growth of both
organized and unorganized criminal enterprises that have
increasingly filled the power vacuum created by the
disintegration of the former Soviet Union and have asserted
themselves in the “gray areas—immense regions where
control has shifted from legitimate governments to new
half-political, half-criminal powers.”
13

The systematic breakdown of the international system
has enabled these parties to seize the initiative and use
terrorism as an instrument to attempt to maximize their
foreign policy objectives. In the face of the existing vacuum
and the inability of regional and international political
organizations to control or combat them, both new state and
non-state actors have and will continue to practice the
techniques of what can be called armed diplomacy—
diplomacy by intimidation thorough the threat and use of
terrorism. The breakdown of the Gulf Coalition, the
inability of the United Nations to act decisively, and the
reluctance of the United States to act unilaterally against
Iraq underscore the fact that a strategy of terrorism, of any
type, will increasingly challenge the faltering abilities of a
fragile and often divided international community to meet
present and future threats and contingencies.
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The discontinuity in the international arena that has
strengthened the threat and use of terrorism as an
asymmetric instrument of armed diplomacy, physical
conflict, and foreign policy has further been buttressed by
the profound impact of changing technologies. While the
impact is both complex and wide-ranging, there are a few
major characteristics that will enable terrorists to continue
to maximize their capabilities in the immediate future. In
the first place, modern terrorists now have the ability
literally to engage in global operations. They are no longer
limited to utilizing terrorism as a tactic in a territorially
based insurgency. As a result of the introduction of
commercial jet aircraft, we have witnessed the emergence of
“Non-Territorial Terrorism”—a form of terror that is not
confined to a clearly delineated geographical area.
14

In a very real sense, terrorists now have the capacity to
engage in what could be called low-intensity aerospace
warfare. They have at their disposal what are for all
practical purposes human intercontinental delivery
systems composed of skyjackers, and terrorists who are
carrying out operations thousands of miles away from their
base of operations. Even more ominous is the fact that states
may increasingly use missiles as part of a terrorist delivery
system. And the time will come when non-state terrorists
may also develop their own long-term stand-off weapon
capabilities. The dangers created by these delivery systems
has of course been greatly intensified as a result of what
could be called a vicious “revolution in terrorist affairs.”
With the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system on
March 20, 1995, by members of the Aum Shinri Kyo cult, the
threshold to mass terrorism had been crossed and the
dangers of future chemical, biological, and nuclear
terrorism can no longer be viewed merely as future threats.
We have now witnessed not only the capability but the
willingness of various terrorist groups to literally declare a
war against all. This willingness and ability to practice
mass terrorism may have modified Sun Tzu’s edict from
15

180

“kill one person, frighten a thousand” to “kill a thousand,
frighten a million.”
The ability of terrorists to spread fear and intimidation
and dramatize their cause to a far stronger adversary as an
aspect of asymmetrical warfare has of course been greatly
heightened by the impact of the media. We have witnessed
the development of the CNNDrome where acts of terrorism
and the justification for them can almost immediately reach
a global audience. This capability unfortunately has now
been enhanced not only through the sophisticated
exploitation of the mass media, but increasingly via the
internet. It can be anticipated that a terrorist group will
skillfully use the net to intimidate a vast new audience by
creating the perception of a terrorist act or terrorist
campaign even though it might not really exit. We may see
the resort to what could be called virtual terrorism, which
could have a profound psychological effect on a public that is
increasingly willing to seek answers to complex questions
by relying on electronic tabloids as a means of creating and
reinforcing accompanying conspiracy theories.
16

17

The potential development of virtual terrorism can be
placed in the broader context of what has now been
identified as “information warfare . . . any action to deny,
exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy’s information and its
functions; protecting us against those actions; and
exploiting our own information functions.” Even more
specifically, one can identify and address the challenges
created by what a number of authors have defined as:
18

Information terrorism [which is] the nexus between criminal
informations system fraud or abuse, and the physical violence
of terrorism. . . . [P]articularly in a legal sense, information
terrorism can be the intentional abuse of a digital information
system, network, or component toward the end that supports
or facilitates a terrorist campaign or action.19

Given the profound changes in the international conflict
environment and concomitant changes in technology, the
challenges created by terrorism as an aspect of asymmetric
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conflict will severely test the abilities of the United States
and an increasingly fragmented international community
to develop the strategies, policies, capabilities, and most
importantly the will to combat an ancient form of violence
that is also as current as today’s headlines.
Doctrinal Development and the Operational Arts.
The challenges created by terrorism as an aspect of
asymmetric warfare will require bold and innovative
measures to counter a form of violence which will
increasingly threaten U.S. national security and
Washington’s present role as the sole remaining military
superpower. The following factors should be considered in
developing the ability not only to react, but to take the
initiative against potential adversaries who can convert
their relative weakness to a source of strength and in so
doing transform U.S. strength into a source of weakness.
The ambiguity that now characterizes the international
arena also characterizes the nature of terrorism. While
there may be agreement on its essential characteristics,
there remain understandable debates whether terrorism is
first and foremost a criminal act, a form of political violence
or ultimately a form of warfare. The fact is that terrorism
spans the spectrum of violence, conflict, and warfare. It is
multifaceted, a consideration that places an onerous burden
on those who would evolve doctrine to combat it.
If terrorism is viewed to be primarily a criminal act, it
falls under the purview of law enforcement. When the
responsibility is placed in the context of democratic law
enforcement, counterterrorism measures would focus on
prevention and response and only when necessary the
utilization of force. In contrast, if terrorism is primarily
perceived to be an aspect of warfare, the application of
offensive measures combined with the use of maximum
force may be viewed as appropriate. Finally, between both
poles is the view that terrorism is essentially a form of
political violence regarding which a mixture of both
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diplomacy and force may be employed to achieve strategic
objectives. However, the nature of terrorism is
characterized, one thing is clear. In combating terrorism
there is a requirement to achieve unity of effort by
integrating police, military, and political counterforces to
prevent, respond, or take the initiative against terrorism.
One should also add that with the emergence of non-state
actors who may use terrorism in pursuit of their goals, any
counterterrorism measures must increasingly utilize assets
from the corporate or private sector. The monopoly of force is
not solely in the hands of states. Therefore, as in the case of
the present war on drugs, there is no clearly identifiable
organization to engage the adversary. The requirement for
coordination among often highly specialized and
competitive organizations within and outside the
organizations traditionally involved in protecting and
promoting national security requires a high degree of
coordination among outwardly disparate forces. This need
for coordination is particularly crucial when terrorism is
used as an aspect of asymmetrical conflict.
20

Furthermore, the challenges created by terrorism have
serious implications in regard to developing the appropriate
organizational doctrines and capabilities to combat the
threat. One of the major characteristics of a larger, more
powerful organization is its complexity and specialization of
function. Whether it be in the conduct of the affairs of state,
the implementation of a criminal justice system, or waging
war, there are highly diverse forces outwardly on the same
team, but which have their own tactics, strategies, and
objectives. In contrast, weaker or smaller entities may lack
the resources and accompanying capabilities to have the
luxury of specialization. While outwardly a potential
liability, the benefits of simplicity may be a real advantage
in conflict against a more powerful adversary. Through
their simplicity, they may avoid the daunting challenges
inherent in coordinating the activities of diverse and
complex bureaucratic structures that characterize modern
police, security, and military forces. Moreover, the
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asymmetric terrorist organization may also avoid the
daunting tasks associated with developing effective
command, control, and accountability among competing
bureaucratic structures. In combating terrorism,
particularly as an aspect of asymmetric warfare, simplicity
is a necessity for the adversary and often an impossible goal
to be achieved by the superior power. Bureaucratic bloat,
the differentiation between line and staff functions, turf
battles, and endless reorganizations have often been the
hallmark of complex organizational responses to terrorism.
If the battle is to be effectively joined against terrorism as an
aspect of asymmetric warfare, an organizational culture of
simplicity may be required even in an ever more
complicated technological environment. But achieving
simplicity may unfortunately be a highly complex process as
a result of the great interdependency and complex
organizational arrangements that are the features of
modern nation-states and particularly a superpower.
Directly related to the need for simplicity in engaging in
asymmetrical warfare are the crucial challenges associated
with organizational doctrine, which “is very narrow in scope
and tends to change relatively frequently in order to remain
current.” Unfortunately, the doctrine of large-scale
complex organizations stresses the requirement for a
21

ladder system [which] often acts as a barrier to fast
communication and execution of operations with its emphasis
on command hierarchy, the differentiation between staff and
line function, [and] the problems of coordination with often
competing hierarchies.22

This organizational doctrine stands in marked contrast
to the internal organizational structure of terrorist groups:
“The centrifugal infrastructure [which] resembles that of a
solar system in which the leader is the sun in the center and
the members are like planets around his direct impact.”
The need to develop a centrifugal organizational structure
to maintain counter-cadre to combat those who have a
centrifugal terrorist infrastructure is not easy to achieve,
23
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especially when one may require joint operations.
Moreover, the requirements for effective command and
control as well as the demand for accountability may act as
serious impediments when a complex large organization
seeks to mirror the organizational structure of those who
engage in asymmetrical warfare.
In meeting the asymmetrical threat the key role of
simplicity of organization should be joined with yet another
doctrinal and operational requirement. That is, in seeking
to engage a small, invisible, flexible adversary, the larger
power must rely heavily on the key role of intelligence. Since
terrorists, whether they are pursuing limited objectives or
engaging in a form of warfare, have the initiative to target a
vast constellation of targets, authorities are inherently
placed on the defensive. Furthermore, target hardening,
however effective, is essentially a form of target
displacement since the terrorists have the option of seeking
softer targets of opportunity.
There are unfortunately many vital targets in a complex,
technologically interdependent society. Intelligence can
thus be viewed as being on the forefront of counterterrorism
warfare. For, once the terrorists go tactical (i.e., initiate
operations and move to the target), the authorities are
essentially forced into a reactive crisis-emergency
management mode with its emphasis on rescue, recovery,
damage control, and reconstitution. Therefore intelligence
is central in preventing, deterring, and when feasible
preempting acts of terrorism. However in meeting the
demand of terrorism as a form of asymmetric warfare, one
might suggest that there are two outwardly contradictory
requirements in regard to both collection and analysis. On
one hand, the need for simplicity that characterizes
terrorist organizational doctrine is also applicable to
counterterrorism collection and analysis. The focal point for
such efforts requires the use of HUMINT in the demanding
task of penetrating terrorist groups, their fronts, and when
appropriate their state-sponsors. As one authority aptly
notes,
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HUMINT agencies can try to recruit agents in secretive states
where intelligence otherwise has no access. In the same way
informers provide almost the only means of penetrating
non-state terrorism: and security intelligence has always
needed informers on subversive movements and other internal
threats.24

In conjunction with this is the need to emphasize the
training and utilization of area specialists who have the
language and associated training and field experience to
literally understand the perception and attendant
motivation of highly diverse men and women representing
different ethnic, political, and religious groups that may
resort to terrorism as part of their strategic goals—be they
based on the call for self-determination or profit.
Unfortunately, and in contrast to the requirement for
simplicity, is the consideration that the United States may
have placed too much emphasis on sophisticated techniques
of technical collection and associated analysis.
In a sense the community may have become to a degree
technologically muscle-bound, relying too heavily on
high-tech capabilities to penetrate and understand the
motivation, behavior, tactics, and strategies of the often
small, free-floating combat cells that characterize many
contemporary terrorists groups. The most impressive
capabilities of overhead platforms and signal intercepts
may be relatively useless when confronted with the reality
of face-to-face communication by two terrorists who are
hiding in a “safe house” in the urban jungle of a city. Yet, at
the same time, the need for more sophisticated technical
collection has understandably been expanded, given the
increased ability of terrorists to use modern technology in
the form of communications and weapons to achieve their
goals. Hence, in the changing terrorist threat environment
there will be a need for the mixture of traditional human
collection as well as high-tech alternatives. But the ability
to achieve an integration of effort by both may be limited as
a result of their different biases based on their training and
education. In effect the traditional “green door” barrier
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between the operator and analyst may now have been
replaced by the barrier between those who emphasize the
requirement for the low-tech human-intensive capabilities,
on one hand, and high-tech proponents in the intelligence
community, on the other. In the increasingly ambiguous
world of terrorism where cults, extremist groups, and
criminal enterprises of all sorts may act independently of
each other, where there are not clearly defined and readily
defined targets of collection, where communication may be
highly personal and therefore not vulnerable to intercept,
there are no technological “silver bullets” for penetration
purposes. Therefore, when confronted with the threat of
terrorism in asymmetrical warfare, the dominant power
must develop the capacity to create and utilize relatively
simple organizational structures and not place undue
reliance on high-tech measures against enemies who know
the value of simplicity in the pursuit of their objectives. This
transformation is not easy for the modern administrative
state which places heavy value on an organizational
structure and culture characterized by complexity. In the
asymmetrical conflict against terrorism, the “War of the
Flea”—one does not engage in overkill by relying on
sophisticated weapon systems.
Implications in Regards to National Security
Policies and Strategy.
The challenges created by terrorism placed in the
broader context of asymmetric warfare are a manifestation
of a profoundly changing conflict environment faced by the
United States as the sole remaining military superpower.
While there is continuity in regard to applying the lessons of
the past to counterterrorism, the new dimensions of
terrorism created by the interaction of the revolution in
technology and the transformation of the international
arena will place a heavy burden on the United States in
addressing present and future security requirements. A
number of key issues can be identified.
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With the end of the outward coherence created by the
Cold war it is now very difficult to identify major strategic
threats to U.S. national security. The balance of nuclear
terrorism and the need for effective deterrence has been
replaced by a laundry list of current threats: terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction, the international drug trade,
global criminality, and other immediate challenges. While
these threats are certainly real, they have not been
integrated into a long-term strategy. What may be
identified as strategy today is for all intents and purposes
contingency-driven short-term geopolitical responses to
immediate threats. This lack of a long-term strategic vision
is further exacerbated by the loss of clarity on what are the
major elements of national security. In the past there was a
relatively clear identification of such major factors as the
Soviet threat and the military, economic, and political
dimensions of superpower competition. Now elements of
national security have been expanded to include such topics
as environmental dangers and other non-traditional
threats. It is not that environmental degradation is of trivial
concern, it is just that the list has been expanded to make
the elements of national security so diffuse that it is difficult
to focus, much less establish the clarity needed to establish
a strategy.
The lack of clarity has created a situation where those
forces involved in protecting national security and
advancing American interests have been overwhelmed with
a wide variety of new roles and missions under what has
been called “operations other than war.” Thus, for example,
the military, while still confronted with the challenges
created by conventional war in the Middle East and Korea,
must also address a whole host of new tasks: peacekeeping,
peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, drug
enforcement, and other similar demands at the very time
when the drawdown in personnel and material continue.
Furthermore, the line between military and non-military
operations has blurred now that we have witnessed the
trend whereby the police acquire military equipment and
25
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training to counter a more demanding criminal challenge,
while the military has become increasingly involved in law
enforcement operations as illustrated by its “war on drugs”
and border interdiction of illegal immigrants. We are
witnessing what may be called “The Militarization of the
Police and the Gendarmification of the Military.” With a
lack of a clearly enunciated strategy and with a bewildering
myriad of roles and missions that imperfectly fuse military
and law enforcement functions, it is no wonder that the
United States is ill prepared to deal with both the short- and
long-term threats to national security created by those who
are and will engage in asymmetric warfare.
26

The lack of vision has also manifested itself in the realm
of national policy. With the end of the Cold War, whatever
bipartisan consensus that remained was greatly weakened
as both Congress and the Office of the President turned
inward to meet domestic concerns without a long-term
commitment to the formulation and execution of foreign
policy. It should come as no shock to discover that it is
exceedingly difficult to formulate long-term strategy in a
policy vacuum. This vacuum creates particular problems in
developing appropriate measures for combating terrorism
as an aspect of asymmetric war. As noted earlier, terrorism
has traditionally been viewed as a form of protracted
warfare in which there are few decisive, much less total
victories. The terrorist who engages in asymmetric warfare
against a greatly superior power has time on his side, for he
can focus operations to create a maximum amount of
disruption and instability with a minimum number of
personnel, resources, and weapons.
Moreover, with the advent of mass terrorism, terrorists
can further maximize their capabilities with frightening
efficiency. Hence, there are serious questions whether the
current and future political leadership, policymakers, and
indeed the public have the necessary vision, capability, and,
perhaps most importantly, the resolve to maintain the
strength of will necessary to deal with adversaries who are
skilled and committed to engaging in protracted war. The
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American ideal of waging war which calls for minimum
casualties, decisive outcomes, and short conflicts
unfortunately does not match the reality of the current and
future conflict environment. Terrorism, be it conducted by a
small ethnic group as part of a regional program of
destabilization, or solely for profit, will severely test the
ability and staying power of the United States to meet the
“death of a thousand cuts” that is often the hallmark of
protracted conflict. Furthermore, terrorists have and will
increasingly use the media and modern technology not only
bring to the war home to the American public, but to test
that public’s will to confront the threat. In “The War in the
Shadows” where stealth and protraction often go hand in
hand, American staying power is open to question.
27

Further complicating the challenge faced by the United
States is the fact that in the next century, Washington will
no longer be the sole military superpower. Consequently
more than ever there will be the requirement for the United
States to act in coalition with other parties against a whole
variety of new threats. But this will in all probability
become even more difficult since we live in an international
environment that, while more economically and
technologically interdependent, may have also become more
politically divided. We could witness the appearance of a
wide variety of groups that reject any semblance of an
international political order. Viewed in this light,
asymmetric warfare will not only continue, but may even
become more threatening to a fragile international order
where the possession of political and economic power may
be transformed into a liability—a target rich environment
for terrorists to practice their form of asymmetric warfare.
Conclusion.
Terrorism is but one manifestation of asymmetric
warfare. But it is a manifestation that in all likelihood will
increasingly challenge the United States in the next
century. Changes in doctrine, strategy, and policy are
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needed, but it is difficult for a superpower to think
organizationally small, breaking through the complexity of
modern government to look beyond the current threats and
formulate a new strategic vision in a rapidly changing
international arena. Terrorism and asymmetry serve to
underscore the need to move beyond the conventional
wisdom of today—a wisdom that will mean far less in a
conflict environment where mass society and high
technology compete with parochial loyalties and the
low-tech forms of violence, thus intensifying instability in
an international arena already characterized by disunity
and uncertainty.
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METAPHORS AND MODERN THREATS:
BIOLOGICAL, COMPUTER,
AND COGNITIVE VIRUSES
Edmund M. Glabus

INTRODUCTION
One challenge of national security planning and force
protection programming is how to visualize military
threats. For current operations, this task is made difficult
by the sheer volume of information we receive purporting to
help us understand threats to military and civilian assets
and operations. Unfortunately, military decisionmakers,
planners, and analysts are often exposed to more
information about any given situation than they can
assimilate within normal operational time constraints.
When planning for future strategies and capabilities, the
converse is true. Instead of too much information, we suffer
from too little. Analysts, planners, and leaders understandably are hesitant to “bet the farm” on predictions,
projections, or forecasts about future adversaries and
scenarios.
However, time and events wait for no man. In the short
term th e b u dg et c al end ar , Pr ogr am Objec ti ve
Memorandum (POM) timeline, and systems acquisition and
fielding cycles all drive Department of Defense personnel to
identify assumptions, derive conclusions, present
recommendations, and make decisions. The military
leadership’s emphasis on extending our conceptual horizons
(e.g., Joint Vision 2010, Army 2010, the Army After Next
Project) also impels us to complete similar actions with even
less clarity and confidence in our assessments. As a result
many decision-makers, planners, and analysts use only a
few highly representative pieces of information to reduce
problems to a manageable size.
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In the complicated environment of military strategy,
decision-makers and staffs will use these shortcuts, or
heuristics, to classify situations according to a few key
features and guide their thinking (and learning). There is
nothing inherently wrong with this shortcut approach to
planning and decisionmaking as long as our heuristics are
reasonably representative. One favorite technique is the
use of the metaphor. As Martin Libicki writes,
Used properly, a metaphor can be a starting point for analysis, a
littoral, as it were, between the land of the known and the ocean
of the unfamiliar. A good metaphor can help frame the questions
that might otherwise not arise, it can illustrate relationships
whose importance might otherwise be overlooked, and it can
provide a useful heuristic device, a way to play with concepts, to
hold them up to the light to catch the right reflections, and to
tease out questions for further inquiry.1

One useful metaphor we can use to visualize modern
threats is that of the virus. Most of us have some familiarity
with viruses. Usually we are aware of related terms like
vaccine, inoculation, and antibiotic. Viruses are mysterious
creatures to some, but reference to virus threats has
achieved a degree of acceptance in national security
discussions. Two developments contributing to this
acceptance are the recent emphasis on information
warfare/information operations, with a strong focus on
computers, and an unfortunate resurgence in biological
warfare activities on both the international and domestic
scenes.
Before we can discuss using viruses as a threat
metaphor, however, we need to define the term in a
conventional sense:
2

vi-rus…[L, slimy liquid, poison, stench….]
1: archaic: venom emitted by a poisonous animal
2a: the causative agent of an infectious disease : disease germ
2b: FILTERABLE VIRUS; specifically : any of a large group of
submicroscopic infective agents that are held by some to be
living organisms and by others to be complex autocatalytic
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protein molecules containing nucleic acids and comparable to
genes, that are capable of growth and multiplication only in
living cells, and that cause various important diseases in man,
animals, or plants….
2c: VIRUS DISEASE….
3: a morbid corrupting quality in intellectual or moral
conditions : something that poisons the mind or soul….
4: an antigenic but not infective material (as vaccine lymph)….

In light of this formal definition, we will explore the use
of the virus as a metaphor for discussing threats that are
difficult to visualize. We will focus on biological warfare,
computer network attack, and memetic warfare (Figure 14).
Using the Army After Next (AAN) Project’s construct of
doctrine/concept/idea, we can view the three types of
warfare listed above through the metaphor of the virus in
order to present them in an easily understandable way. As
we move from biological warfare, to computer network
attack, to memetic warfare, our illustrations will cross the
spectrum from doctrine, to concept, to idea.
3

Doctrine
Joint Pub 1-02 Biological
Warfare

Memetic
Warfare

“Innovative
Idea

Computer
Network
Attack

Concept
Joint Pub 3-13
(Draft)

“

Figure 14. Viruses in the Context of Warfare.
SUMMARY AND RELATIONSHIP OF VIRUS
METAPHORS
In his book Virus of the Mind: The New Science of the
Meme, Richard Brodie relies on metaphor to discuss what he
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concludes is a new form of virus. According to Brodie,
“viruses occur in three different universes: biology,
computers, and the mind.” Viruses of the mind we shall
refer to as “cognitive” viruses. The following table, adapted
from one found in Virus of the Mind, “shows the
correspondence between words used to talk about evolution
and viruses in each of the three universes.” In this article
we will use Brodie’s taxonomy to explore the use of the virus
metaphor, examining in turn the use of biological,
computer, and cognitive viruses as threat metaphors.
4

Biology

Computers

Cognition

Gene

Machine
Instruction

Meme

Cell

Computer [and
Paper]

Mind

DNA

Machine
Language

Brain
Representations

Virus

Computer Virus

Virus of the Mind

Gene Pool

All Software

Meme Pool

Spores/Germs

Elect. Bulletin
Board Postings

Broadcasts/Public
ations

Species

Operating System

Cultural
Institutions

Genus/Higher
Classifications

Machine
Architecture

Culture

Organism

Program

Behavior/Artifact

Genetic
Susceptibility

“Back Door” or
Security Hole

Psychological
Susceptibility or
“Button”

Genetic Evolution Artificial Life
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Cultural
Evolution

BIOLOGICAL VIRUSES: DEFINITION
AND THREAT CONTEXT
Firmly grounded in doctrine, biological warfare is the
“employment of biological agents to produce casualties in
man or animals and damage to plants or materiel; or
defense against such employment.” It is the easiest type of
warfare to discuss using the term virus, as viruses literally
are part of the discipline. For purposes of this paper, we will
use version 2b of the virus definition presented earlier to
describe viruses when the term is associated with the
biological threat. Although most closely related to the virus
metaphor, biological warfare threats include more than
viruses (e.g., bioregulators, bacteria, fungal toxins, and
vectors). From a layman’s perspective, however, these
biological warfare threats can all be visualized in terms of
viruses.
5

As with most national security threats, the majority of
official government analyses and estimates are classified.
However, one particularly good open source document on
the biological virus threat is the Office of the Secretary of
Defense’s Proliferation: Threat and Response.6 In a concise
threat statement, the OSD report concludes: “Biological
weapons have the greatest potential for lethality of any
weapon. Biological weapons are accessible to all countries;
there are few barriers to developing such weapons with a
modest level of effort. The current level of sophistication for
many biological agents is low but there is enormous
potential—based on advances in modern molecular biology,
fermentation, and drug delivery technology—for making
more sophisticated weapons.”
7

The magnitude of the biological warfare threat is
difficult to convey, but one example gives an idea of the
potential scope of the problem. According to an article by
Washington Post staff writer R. Jeffrey Smith, Iraq has
declared it maintained biological weapons, including
anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin. Let’s use only the
first two of these agents as examples.
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•

•

Anthrax: “This often fatal bacteria causes high fever,
difficulty in breathing, chest pain and eventually
blood poisoning. Antibiotics often prove useless after
a short period. [Iraq has declared] 2,245 gallons,
enough to kill billions. The United Nations (U.N.)
suspects production was three to four times that.”
Botulinum Toxin: “This bacteria first causes
vomiting, constipation, thirst, weakness, fever,
dizziness, blurred vision, pupil dilation and difficulty
in swallowing. Eventually it causes paralysis,
respiratory failure, and often death. [Iraq has
declared] 5,125 gallons, enough to wipe out Earth’s
population several times. The United Nations
suspects the number may have been twice that.”
8

Although it is convenient to focus on one country, Iraq is not
alone in this respect. The OSD report addresses potential
research, production, testing, or weaponization of biological
weapons by Iraq, North Korea, China, Iran, and Russia,
among others.
Potential non-state actors include both foreign terrorist
organizations and domestic groups. Recently in the United
States a “microbiologist on probation for fraudulently
obtaining bubonic plague toxins in Ohio in 1995, and . . . a
Las Vegas area entrepreneur and home-laboratory medical
researcher, were arrested . . . [and] charged with possessing
anthrax for use as a weapon.” Although, as it turned out,
the vials contained a harmless anthrax strain for use in
inoculating farm animals, FBI agents continued to
investigate the potential for criminal wrongdoing. Other
examples are more clear-cut. As Charles Mercier writes,
9

biological . . . agents can readily be developed by
terrorists…[requiring] a college-level knowledge of biology or
chemistry, less than $20,000 in supplies, and the forged
documents or accomplices needed to obtain “seed” bacteria or
precursor chemicals . . . a U.S. neo-Nazi group (the Order of the
Rising sun) produced 80 pounds of typhoid bacillus in 1972, and
in 1984 Paris police raided an apartment rented by the Baader
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Meinhof gang and found flasks of Clostridium botulinum
culture. More recently, Japanese police found 160 barrels of
peptone (a growth media for bacteria) along with Clostridium
botulinum when they raided an Aum Shinrikyo compound
near Mount Fuji. Tricoecene mycotoxins (e.g., “yellow rain”)
can be produced simply using a corn meal slurry and the
appropriate strain of fungus.10

In discussions of biological warfare, we can start by
examining viruses in a literal sense, as part of the family of
biological agents. It is very easy for us to then turn to other
biological threats and apply the virus metaphor. However, a
more interesting test is to apply the metaphor to
information warfare, specifically the realms of computers
and cognition.
COMPUTER VIRUSES: DEFINITION
AND THREAT CONTEXT
With regard to joint doctrine, computer network attack,
after starting out as an innovative idea, is currently
undergoing refinement as a concept and appears to be
making a formal transition to doctrine. Computer network
attack is currently defined as “operations to disrupt, deny,
degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and
computer networks, or the computers and networks
themselves.” It was inserted in the draft of Joint
Publication 3-13, Information Operations, and has survived
the early rounds of staffing. Although computer network
attack is not focused solely on defending against viruses
(“hacking” without inserting viruses is a constant concern
among military information security professionals),
computer viruses are certainly a leading threat concern.
The U.S. Army’s Field Manual 100-6, Information
Operations, also refers to virus threats, but the treatment is
brief: “It is even possible that a military system could come
from the factory with an embedded logic bomb or virus. In
the past, new commercial floppy disks used by government
agencies have been found to contain a virus upon delivery
from the factory.”
11

12
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We interpret computer viruses using Dr. Fred Cohen’s
informal definition: “A computer virus is a computer
program that can infect other computer programs by
modifying them in such a way as to include a (possibly
evolved) copy of itself.” It is useful to note that computer
viruses do not exist solely in the digital environment. For
example the publication 2600 and other magazines
(published openly or underground) contain written code for
viruses in a “dormant” state, waiting to be input as machine
instructions in computer software.
13

Demonstrating the current threat from computer
viruses is difficult for several reasons. In this instance, both
the government and industry share a reluctance to discuss
and disclose “cyber-threats” and associated attacks. The
government, as is common with threat estimates, has based
much of its analysis on classified data. Industry on the other
hand, while concerned with privacy and proprietary data, is
perhaps more driven by the desire not to lose customer
confidence by disclosing vulnerabilities and mishaps
involving its automated information systems.
The Report of the President’s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) represents the most
inclusive effort to date to arrive at a baseline unclassified
threat statement for computer networks. In addition to the
hacking threat, the commissioners specifically mention
America’s vulnerability to viruses.
The threat is real enough. . . . Skilled computer operators have
demonstrated their ability to gain access to networks without
authorization. . . . Whatever their motivation, their success in
entering networks to alter data, extract financial or proprietary
information, or introduce viruses demonstrates that it can be
done and gives rise to concerns that, in the future, some party
wishing to do serious damage to the United States will do so by
the same means.[Emphasis added.]14

While general information on the threat from viruses is
available, more specific public information on deliberate
attacks is unlikely to appear unless and until some of the
15
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PCCIP’s recommendations for information sharing are
implemented.
Our aim, though, is to explore the use of viruses as a
metaphor for modern threats. In the context of our
metaphor to visualize threats, what if we step back from the
actual machine instructions used in computer viruses? Does
the virus metaphor apply to the more common hacking
threat? Cyber attack in the form of unauthorized entry into
a network or system is a serious concern, comprising the
chief focus of the PCCIP. One of the more rigorous
examinations of the threat of computer attack is a 1996
General Accounting Office (GAO) report. While the report
admits the exact number of computer attacks on the
Department of Defense is unknown, it goes on to declare
that “Defense may have experienced about 250,000 attacks
last year [1995], and…the number of attacks is
increasing.”
16

The report contains what has become an infamous
collection of statistics by the Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA), the implications of which are eye opening
for strategists. According to the report, the DISA
Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment Program simulates
cyber attacks by attempting:
to penetrate computer systems at various military service and
Defense agency sites via the Internet. Since the program’s
inception in 1992, DISA has conducted almost 38,000 attacks
on Defense computer systems to test how well they were
protected. DISA successfully gained access 65 percent of the
time. Of these successful attacks, only 988 or about 4 percent
were detected by the target organizations. Of those detected,
only 267 attacks or roughly 27 percent were reported to DISA.
Therefore, only about 1 in 150 successful attacks drew an
active defensive response from the organizations being
tested.17

Using version 2b of the definition of virus from this
paper’s introduction, consider for a moment the nature of
these simulated cyber attacks, as well as actual attacks
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reported in the news media. There are many types of
hackers, who

•
•

•
•
•

can be aggregated by age, motivation, nationality, etc.
(“any of a large group of”)
are extremely small in relation to their targets—from
one to a handful of hackers taking on several major
military installations simultaneously for example
(“submicroscopic” in relative size)
obtain unauthorized and undesirable entry
(“infectious agents’)
recruit new members, teach them, and share tools
(“are capable of growth and multiplication”), and
according to the GAO report have caused costly and
considerable damage (“cause various important
diseases”). Certainly the virus metaphor appears to
be a fitting layman’s thumbnail denomination for the
cyber attack threat. On one level it can be said that
infectious agents (hackers) sometimes use infectious
agents (viruses) in their cyber attacks.

COGNITIVE VIRUSES: DEFINITION
AND THREAT CONTEXT
Perhaps the most challenging type of warfare to relate
convincingly to the virus metaphor is memetic warfare,
based upon cognitive viruses. This is the case for a number
of reasons. First, memes and memetics are both relatively
recent terms in scholarship and national security
explorations. Second, by no means are the ideas contained
in and accompanying the area of memetics regarded by
either academics or strategists as proven. Finally, memetic
warfare is the least tangible type of warfare nominated in
this paper for serious examination.
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The scope of this paper does not permit a full treatment
of the idea of memetic warfare. The closest related doctrinal
term would be “perception management,” defined as

•

actions taken to convey and/or deny selected
information and indicators to foreign audiences to
influence their emotions, motives, and objective
reasoning; and to intelligence systems and leaders at
all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately
resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions
favorable to the originator’s objectives. In various
ways, perception management combines truth
projection, operations security, cover and deception,
and psychological operations.
18

Fortunately in the context of the Army After Next
Project’s construct, the nomination of “innovative ideas”
like memetic warfare is encouraged. It is when the idea
becomes a candidate for an Army concept or doctrine that it
undergoes the acid test. In this paper we can merely outline
the idea and discuss it in terms of cognitive viruses.
We define a cognitive virus as any agent that infects
people with a meme, a unit of information in a mind whose
existence influences events such that more copies of itself
get created in other minds. Professor Richard Dawkins
hinted at the original idea of the meme in his book The
Selfish Gene, and he defined the term in The Extended
Phenotype. Several thinkers have extended this idea to
discussions of warfare, including the father of modern
information warfare, Dr. Thomas P. Rona, who described
the idea of “societal immunodeficiency virus” (or SIV,
against which unwarned populations would have no
effective defenses) in some of his last discussions and
writings.
19

20

A good but short (3-page) summary of the memetic
warfare idea is found in the Jane’s Special Report, U.S.
Information Warfare, by Dr. George Stein and Colonel
(USAF Retired) Richard Szafranski. The section titled “The
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Memetic Warfare Model” attempts to apply memetics to the
topic of information warfare, with very intriguing
implications. The authors first recapitulate the tenets of
memetics, describing the meme as “the basic unit of cultural
imitation. . . . the means by which a society reproduces
itself.” They also call memes the “monads or building blocks
of culture, thinking and behavior,” stating that “humans
appear to be able to create ‘designer viruses’ of the mind
[that] nature cannot.”
21

Turning to the topic of information warfare (IW), Stein
and Szafranski speculate that “IW activities would be
designed to . . . insert new memes into the mind of the
adversary. In so doing, however, the mind viruses would
immediately begin to evolve, as each affected enemy mind
added to or modified the deployed virus.” According to the
authors, if borne out by further research and scientific
study,
In memetic-based IW, overt and subliminal messages could be
constructed to communicate memes at multiple levels, aiming
to travel at what Colonel [Robert J.] Wood characterized as
different “channels.”[22] Hidden somewhere in the surrender
and safe passage leaflets routinely used to incite enemies to
despair and surrender ought to be a snake split in two, a good
soldier towering above, an abundance of food and sunshine on
the surrender side of the line and a golden bridge across. Where
propaganda leaflets fail to use multiple channels, they fail to
compound the probability that the right memes are
communicated.23

We need to point out a chief difference between
traditional propaganda and memetic warfare, and
introduce a threat context for cognitive viruses. Unlike
traditional psychological operations (PSYOP) themes and
messages, cognitive viruses by our definition infect people
with a meme, a unit of information in a mind whose
existence influences events such that more copies of itself
get created in other minds. These memes present a potential
threat and opportunity for military strategists because they
spread so well and are so durable. In America, civilian
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examples of these memes are the “bad ideas” that simply
won’t go away. In Virus of the Mind, Brodie illustrates
several such as conspiracy theories (to include both “vast
right-wing and vast left-wing” themes), urban legends (e.g.,
decades-old complaints that Procter & Gamble’s logo is a
satanic symbol), and get-rich-quick Ponzi schemes that
continue to draw in victims and make their propagators
rich.
24

While these examples may make for amusing coffee-bar
banter, some memes have very deleterious effects, with
potential impacts on the overseas environment in which
U.S. national security activities (and potential military
deployments) occur. During the Korean Conflict,
allegations of U.S. germ warfare spread particularly
quickly, and proved resistant to repeated American
denials. More recently there has been a continuous
low-level strain of rumor and innuendo that the CIA and/or
DoD invented the AIDS virus, and then exported it overseas
as part of a racist plot. Frank Barnett writes that glasnost
failed to inhibit “Gorbachev’s regime from inciting Africans
to believe that U.S. defense factories generated the AIDS
virus, or from inflaming India with the rumor that
Washington hatched the plot to assassinate Mrs. Gandhi.”
These particularly tenacious memes have yet to be
eradicated. For another example, we could ask soldiers who
have been stationed in Latin America, specifically those
who have traveled to Guatemala, about the enduring local
rumors that Americans are buying babies and using them
for body parts and medicinal experiments.
25

26
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We might wonder whether some of these memes are so
potent as to be impossible to eradicate, and will continue to
require managed treatment in the form of denials and
focused public information campaigns when outbreaks flare
up. In addition we might ask what the difference is between
memetic warfare and perception management. There might
not be a difference; perhaps the ideas we described above
are only an advanced form of modern perception
management, using the best research and analysis
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available from area specialists, cultural anthropologists,
psychologists, technologists, and communications
professionals. On the other hand, it may be that memetics
will enable military analysts, planners, and decisionmakers
to obtain a greater understanding of IW, providing a potent
and refined tool with which to shape our adversaries’
perceptions. In that case, the effect may well most resemble
the activities of “viruses of the mind,” and the virus
metaphor would be well chosen.
SUITABILITY OF THE VIRUS METAPHOR
Although we chose the virus metaphor to help visualize
modern threats, the technique is not without its pitfalls.
Martin Libicki used metaphors as intellectual tools
throughout his book Defending Cyberspace and Other
Metaphors, but he is cautious in prescribing them:
Before analysis proceeds and policy recommendations can be
justified, metaphors must be put back into the box from whence
they came so that issues can be understood for what they are,
not what they look like. To use metaphor in place of analysis
verges on intellectual abuse. It invites the unquestioning
extension of a logic that works across the looking glass but lacks
explanatory power in the real world. Those who forget this are
apt to try to make their metaphors do their thinking for them.

Put another way, when one holds a hammer, most problems
look like nails. However, Libicki’s metaphors, including a
fascinating essay on warfighting lessons to be learned from
observing the human immune system,
show an
appreciation for the judicious use of metaphor.
29

In the data smog of the modern information
environment, decisionmakers, planners, and analysts often
use only a few highly representative pieces of information to
reduce problems of current operations to a manageable size.
The military leadership’s emphasis on extending
conceptual horizons to the year 2020 and beyond also impels
strategists to conduct assessments, present recommendations, and make decisions with even less clarity and
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confidence in their assessments. In response, decisionmakers and staffs will use shortcuts, or heuristics, to
classify situations according to a few key features and guide
their thinking (and learning).
The virus metaphor shows promise as a visualization
tool to grapple with modern threats in biological warfare,
computer network attack, and memetic warfare. Used
judiciously, and in particular if coupled with the AAN’s
construct of doctrine/concepts/ideas, the virus metaphor
helps provide both definition and context for harried
strategists assembling concise threat pictures. If the
metaphor withstands the scrutiny of time and criticism, it
may prove a valuable thinking and learning tool suitable for
the military’s intellectual toolbox.
VIRUSES, WMD, AND ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE
For all our focus on viruses as a metaphor to visualize
modern threats, how serious are “virus threats”? Are
viruses really weapons of mass destruction (however
unconventional)? If so, could the United States be
blindsided by their employment?
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Certainly the potential exists for a “bolt out of the blue”
strike employing biological weapons. Their delivery at the
proper time and place would almost assuredly cause
massive casualties in a highly industrialized nation, with
estimates ranging from 100,000 to a million for more serious
attacks. Efforts to control them range from international
agreements such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention to the U.N. inspection effort in Iraq. Biological
viruses are weapons of mass destruction in the most
concrete sense, with permanent and complete effects
projected to be every bit as lethal as some nuclear weapons.

209

Weapons of Mass Disruption.
The case of computer viruses, writ small as machine
instructions or writ large as hackers, is less clear. Certainly
there are those who predict an “electronic Pearl Harbor,” a
large-scale surprise information warfare strike on
America’s critical infrastructure. Others acknowledge this
possibility, but believe the more likely circumstance to be a
large-scale attack without very destructive effects. For a
strategic cyber attack, the “modern version of the scorched
earth principle becomes logically the destruction,
incapacitation, and corruption of the enemy’s information
infrastructure. This aspect of ‘information warfare’ has the
side benefit for the attacker to create confusion, panic, and
irrationality among the civilian target population. ” In this
case, viruses are more like weapons of mass disruption,
having a temporary and partial, albeit potentially serious
effect. (See Figure 15.)
30
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Figure 15. Unconventional Weapons of
Mass Destruction/Disruption?
Weapons of Mass Deception.
Finally we turn to the question of cognitive viruses.
While some may abhor their use in either peace or war, their
employment seems destined to continue, if not increase. It
has been argued that what we have called memetic warfare
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has been used to instigate outbreaks of violence in Rwanda,
Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia. The issue is
inflammatory, but the alleged misuse of mass media is
sufficiently troubling that recommendations to create a
special U.N. unit to “monitor, counter, and block radio and
television broadcasts that incited widespread violence in
crisis zones around the world” has come from such unlikely
sources as a former U.N. Human Rights Officer. However
troubling the concept of cognitive viruses might be in some
quarters, and recognizing that they can compound if not
instigate bloodshed, they are better termed weapons of
mass deception than mass destruction.
Rather than thinking of them solely in terms of WMD, a
better approach is to recognize that the different types of
“virus warfare” are well-suited for use as asymmetrical
means in a conflict. Asymmetrical warfare is likely to be one
of the foremost challenges faced by the United States in
future conflicts. As General Charles Krulak stated, “Our
enemies have seen CNN. They watched the technology and
they will not be content to fight the son of DESERT STORM.
They will fight the stepson of Chechnya, the stepson of
Somalia. [The 21st century] will be a century—the first part
of it at least—of chaos.”
32

Assessments of AAN wargames have supported General
Kru lak ’s assessment. Asymmetr i c al r es p ons es
characterized the Red Team’s reaction in the face of Blue’s
superiority in firepower and information dominance: “Red’s
learning curve rose sharply as the games progressed.
Confronted by overwhelming combat power, he resorted to
asymmetric responses in an effort to offset Blue’s
advantages.” Just as the notional adversaries engaged in
asymmetrical warfare during the wargame, future U.S.
adversaries could employ the three types of “virus threats”
described above. In thinking through the implications of
asymmetrical threats, using the virus metaphor as a
visualization tool could assist strategists in this difficult
task.
33
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OUR NEW OLD ENEMIES
Ralph Peters

Our enemies of the future will be enemies out of the past.
As the United States armed forces put their faith and
funding behind ever more sophisticated combat systems
designed to remove human contact from warfare, mankind
circles back to the misbehaviors of yesteryear. Technologies
come and go, but the primitive endures. The last decade of
this millennium has seen genocide, ethnic cleansing, the
bloody rending of states, growing religious persecution, the
ascendancy of international crime, an unprecedented
distribution of weaponry, and the persistence of the
warrior—the man of raw and selfish violence—as a human
archetype. In the 1990s, our Gulf War was the sole conventional conflict of note. Both lopsided and inconclusive, it
confirmed the new military paradigm—the United States is
unbeatable on a traditional battlefield—but that battlefield
is of declining relevance.
We have failed to ask the most basic military question:
Who is our enemy? Our ingrained response when asked
such a question is to respond with the name of a country—10
years ago it was the Soviet Union, while today China is the
preferred answer. We are desperate for enemies who make
sense to us, who certify our choices and grant us clarity of
purpose. But the age of warfare between states is waning—
it may return, but it is not the preeminent military
challenge of the coming decades. I believe we must ask that
question, “Who is our enemy?” on a much deeper level. We
must study the minds and souls of violent men, seeking to
understand them on a level our civilization has avoided for
2,000 years. We can no longer blame atrocities and the will
to violence on the devil, or on mistaken ideologies, or even on
childhood deprivations. None of the cherished explanations
suffice. In this age of technological miracles, our military
needs to study mankind.
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Morally, the best among us may be those who argue for
disarmament. But they are mistaken. The heart of the
problem is not the weapon, but the man who builds and
wields it. Were we to eliminate all weapons of mass
destruction, as well as every last handgun and pocketknife,
the killers among us would take up wooden clubs or rocks.
The will to violence is within us—it is not merely a function
of the availability of tools.
Man, not space, is the last frontier. We must explore
him.
It should not surprise us that religions have done a
better job of locating man’s desires and impulses than have
secular analysts, whether Hegel, Freud or media critics.
Religions handle the raw clay, and only those, which
address all of man’s potential shapes, survive. We are
defined by the full range of our desires and behaviors, not
only by those worthy of emulation. Successful religions
grasp our totality (and our fears). While social orders are
concerned with surface effects, religions look within. And
every major religion has a prohibition against killing. There
would be no need for such rules were man not a killer by
nature.
In th e J u deo- Chr i s ti an her i tage, ther e i s a
commandment believers credit directly to the writing finger
of God that says, “Thou shalt not kill.” Think about that.
Overall, the Ten Commandments did a remarkable job of
cataloging human frailty. As behavioral rules they are as
valid for today’s techno-civilization as they were for the
dreary near-Orient of 3,000 years ago. Those prohibitions
acknowledged the most destructive things that we humans
are apt to do, and they warned us not to do them. The
warning not to kill was the bluntest commandment.
For the moment, lay aside the concept of the Old
Testament as a sacred book and consider it as a
documentary of human behavior: It is drenched in violence,
and its moral tenets arose in response to a violent world. It
begins with the plight of two refugees—Adam and
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Eve—and moves swiftly to the fratricide of their children. In
book after book, we encounter massacre, genocide, ethnic
cleansing, rape, plunder, kidnapping, assassination,
ineradicable hatreds, and endless warfare. The fall of
civilizations is reported with a merciless eye, and cities
vanish with a terse comment. It sounds like the 20th
century: Humanity is consistent.
Historians, however, are inconsistent. Today, we have
moved away from our earlier view of civilization as a process
of constant improvement, with Western civilization as
man’s crowning achievement. Yet, the most vociferous
multiculturalists and anti-modernists, who imagine virtue
for all that is foreign, still insist thoughtlessly that
humankind is perfectible, if only we would take the latest
scholarship on the mating habits of aborigines more
seriously. I do not believe that Man has improved. There is
no evidence for it. Are we better than Christ, the Buddha or
Mohammed, better than Socrates, Ulug Begh, Maimonides
or Saint Francis? Fashions, conveyances, medicines,
communications, and the sophistication of governmental
structures have all evolved. Man has not. Man is the
constant. Saddam is Pharoah, and Cain will always be with
us.
I have chosen religious texts and figures as examples
because you know them and they resonate—not because I
expect you to dial a 1-800 number with a credit card pledge.
Is there a more powerful, cautionary myth for a military
man than that of Cain and Abel? Throughout both
Testaments, we encounter violent actors and soldiers. They
face timeless moral dilemmas. Interestingly, their social
validity is not questioned even in the Gospels. Although the
New Testament is often ambivalent toward soldiers, the
thrust of the texts is to improve rather than abolish the
soldiery. It is assumed that soldiers are, however
regrettably, necessary. In Luke, soldiers approach John the
Baptist asking, “What shall we do?” John does not tell them
to put aside their arms. Rather, he answers them, “Rob no
one by violence or by false accusation, and be content with
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your wages.” Would that the generals and admirals
involved in procurement heeded that advice today.
The Bible does not sugarcoat man’s nature. Belief is not
required—read it as a document and you will get a better
picture of the very human enemies our soldiers will face in
the next century than any work of contemporary
scholarship or speculation provides. From child warriors to
fanatics who revel in slaughter, our future is written in our
past.
Still, if you are uneasy with the Old Testament as a
catalog of human behaviors, substitute another work, The
Iliad, that is the fountainhead of our civilization’s secular
literature. It begins with an argument over raping rights,
proceeds through slaughter and betrayal, and has genocide
as its goal. It could be about the wreckage of Yugoslavia.
In our staff and war colleges, we still read
Thucydides—not for the history, but for the immediacy. Has
there been another historian since the Greek twilight who
matched his wonder at man’s complexity and our inability
to fit our desires to our capabilities?
Literature is history with the truth left in. I believe we
can profit from the study of the classical texts as never
before. The veneer of civilization—so recent and fragile—is
being stripped from much of the world. The old problems are
today’s problems—and tomorrow’s. If we want to know
“Who is our enemy?” we must look within.
I believe that mankind is a constant in a changing world.
We love the familiar, and find change hard. The conflicts in
which our military will engage in the coming years will have
many topical causes; at bottom, however, there will be only
two: Man’s nature, and the impact of change upon him.
The Muezzin and the Microchip.
Whether or not we as individuals believe in a divine
being, we can recognize religion as the most supple and
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consistently effective behavior modification tool available to
mankind. Now if you study religions—and the soldier who
does not know what his enemy believes fights blindly—you
will find that virtually all of them have two myths in
common: a creation myth, and the myth of a lost golden age.
The need for a creation story to explain our origins is
self-evident—it responds to the adult counterpart of the
child who wants to know from whence his little sister came.
But the myth of a lost golden age, of the white and shining
temple before the fall, is directly relevant to our purpose of
understanding our enemies.
We live in an age of unprecedented change—this is
statistical fact. Never before has so much happened on so
many levels with such breathtaking speed. Developments
in a wide range of disciplines tumble over one another in a
practical and psychological avalanche. Whether we speak of
social structures and gender relations, medicine,
communications and the utility of information, the
changing nature of work and wealth, convenience and the
shape of the inhabited landscape, or the sheer revolution of
choice available to our citizens, our society has undergone a
greater degree of intense and layered change than has any
human system in history. It is a tribute to the robustness of
our civilization that we have coped so well with change thus
far. Other civilizations and cultures—and individuals
elsewhere—are less resilient and are not coping effectively;
in fact, they are decaying. And the decay of a culture is the
human equivalent of the decay of atomic particles.
We live in an age when even the most adept, confident
man or woman feels the earth shifting underfoot. In the
parlance of strategic theorists, change is destabilizing. In
the experience of the human being enduring it, change is
confusing, threatening, and often hurtful. In the great
scheme of things, most change turns out to be positive for
most people. But it is only rarely so perceived.
Especially as we grow older, our eyes play tricks on
us—we are more likely to see that which is lost than that
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which is gained. How often do we hear our colleagues,
friends or relatives complain about the passing of the good
old days or how much better things were under the old boss
(forgetting how that boss was resented during his or her
tenure)?
Experience is of two kinds: that which we undergo, and
that which we remember. Those “good old days” were not
better. If man has not developed much, his (and certainly
her) opportunities have. But we long for the certainty of that
which we have known, suffered, and survived—especially
when it lies at a safe distance. When I was a kid, a drugstore
in my hometown displayed a poster showing a little boy
lowering a bucket into a well. The print read, “Remember
how sweet the water was from the old well? It was the
leading cause of typhoid fever.” I have never encountered a
more succinct description of man’s relationship to change.
In our memories, we sweeten the waters of the past and
erase the dirt and sickness from the myths we make of our
experience.
Men fight for myths, not for truth.
Those myths of the lost golden age are most seductive in
turbulent times. In the ferocity, confusion, and competition
of the moment, we need to believe that things were not
always so hard or so unfair, that there was a time of greater
kindness and justice, when man’s better qualities
prevailed—and that such an epoch might return, if only we
take the correct actions. Whether a radicalized mullah
aching to turn back the clock to the days of the great caliphs,
or a weekend militiaman in the Midwest longing for the
surety of a misremembered childhood, the impulse to
believe that times were better once upon a time is universal.
The experience of change and the consequent impulse to
gild the past are also timeless. I wrote above that we live in
an age of unprecedented change. This is true. Yet, it is also
true that men and women in past ages have lived through
times of then-unprecedented change. They, too, have felt
the earth shake beneath their feet and heard the heavens
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rumble. Accounts of the early days of the locomotive and
telegraph are packed with wonder and warning. An early
weapon of mass destruction, the crossbow, was outlawed in
its time by secular authorities and by the Pope. Poets have
always wept over the prosaic nature of their own ages, when
the beauty of the past lay murdered by the practical. Can we
imagine the shock at the arrival of bronze weapons felt by
the people of the ancient Middle East? How the villager
must have recoiled from the stench and temptation of the
rising city. The first wooden cask would have excited
mockery and the insistence by the old guard that wine was
meant to ferment in clay pots and that was that. The potato,
the most revolutionary food in modern history, terrified
Europeans when it was first imported, inspiring the belief
that it caused leprosy, among other diseases. The
information is lost to us now, but try to imagine the shock
the first laws codified by a state produced in ancient
populations governed until then by custom and by fear of
the supernatural. For that matter, imagine the shock a
legitimate, enforced code of law would produce in Russia or
Mexico today.
Given our fear of change, it is astonishing how intensely
we have developed our civilizations, if not ourselves. We
have changed the world—but all we have changed about
ourselves are our table manners.
This fear of change and the longing for the preservation
or resurrection of an old order are relevant stuff for us. Even
when our enemies are not personally motivated by the fear
of change, it is the fears of their neighbors that grant those
enemies opportunity. Wrapping themselves in the cloak of a
convenient cause, they exploit any rupture between the
governing and the governed, any gulf between a prospering
“progressive” elite and the stagnating ranks of believers or
traditionalist masses. The men who guide the world to
massacre understand the power of a call to the banner of
nationalism, or an appeal to tribal supremacy, or an
invitation to do some god’s cleansing work with fire and
sword. Demagogues capitalize on the sense of a trust
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betrayed and the “evil” of the new. They are geniuses of
blame. All of their failures, and the failures of all of their
followers, will forever be the fault of another.
Men will fight to the death to cling to a just-bearable
past rather than embrace a less certain future, no matter its
potential.
In any age of great change, human beings respond by
turning to religion and resuscitating tradition. In the age of
science, the frightened turn to belief. Perhaps the truest of
all our cliches is that “Ignorance is bliss.” Men and women
do not want to know. They may be pleased to learn of the
misfortunes of their neighbor—television talk shows have
their roots in tribal whispers—but they do not want to know
that their way of life, of belief, of organizing, learning,
producing, and fighting, is a non-competitive bust. The
greatest impact of this information age is that it forces
awareness of their inadequacy on the global masses.
At the height of the British Empire, the average
imperial subject had no idea how his rulers lived. Today, the
poor of the world’s slums—the subjects of America’s cultural
and economic empire—are on to the lifestyles of the rich and
famous, courtesy of television, films, video, radio, cassettes,
and appalling local journalism. They do not, of course, grasp
our reality. But they believe they do. The America they see
is so rich and powerful it can only be predatory. It must have
robbed them to grow so rich. It has no right to be so rich. And
it is unjust that we should not be so rich.
The media provide instant myth. An illusion of America
arrives, courtesy of lurid television serials, that is not only
exaggerated in its wealth, ease, and sexuality, but that is
devoid of antecedents. The world sees our wealth, but not
the sufferings of our ancestors in the creation of that wealth.
It is as if our riches had fallen from the skies. It is an
unbearable spectacle to those who have not.
At the same time, those who watch from abroad,
appetites growing, find themselves less and less able to
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compete with the American juggernaut. Economic
structures, the decline in the relative value of muscle power,
educational inadequacies, social prohibitions, and
counter-productive customs, the ineffectiveness of civil law
. . . these things and more constrict the potential of other
cultures to compete with the Great West—the United
States and our most culturally-agile allies. Even cultures
that appeared poised to break out to near-equivalence with
us, such as those of Southeast Asia, hit cultural
ceilings—and such ceilings are made of iron, not glass.
Most analysis of the current plight of the Asian “tigers”
focuses on economic issues—but the underlying problem is
cultural: the human infrastructure could not support the
level of success already achieved, let alone that which was
desired. The most disappointing—and worrisome—aspect
of the near-collapse of Asian economies was not the
financial losses but the alacrity with which the disappointed
states, leaders, and people blamed foreigners for their
misfortunes, when the problems were transparently
homemade. They also blamed their own minorities,
especially the diaspora Chinese. Already, in Indonesia, we
have seen the return of ethnic pogroms. Hatred is always
more satisfying than a sense of responsibility.
When nations and their underlying cultures fail to
qualify in today’s hyper-competitive world, they first
complain. Then, if there is no turn-around, they kill. Our
future enemies will be of two kinds—those who have seen
their hopes disappointed, and those who have no hope. Do
not worry about a successful China. Worry about a failing
China.
And even a failing China is unlikely to become the threat
defense contractors would have us believe. China is
culturally robust. Our most frequent opponents will rise
from cultures on the rocks. In our grim century, Russia and
Germany grew most dangerous after their systems of
cultural organization failed. Above all, this means the
Islamic world will be a problem for the foreseeable future,
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since it is unprepared to deal with the demands—and
mandatory freedoms—of the post-modern age. Beyond that
faded, failin g civi l i zati on, watc h out f or other
change-resistant cultures, from tribes and clans to states
that never shook off agrarian mentalities. None of these will
threaten our homes; abroad, however, they will threaten
our preferred order and the extraction of the wealth that
pays for our homes.
Contrary to the satisfying myths of the Left, the United
States did not build its new cultural-economic empire on the
backs of the world’s workers and peasants. But, thanks to
the information age, we will expand that empire at the
expense of failing cultures. The Left understood neither the
timeline nor the dynamics. And the Left still gets one huge
thing wrong: the notion of American malevolence. The
United States prefers prosperous markets—impoverished
masses don’t buy much software—but we cannot force
people to be successful.
Those who fall by the wayside in global competition will
have themselves, and their ancestors, to blame.
Sherman, Set The Way Back . . .
With the anti-modern tide of fundamentalism that has
swept away regimes and verities over the past two decades,
we have come to accept, once again, that religious belief can
turn violent. Yet, when we analyze our opponents, we insist
on a hard Joe Friday, “just the facts” approach that focuses
on numbers, hardware, and, perhaps, a few of their leaders.
We maintain a mental cordon sanitaire around military
operations, ignoring the frightening impact of belief on our
enemy’s will and persistence. We accept the CNN reality of
“mad mullahs” and intoxicated masses, but we do not
consider belief a noteworthy factor when assessing our
combat opponents. Yet, only plagues and the worst personal
catastrophes excite the religious impulse in man to the
extent that war does.
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The interplay of religion and military violence deserves
books, not just a few paragraphs. But begin with that which
we know. In vague outline, we are all familiar with the
Great Indian Mutiny, when the British East India
Company’s native levees, both Muslim and Hindu, reacted
to a rumor that their new cartridges had been soiled with
pig fat or beef lard by rising up and slaughtering their
overlords. While any Marxist will tell you there were
structural factors at play in the Sepoy Mutiny and that the
cartridges were but a catalyst, the fact remains that the
most savage experience of the Victorian era was the
butchery of the Mutiny—first the atrocities committed
against British men, women, and children, then the
slaughter perpetrated against the native population by the
British.
The Great Mutiny offers only a hint at the religious
violence once extant in the British Empire. London’s
imperial history offers an interesting study for today’s
problems; the overwhelming impact of industry-backed
regiments against native masses, the shattering of
established orders, the spiritual dislocations of the defeated
. . . all this is replaying around us, and will play on into the
next century at fast-forward speed. Notably, Britain’s most
embarrassing defeats of the 19th century were dealt the
empire not by other organized militaries, but by true
believers—whether the ferocious holy warriors of
Afghanistan or the devout Calvinist Boers. Again and
again, resistance to British influence or rule rallied around
a religious identity, whether following the Mahdi in the
Sudan or, in our own century, struggling to recreate Israel.
Our own national introduction to imperial combat involved
a Chinese revivalist order, the “Fists of Righteousness,” or
Boxers. In the Philippines, the impassioned Muslim Moros
proved a far tougher enemy for us than the conventional
Spanish military.
And what of the impact of belief within armies? It is a
war-movie truism that the frightened and dying turn to the
chaplain, but, if we argue individual cases, we might
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conclude this is evidence of desperation, not of a genuine
propulsion toward belief. Yet, consider our own bloodiest
conflict—the Civil War. It saw a widespread religious
revival in blue ranks and gray—although as the South’s
condition worsened, the intensity of religious fervor in the
Confederate armies grew extreme. Although it is
unfashionable to say so, there is ample evidence that, for
many on both sides, this was a holy war. Certainly, the
hungry, ill-clothed men in the Army of Northern Virginia
fought with the determination of martyrs. Stonewall
Jackson entered the war a religious extremist and fought
with a holy warrior’s dedication. Sherman was a secular
fanatic produced by an age of belief. His march from Atlanta
to the sea, then northward through the Carolinas, was
executed with a religious fervor, if without religious
rhetoric. When we return to the sources—the letters and
reports—it is clear that God was very much with both sides.
This is an ancient phenomenon. Return to the Iliad.
Read differently and more closely this time. Don’t skim the
long passages detailing sacrifices or the name-dropper
poetry about squabbling gods. Look at what Homer tells us
about belief in the ranks. The book begins with
Agamemnon’s defiance of the ordained order of things—a
middle finger thrust out not only at Achilles but at the gods.
The Greek forces suffer for it. Plague sweeps over them. The
Trojans briefly turn the tide. And the Greeks respond in
terms of their religion. The first step is not a new battlefield
strategy, it is a religious revival. Even the king must be
called to order. Penitence is in. Sacrifices must involve real
sacrifice. Certainly, the return of Achilles to the fight boosts
morale—but the Greeks also experience a renewed sense
that the gods are on their side. Meanwhile, in threatened
Troy, an other-worldly fatalism takes hold, dark prophecies
ring out, and Priam and his people search for an explanation
of their impending fall in the will of the gods.
Of course, we do not read the Iliad that way. It is not our
habit; we shy away from manifestations of faith, suspecting
or ignoring them, or, at best, analyzing them in the
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dehydrated language of the sociologist. But if we want to
understand the warriors of the world, and the fury that
drives them, we had better open our minds to the power of
belief.
In our own Western cultural history, the fiercest
military brutalities and the most savage wars were fought
over faith, whether Crusades or defensive wars against
Muslims, campaigns of suppression against dissenting
Christians, the great religious wars of the 16th and,
especially, 17th centuries, or the 20th century’s world wars
between our great secular religions.
Now our history is playing out in other flesh. When
Indonesian rioters murder Chinese merchants, or when the
Sudanese Muslims who hold power butcher and enslave the
Christians in their country’s south, their behavior is not
inhuman. On the contrary, it is very human, indeed.
Beware the enemy motivated by supernatural
convictions or great moral schemes. Even when he is less
skilled and ill equipped, his fervor may simply wear you
down. Our military posture could not be more skewed. We
build two-billion-dollar bombers, but we cannot cope with
barehanded belief.
The Shaman and the Gangster.
If the intoxicated believer is one very dangerous extreme
in the range of our enemies, the other is the man utterly free
of belief, or fear of the law, or civilizing custom. When you
encounter them together—the saint and the cynic in
league—you have the most dangerous combination on
earth. Charismatics and opportunists are a dynamic match,
as many a successful televangelist instructs us. You see it in
a sloppy fashion with Saddam Hussein and his belated
attention to Islam, but also in the alliance between Kremlin
bandits and the Orthodox Church.
From Algeria’s religious terrorists to politicians
anywhere who align themselves with religious movements
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whose convictions they privately do not share, it is often
difficult for us to determine where the prophet ends and the
profiteer begins, how much is about faith and how much
about grabbing power. In such cases, we tend to err on the
side of cynicism, preferring to impute base motives to our
enemies (even as we imagine that those enemies are
somehow redeemable). But slighting either side of the
equation, the human potential for cynicism or for belief,
brings us only half-answers. In conflict, the saint and the
cynic can complete each other without consciously
understanding why their alliance works so well—together
they combine the qualities of the cobra and the chameleon.
The most difficult thing for Americans in (and out of)
uniform to face may be that even the most powerful military
can, at most, briefly alter outward behaviors. We subdue
belief only by killing the believer. The opportunist will bow
to the threat of lethal power—until you turn your back. But
no display of might will change the essence either of the man
driven by God, or of the man driven by greed.
We have entered another age when empires begin to
learn their limits. While our empire has—and will
maintain—informational dominance, we cannot dictate
which information will be accepted and acted upon by
foreign populations. We can flood them with our culture,
shock them into doubt, sell them our wares—but we cannot
make them behave as we would like . . . unless we are willing
to commit brutalities on a scale that would destroy our own
myth of ourselves.
Certainly, if sufficiently provoked, we are capable of
killing plentifully and with enthusiasm. But such events
are exceptional. In their balance and wisdom, the American
people will fight genuine enemies, but they would not now
countenance the slaughter of foreign populations over
distant misbehaviors. The mark of our civilization’s
greatness is a very simple but very rare one: at this point in
our social development, we would rather do good than evil,
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so long as it doesn’t cost too much. It is a surprisingly rare
quality.
Elsewhere, there is less interest in the inviolability of
the individual or of his society, if it is foreign and subscribes
to a different creed. We face enemies whose sole motivation
to refrain from killing is the fear of being killed. Nothing else
moves them. It is difficult for Americans, with our lack of
historical knowledge and our fuzzy notion of the validity of
all cultures, to grasp the richness of hatred in this world. For
all of our alarm over crime, most Americans live in an
astonishingly safe environment. We are not threatened, and
we behave cooperatively and corporately. But our safety is
both the result of and contributor to our insularity. We lead
sheltered lives. And we imagine that the rest of the world is
just like us, only less privileged.
But the rest of the world is not like us. For all of our
lingering prejudices, we have done a remarkable job of
subduing our hatreds. Perhaps it is only the effect of wealth
bounded by law, but we are a powerful exception to history.
We are indescribably fortunate—but our good fortune has
lulled us into our primary military and diplomatic
weakness: we do not understand the delicious appeal of
hatred.
We cannot understand how Serbs, Croats and Bosnian
Muslims could do that to each other. We cannot understand
how Hutus and Tutsis could do that to each other. We do not
understand how the Chinese could do that to the Tibetans.
We do not understand how the Armenians and Azeris could
do that to each other. We do not understand how the tribes
of Sierra Leone or Liberia could do that to each other. We do
not understand how India’s Hindus and Muslims could do
that to each other. We do not understand how the Russians
and Chechens could do that to each other. We do not
understand how Haitians, Somalis, Colombians, Mexicans,
Indonesians, Sri Lankans, Congolese, Burundians, or Irish
could do that to each other. . . .
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Over the years, I have written about “warriors,” the
non-soldiers we encounter and fight, from guerrillas to
narco-traffickers. In the past I stressed the importance of
recognizing five types of warriors: the scum of the earth, the
average Joe who is drawn into the conflict as it drags on,
demobilized military men, opportunists, and true believers.
Now I worry about only two of these sources of conflict—the
opportunists and the believers, the gangsters and the
Godly, the men unrestrained by morals and those whose
iron morality is implacable. They are the centers of gravity.
The others are swept along by the tide.
Man, the Killer.
Of all the notions I have advanced over the years, only
one has met with consistent revulsion and rejection—the
statement that men like to kill. I do not believe that all men
like to kill. At the extreme, there are those saintly beings
who would take their own lives before taking the life of
another. The average man will kill if compelled to, in
uniform in a war, or in self-defense, but has no evident taste
for it. Men react differently to the experience of killing.
Some are traumatized. Others simply move on with their
lives. But there is at least a minority of human beings—
mostly male—who enjoy killing. That minority may be
small—but it does not take many enthusiastic killers to
trigger the destruction of a fragile society. Revolutions,
pogroms, genocides, and civil wars are not made by
majorities, but by minorities with the acquiescence of the
majority. The majority may gloat, or loot, but the killing
minority drives history.
Violence is addictive. Police know this. That’s where the
phrase “the usual suspects” comes from. In our society, the
overwhelming majority of violent acts are committed by
repeat offenders. Statistics would make us a violent nation;
in fact, we are a peaceable people until aroused. The
numbers are skewed because we have failed to deter
recidivists. Spouse- and child-abusers do not do it
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once—they repeat. Sex offenders—and sex crimes are all
crimes of violence—are notorious repeat offenders. Most
barroom brawls are begun by the same old troublemakers.
Even in combat, when mortal violence is legal, most enemy
combatants killed in close fighting appear to be killed by a
small number of “high performers” in our ranks.
Throughout history, many a combat hero has had difficulty
adjusting to peace.
We reject the evidence of the human enthusiasm for
violence because it troubles us and undercuts the image we
have created of perfectible Man. But violence has an
u n den iab le a ppeal . Cer tai nl y f or the other wi se
disenfranchised, it is the only response left. Perhaps the
psychologists are right that much violence is a cry for help.
But what both of those arguments really say is that
violence, however motivated, is gratifying and empowering.
Religions and civilizations may be seen as attempts to
discipline mankind, to trim our worst excesses.
Traditionally, religions and civilizations acknowledged
mankind’s propensity for violence and imposed appropriate
strictures. Certainly, no religion or civilization has believed
it could ignore violent behavior as peripheral. Yet, our
contemporary American approach is to treat violence as an
aberration, the product of a terrible misunderstanding. It is
the mentality of the born victim, of the abused spouse who
believes every weeping apology, of the social worker who
believes in the mass murderer’s rehabilitation. Our willful
denial of the full spectrum of man’s nature, from the sublime
to the beastly, is a privilege of our wealth. It is not a privilege
that will be extended to our soldiers.
Look at the wreckage of this decade. Can we pretend
that the massacre of half a million Rwandan Tutsis by their
neighbors was carried out as a laborious chore? On the
contrary, reports from the scene describe murderers
intoxicated by their deeds. When we consider the ingenious
cruelties perpetrated daily in Algeria, can we believe that
the killers are forced to commit those atrocities against
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their inclinations? Will we pretend that the dead of
Srebrenica were the victims of reluctant hands?
A meaningful sense of humanity demands that we ask
hard questions about the nature of man. Military
effectiveness in the coming decades will make the same
demands. It will be terribly difficult for us. Our uniquely
noble elevation of the individual’s worth is ill-suited to a
world in which our opponents regard the masses that follow
them as surplus capital.
The American Myth of Peace.
A corollary to the universal myth of a lost golden age is
the recurring myth of the peaceable kingdom, where the lion
lies down with the lamb and the spear is broken in two. This
has long been a powerful myth in the American ethos,
carried from Europe by the first colonists who sailed for New
England. Especially in those northern colonies, many of the
early settlers belonged to dissident Protestant sects out to
replicate the kingdom of God on earth. Many were
pacifists—at least among their brethren—or had strong
pacifistic inclinations. They had been oppressed and, no
matter that they would become oppressors in their time,
their experiences had condensed their vision of a just, ideal
world to diamond hardness.
Our founding fathers and mothers fled Europe’s
dynastic struggles convinced that such wars, and by
extension all wars, were ungodly. Later, they fought the
Indians, then the French, then the British, then their
southern neighbors, then much of the world. But they never
accepted war as in the natural order of things. War was a
terrible, unnatural misfortune, perpetrated by despots and
madmen, or spawned by injustice. But it was not a core
human endeavor.
From that heritage we Americans have developed our
ahistorical belief that all men want peace, that all conflict
can be resolved through compromise and understanding. It
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leads to the diplomatic equivalent of Sunday-night snake
handling—faith in the power of negotiations to allay hatred.
Because we are privileged and reasonably content with our
corner of the planet, we find peace desirable. There is
nothing wrong with this. The problem arises when we
assume that all other men, no matter how discontented,
jealous, disenfranchised, and insulted, want peace as well.
Our faith in man is, truly, a blind faith.
Many human beings have no stake in peace. They draw
no advantage from the status quo. We even see this is our
own fortunate country. A disproportionate share of crime is
committed by those with the least stake in society—the
excluded and marginalized with little or nothing to lose. In
this age of accelerating change, we, too, suffer from extreme
fundamentalism concentrated at the lower end of the social
spectrum (though not at the bottom among the
drug-wrecked Lumpenproletariat). Consider the crimes
that trouble us most. Gang crime occurs between those with
the least to gain or lose from the social order the rest of us
cherish. The Oklahoma City bombing was the work of a man
who felt rejected by the society around him, who felt
wronged. The repeated bombings of abortion clinics
consistently prove to be the work of low-skilled males who
have turned to aggressive religious beliefs in which
tolerance is intolerable. Dangerous true believers and
violent opportunists are very much with us in our own
homeland.
We are, however, better positioned to control their
excesses. Neither right-wing militias nor extreme
fundamentalists are going to take over our country in the
foreseeable future. But much of the world is less fortunate.
Where there is less opportunity (sometimes none) and the
existing, comforting order shrivels, human beings want
validation and revenge. They cannot accept that their
accustomed way of life is failing and that they are failing
individually because of the behaviors to which their culture
has conditioned them. They want someone to blame, and
then they want revenge on that someone. A leader, secular
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or religious, has only to preach the gospel of foreign devils
and dark conspiracies—to absolve his listeners of
responsibility for their own failures—and he will find a
willing audience. Humans do not want change. They want
their customs validated. They want more material
possessions, but they do not want to alter their accustomed
patterns of behavior to get those things. This is as true in
America’s inner cities as it is in the slums of Karachi or
Cairo.
Again, many human beings thrive on disorder. When
the civil war ends, the party is over. Many of the difficulties
in Bosnia today stem from warriors who built thriving black
market and criminal networks during the fighting and do
not want to let go of them. Often, those who do the bulk of
the fighting are men ill equipped to prosper in peace. The
gun is their professional tool. When they grow convinced by,
or are at least cloaked in, nationalist or fundamentalist
religious beliefs, they are vulnerable only to greater force. In
Russia, much of the citizenry longs for the rule of law—even
the harsh law of the past. But those who have enriched
themselves during Russia’s new “time of troubles” like the
system just the way it is; it is difficult to convince a
prospering gangster that the rule of law will work to his
advantage. Around the world, from Uganda to Abkhazia, it
is difficult to persuade those whose only successes in life
have come from the gun in their hand that they should hand
over that gun. Being a warlord, or just the warlord’s
retainer, is a far more attractive prospect than digging a
ditch for a living—or, worse, failing to find work as a
ditchdigger.
We profit from peace. Our opponents profit from conflict.
It is as fundamental a mismatch as the one between our
forces and theirs. When they try to play by our rules,
whether in the military or economic sphere, we demolish
them. When, however, we are forced to play by their rules,
especially during military interventions, the playing field is
not only leveled—it often tilts their way.
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When we drive the warriors into a corner or defeat them,
they will agree to anything. When our attention is
elsewhere, they will break the agreement. Their behavior,
natural to them, is unthinkable to us. And then they
massacre.
We pride ourselves on our rationality, while avoiding
reality. If we are to function effectively as diplomats and
soldiers, we need to turn a dispassionate eye on mankind.
We need to study the behavior of the individual and the
mass, and to do it without stricture. We cherish the fiction
that technology will be the answer to all our dilemmas. But
our enemies know that flesh and blood form the irresistible
answer to our technologies.
Troy and Jerusalem.
Another cliche with a core of truth is that Americans are
the new Romans, proprietors of a (near-) universal empire
based upon engineering and codification. Certainly, we
guard the walls of our civilization against new barbarians.
But the mundane parallels are more intriguing. First, even
when the Romans behaved cruelly at the height of empire, it
was a measured policy. Second, their military was tiny in
proportion to the range of their empire, and their legions,
while rarely defeated, were often astonished by the
savagery of their opponents. Third, the Romans so
cherished their civilized image of themselves that it blinded
them to barbarian strengths.
Fanatics brought Rome down. We associate the fall of
Rome with Alaric and the Visigoths and a jumble of other
warrior peoples who swept in from the north for long
weekends (as German tourists do today). But Rome’s
decline was slow, and the empire rotted from within.
Romans loved the law—even under the worst emperors, the
rule of law never disappeared entirely—and they grew
convinced that peace was the natural order of things. Their
judges sought equity and order, and their legalisms crippled
them.
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Let us return to our beginning and consider the New
Testament. Contrary to the Christian creed, the historical
figure of Jesus does not appear to have “suffered under
Pontius Pilate.” On the contrary, Pilate the Roman did not
understand the case before him and was not certain it fell
within his purview. He was baffled and annoyed by the local
squabbles, failed to appreciate the social and religious
complexities involved, and just wanted the problem to go
away. He was the classic representative of empire. We can
almost smell the heat of the day and imagine the Roman’s
impatience with his translator. When arbitration failed,
Pilate “washed his hands” of the prisoner’s fate, more
diplomat than soldier. Pilate was a symbol of weakening
Rome and growing Roman self-doubt. He served at Rome’s
apogee, yet the cancer was already there. His descendents,
preferring debate to decision, would be no match for the
fanatics who could kill the sober and the just without
blinking. Pilate stuck to the letter of the law, and the law
damned him.
As empires fall—and I am not suggesting that our own
empire will fall for a long time—the people of the empire
return to religion. Christianity, a liberating mystery
religion of the lower classes, had to struggle during the
heyday of the Roman empire. But when the decline became
impossible to deny, the new religion, with its revolutionary
rhetoric, prospered. In prospering, it further accelerated the
decline of the old order. The repressions were too little too
late.
The Romans were chronically late to respond to
challenges in the age of the lesser caesars. The destruction
of Solomon’s Temple in Jerusalem and the suppression of
the Jewish kingdom was not a sign of remaining imperial
strength, but of weakness, frustration, and decline. In its
confident years, the Roman Empire had been absorptive
and tolerant. For centuries, these qualities lent strength
and co-opted new subjects—but ultimately core identities
and commitments to the Roman idea were fatally diluted. It
was those who refused to be absorbed and who rejected
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toleration, from the brute German tribes to the true
believers from the eastern provinces, who outlasted the
greatest empire the earth knew until our own century.
We can measure historical climates by reading the
growth bands of a tree stump. We can measure the climate
of a culture by noting its religious revivals or the advent of a
new religion—each marks a time of great stress on the
society. In 1998, we are living in the most passionately
religious age in centuries. The future looks ferocious.
Leaving aside the threat from weapons of mass
destruction, however, the United States appears
invulnerable for the foreseeable future. Terrorists might
annoy us, but we will triumph. We will, ultimately, find the
strength of will to do what must be done. The problems
raised in this essay affect the average, prosperous American
citizen little, if at all. But it is the soldiers of our new empire,
the men and women who serve in our expeditionary forces
and deploy to subdue enemies we refuse to understand, who
will pay the cost of our willful ignorance. They will still win,
when allowed to do so. But more of them will suffer and die
for lowered returns because of our stubborn unwillingness
to face the complexity of mankind.
Come back now to Troy. Read that great poem one more
time, without the prejudices we have learned. You will find
that the triumphant Greeks were the devious, the
barbarous, and the murderous. The Trojans were the urban,
civilized, and tolerant. Troy stood for learning, piety, and
decency. Its mistake was to humiliate implacable
barbarians, without the will to destroy them. The Trojans
fought to be left alone in their comfortable world. The
Greeks fought for revenge, spoils, and the pleasure of
slaughter. The Greeks won. Ulysses, who finally inveigled a
way through the city gates, was the first great Balkan
warlord. Murdered King Priam was a decent man who
watched the war from behind his walls and had to beg for
the return of his son’s mangled body. He was presidential in
his dignity.
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We are not Trojans. We are far mightier. We rule the
skies and seas, and possess the power to rule the land when
we are sufficiently aroused. But we have not learned to
understand, much less rule, minds and hearts and souls.
The only moral we need to cull from the Iliad is that it is
foolish to underestimate the guile and determination of the
killers from the other shore.
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PART III: STATE-ON-STATE APPROACHES
INTRODUCTION
Lloyd J. Matthews

In Part III—State-on-State Approaches, we move from
particular asymmetric threats to U.S. security to particular
countries that might pose such threats. Strategic analysis
remains incomplete if it merely dissects how we can be hurt
or defeated, failing to connect such vulnerability to concrete
capabilities of actual or potential enemies from this world.
In “How We Will Lose the War With Russia: A Critique of
U.S. Military Strategy,” Dr. Stephen J. Blank offers the
thesis that in a war with Russia we could well suffer
politico-strategic defeat despite achieving decisive
operational success. At the outset, Dr. Blank notes that it is
hard to construct a rational definition of victory that does
not entail the destruction of Russian nuclear and/or
conventional capability, the collapse of its government, or
the occupation of Russian territory. Yet, would we want any
of these things to happen? Would they bring us a better
peace? Dr. Blank goes on to point out that any one element of
this notion of victory implies total war, which itself becomes
unthinkable given Russia’s still formidable nuclear arsenal.
How could we find ourselves in this kettle of fish?
Ironically, according to Dr. Blank, it could be the result of
our own misguided declaratory policies, aided and abetted
by our arrogance regarding the oft-sung epic prowess of the
Army After Next.
By advertising our capability and intention to wage
massively destructive, simultaneous, multi-level war
throughout the depth of the enemy’s homeland and to
decapitate his government by destroying all nodes of
command, control, and communications, we effectively
threaten a war that from the enemy’s perspective is total.
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Such a perception opens the door to desperate acts of
preemption or retaliation by the enemy, employing nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction. We thus fall victim
to our own hoopla in behalf of the vaunted technological and
informational superiority produced by the Revolution in
Military Affairs.
The RMA and its important derivative, information
warfare, doubtlessly do confer upon the United States
significant asymmetric advantages over Russia at the
operational level of war. But rather than continuing to gloat
publicly over these advantages, in the process propounding
a da n g erou sly a ggr essi ve str ategi c d oc tr i ne f or
employment, U.S. thinkers must, in Dr. Blank’s view,
devote harder thought to the limitations of new weapon
systems and particularly to the second- and third-order
effects of the doctrine for employing them, and then align
that doctrine with America’s true politico-strategic aims
and interests.
In “Regional State Competitors: The Case of Iraq,” Dr.
Stephen C. Pelletiere undertakes to demonstrate that in the
Gulf crisis of February 1998, featuring an asymmetrical test
of power between Iraq and the United States, the weaker
power won. In this sobering study, perfectly suited to a
conference on asymmetrics, we learn, or re-learn, that
victory doesn’t always go to the party with the bigger
battalions.
It is true that Iraq did finally accede to the resumption of
biological-chemical weapons inspections, but it did so only
after having stalled long enough to perform any necessary
sanitization of suspect storage and manufacturing sites,
and after isolating the United States from its 1991 Gulf War
coalition allies. By cleverly playing upon Arab resentment
of the U.S. double standard in dealings with Iraq vis-à-vis
Israel, by exploiting European resentment of U.S. attempts
to infringe economic ties with Iran, and by fueling domestic
opposition to threatened attacks on Iraq within the United
States itself, Saddam Hussein greatly weakened his
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superpower enemy in any future resumption of the crisis
and took a giant step toward accomplishing his goals of
ending the United Nations inspections and having the
economic sanctions lifted.
Lacking solidarity with its coalition partners, lacking
consensus on the home front, and lacking a broadly felt
sense of threat from Iraq itself, the United States would be
best advised, in Dr. Pelletiere’s estimation, to avoid another
confrontation with Iraq and re-think its present policy of
“dual containment” (isolation) of Iraq and Iran.
In “Beyond Russia and China: A Survey of Threats to
U.S. Security from Lesser States,” Dr. Kori N. Schake, after
taking note of the supposition that a major peer competitor
of the United States is unlikely to emerge within the next 15
years, sets out to discover which if any less-than-peer states
(excluding Russia and China) might pose a threat in the
interim.
The three “usual suspects,” North Korea, Iran, and Iraq,
are examined initially and found to be increasingly unlikely
as credible opponents—North Korea out of abject economic
weakness, Iran because of its moderating internal political
environment, and Iraq owing to the continued marginality
of its armed forces.
There are, however, six “nightmare scenarios,” unlikely
but possible, that in Dr. Schake’s view could materialize to
threaten U.S. security or interests: (1) anti-U.S. coalitions;
(2) violent emergence of new states based upon ethnic
consolidation; (3) adverse change of political orientation
among existing U.S. allies; (4) political/psychological
manipulations by enemy states to constrain application of
U.S. force; (5) RMA-induced incompatibilities between the
armed forces of the United States and those of its allies; and
(6) criminalization of governments. With regard to the
latter, the rise to power of criminal regimes in either Russia
(with its nuclear arsenal) or Mexico (with the 2000-mile
Mexican-U.S. border) would pose a particularly grave
threat to U.S. security.
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While Dr. Schake makes no claim that the United States
could control or even materially influence all emergent
scenarios antithetical to American interests, she does make
the point that adequate vigilance abetted by traditional
diplomatic-military tools could make America’s task
manageable in most cases.
Glancing back to Part I on asymmetric warfare as
practiced in ages past and present, we recall one cardinal
axiom: A superior level of scientific and technological
advancement along with the weaponry that goes with it does
not necessarily translate to victory in war. Victory goes
rather to the side that musters in its behalf a decisive share of
the total universe of factors affecting man’s will and ability
to coerce his fellow man.
In Part II addressing generic threats to American
security over the next 20-25 years, we learned that those
threats can take new and unexpected forms. Enemies
unable to outmatch us on our terms will exert great
ingenuity and resourcefulness to outmatch us on their
terms, particularly in areas where we are too negligent, too
complacent, or too proud to attend. Part III teaches much
the same lesson, reminding us additionally that relatively
backward states taken for granted can rise up to smite us
when conditions are right. America the technological and
information behemoth beware.
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HOW WE WILL LOSE
THE NEXT WAR WITH RUSSIA:
A CRITIQUE OF U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY
Stephen J. Blank

Introduction.
The ignominious fiasco of our campaign against Iraq
showed that our strategy was deficient or had gone on
holiday. We have clearly forgotten that war remains the
continuation of politics by other means which are employed
to obtain a supposedly better peace. Hence the strategy that
cannot materialize political goals either through war or
peaceful means is defective. Our Iraqi experience shows
that we cling to failed strategies and ways of thought, that
we still see war as being distinct from politics and military
operations as distinct from strategy.
These defects apply with particular force to a (hopefully)
purely hypothetical war with Russia or any potential peer
competitor. Indeed, such a scenario immediately raises the
question of devising a rational definition of victory. A victory
in a war with Russia must mean either the destruction of
Russian nuclear and/or conventional capability, the
collapse of its government, or the occupation of Russian
territory. Any of these definitions of victory must entail a
total war which should be ruled out due to Russia’s nuclear
arsenal. But even if we won without going nuclear, we would
have ultimately won nothing and fought a war with little or
no strategic rationale. However, that consideration does not
necessarily prevent the unthinkable from becoming real.
Indeed, our infatuation with technological revolutions in
warfare suggests that we still seek to wage limited
high-tech conventional war without fully grasping that
doing so against major rivals entails a total war. Army
strategy, for instance, proclaims that it will be satisfied with
nothing less than decisive victory, but if victory cannot be
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plausibly defined then what happens? Our strategy does
not know where it is going. Thus the inherent difficulty of
defining a true strategic victory in what would almost
inevitably be a total war for our enemy suffices to call our
strategy into question.
That strategy rests on the oft-cited formulation of
“leveraging” technological superiority and converting it into
operational and strategic superiority. However, the
revolution in military affairs (RMA) and our superiority in
information warfare (IW) are not surrogates for strategy
and do not eliminate the need for it. Indeed, the wonder
weapons we possess cannot deprive Iraq of a weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) capability, locate its sources, or
overcome the shortfall in intelligence regarding the location
of Iraqi WMD assets and capabilities. The confident
prophecies that the battlefield will soon be subject to our
global reconnaissance technologies—meaning that if you
move, you die—are premature.
2

Therefore we must locate the deficiencies in our own
strategy, which can cause strategic defeat or failure
(against Russia or comparable rivals) even if we win an
overwhelming battlefield victory. Moscow is already
preparing materially and doctrinally for contemporary and
future war. While Russia probably cannot acquire all the
necessary skills and integrate all the aspects of modern
platforms to create RMA and IW capable forces, it continues
to upgrade its forces’ capabilities towards that end. We can
expect Russia to continue to explore new capabilities and
ideas since it feels it must resist U.S. power.
3

Problems of U.S. Strategy.
First of all, to attain victory, however we define that
term, we must overcome our own ingrained tendencies to
chauvinism, insularity, and ethnocentrism in military
affairs. Otherwise those qualities, born of past success, will
handicap us in any contest with foreign states, political or
4
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military. We ignore foreign countries’ ideas and situations
at our peril and risk losing victory at the strategic level.
For instance, it is commonly accepted that current
concepts of the RMA and of IW constitute a uniquely
American doctrine of war. The next century is confidently
expected to be an American one where everyone follows our
example. Everyone must follow in our wake or fall apart.
And that fact gives us a lasting information edge. This state
boosterism is often accompanied by an equally triumphalist
and pervasive service boosterism that obscures more than it
enlightens. Indeed, some Air Force writers regard the
current dominance of U.S. air power as revealing an almost
mystical relationship between a supposedly more
democratic form of military power and the world’s leading
democracy. But both service and national ethnocentrism
are grievously misplaced.
5

6

Indeed, the very concept of the RMA originated in Soviet
military thought as a response to the advent of nuclear
weapons and the dawn of the cybernetic age. Soviet writers
sought to use conventional arms to obtain a decisive
strategic result in Europe and, to a lesser degree, in
Northeast Asia. They sought to achieve victory and avoid
nuclear war through deterrence or parity, or by destroying
our strategic weapons in Europe in the first hours of the
offensive. They also contemplated their own first strike
attack on our strategic forces but could never figure out how
to avoid a subsequent unwinnable nuclear war. But both
they and we were essentially driven by the search for usable
military power.
7

8

9

In the 1980s we appropriated the term RMA and other
Soviet operational concepts like Airland Battle and Follow
on Forces Attack. As the Soviet regime fell apart in the
1990s, we conducted a textbook Soviet-style offensive in the
Gulf in 1991 as the Soviet Chief of the General Staff claimed
to U.S. visitors. Thus our paradigm was born in Moscow
although Moscow could not realize its theoretical
innovations in practice.
10
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Nevertheless our current thinking about war, derived
from Operation DESERT STORM, could lead us into failure
to understand modern warfare and strategy. The Iraqi
crisis of February 1998 suggests that this failure may not be
far off. Indeed, it is all too apparent that our strategy
essentially consists of a mechanical repetition of preparing
to fight the last war again and again. We have failed to
translate our earlier battlefield victory against Iraq into a
lasting status quo, where we no longer must revisit the
scene and use force again under much worse political
conditions. If we should fall into conflict with Russia, we will
not have the luxury of revisiting the theater 7 years later to
try to rectify our mistakes. Nor do we have the luxury of the
leisurely buildup of forces in the theater that characterized
DESERT STORM.
Given the prevailing and all-encompassing sense of
threat in Russian military writing, Moscow would likely
view a war with us as an unlimited or total war. Whether we
won by destroying conventional forces and escaping nuclear
conflict, or somehow destroyed or neutralized Russia’s
nuclear capabilities, or even occupied parts or all of Russia,
there is no way any Russian government could survive.
That government would disappear or at least lose territory.
And we, like the foreign occupiers in 1918, would be forced to
occupy and patrol vast areas of a nuclearized former Soviet
Union—clearly an absurd strategic result. Yet once we
make our central target and center of gravity the stability of
the enemy’s government, as our strategy and doctrine do,
we have made that war a total war for our enemy. Almost
without realizing it, we have converted our operational
template, believing it to be one of limited war, into an
asymmetric total war for our enemy. This strategic
nonchalance inevitably has profound and far-reaching
results. To embark upon it means gambling on
revolutionary transformations beyond our control,
imagination, and understanding.
Indeed this unthinking jeopardizing of our strategic
goals through an asymmetric war almost suffices to
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guarantee strategic failure since nobody can give a
plausible definition of victory. Where the proper limits of
operations cannot be determined or imposed, the end result
is invariably chaos, revolution, and defeat, as Bismarck
predicted in 1887-88 and as came true in Germany’s
“victory” over Russia in the First World War.
11

Our quest for military victory, based on our economy and
modern technology’s astonishingly innovative capabilities,
pushed us to pursue qualitative superiority against the
massive Soviet armies. This “offset strategy,” first
developed by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in the
1970’s and then carried forward by the Reagan and Bush
Administrations, aimed not only to give U.S. forces
qualitative superiority, but also the capability to defeat
Soviet forces by innovative and borrowed operational and
strategic concepts, including global economic and
propaganda warfare. These forms of warfare must be
listed in any objective account of U.S. strategy to use
technology and telecommunications to attain high-level
strategic objectives, including the destabilization of enemy
regimes.
12

However, whether intended or not, this strategy also
provided our government and armed forces the means to
achieve strategic objectives that related to more domestic,
parochial concerns.The RMA and IW, at least in theory,
provide opportunities to wage war rapidly at great distance
by achieving air and electronic superiority as a leveraging
force, sustain minimal casualties in order to overcome
domestic opposition, avoid protracted war at all costs,
replace the politically costly system of conscription and its
associated manpower costs with technology to make up the
increasing shortfall between our growing responsibilities
and declining defense budgets, and constrain the media’s
ability to portray the war other than as the generals want it
portrayed. In other words, the RMA and IW supposedly
enable us to overcome what many military men believed
were the reasons for our loss in Vietnam and also to
revolutionize warfare to our advantage.
13
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Adherents of the RMA proclaim that it leads to a new
paradigm of “distance warfare” or “parallel warfare”
because it strikes at enemy targets all at once. It is a war
dominated by long-range strike platforms operated by fewer
soldiers, using state-of-the-art sensors, precision-guided
weapons, etc. New forms of war also let us overcome the
dilemma of sequential operations. By linking strike and
reconnaissance capabilities and platforms in real time so
that forces can effect decisive strategic outcomes in the
initial operation and collapse together the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of war, we can convert
formerly sequential and interrupted operations into one
decisive, rapid, continuous joint operation. This decisive
operation would mount a combined, joint weapons and
electronic attack on classic military targets as well as the
en emy ’s
c ommand control-communications-computers-surveillance-reconnais
sance (C4ISR) capabilities. The latter constitutes the
enemy’s true center of gravity. The notion that we would
successfully target the enemy’s ability to know what is
happening and lead its troops has been “deified” as doctrine,
at least in the Air Force. In the first strike alone, our
technological and informational superiority would destroy
the enemy’s capability to command and control his troops
and know what is happening. We would have effectively
decapitated the enemy and could finish off the disconnected
pieces of his forces in an uninterrupted operation.
14
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Such warfare means that the first operation becomes the
only one if and only if it is successful. No longer are there
a series of sequential operations in time and space. Rather
one large uninterrupted operation of devastating and
unremitting force occurs quickly. There, the decisive edge
goes to whoever attains technological superiority because
he can control the ether, degrade the enemy’s information
structures and capacities, and thus nullify enemy
platforms’ strike capability and decision-making systems.
Technological superiority can be converted into lasting
strategic superiority, mainly by aerial, missile, and
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electronic attack (or by the mobility and maneuver of
multiple fires from different distances). The great value of
the new technologies and weapons is their ability to
leverage time, today’s preeminent scarce factor. By
mastering time, we will master our enemies. And we can
collapse distinctions between front and rear. The entire
enemy territory becomes the theater of war. Informational
nodes and C4I throughout the depths of this territory may
be even more important strategic targets than are the
armed forces opposing us.
16

Allegedly we can also destroy enemy capability with
much less lethality and loss of life on both sides due to our
superiority in technology and informatics. Our superiority
is taken for granted, as is the supposition that we can exploit
those advantages to obtain a decisive and quick victory on
the battlefield, and destroying the enemy’s will and
capability to fight. Thus information capability and
superiority are vital to all our operations and activities.
Information superiority confers upon us a capacity for
dominant mobility, precision engagement, the capacity to
deprive the enemy of knowledge about his situation through
our dominant battlespace awareness, and lets us conduct
focused logistics. At the same time, we can fully protect all of
our assets against the enemy’s attack by getting in the first
blow and attain “full dimension protection.” Such
operations also allow us to map virtually the enemy’s entire
battlefield, making it completely transparent to us while
our terrain remains opaque to him.
17
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Finally, by making tactical operations pay off at the
operational and strategic level and eliminating the need for
sequential operations by striking at the heart of the enemy
in a single massive, joint, and coordinated operation, we can
negate or greatly reduce friction in war. Our knowledge will
be perfect or as close as possible to that state depending on
which analyst you read. But the enemy’s knowledge will
not be, and we can thus have dominant battlespace
knowledge. The whole point of the operation is at least to
create a decisive imbalance in the amount of friction and fog
19
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that redounds to our advantage and can then be converted
into a lasting strategic advantage. All these emblems of our
technological superiority, taken together and thus
multiplied in effectiveness, will confer not just operational
superiority, but a lasting politico-strategic superiority and
hegemony.
20

This is not only because our superiority will remain
unchallenged, but because our superior strengths will both
deter and win wars. Even though conventional deterrence
has been flawed in this century, to the extent that it can
succeed it can best be accomplished with U.S. forces
configured for deterring and winning regional or theater
conventional wars. But it does not end there. We are also
building our military forces to become a generic military
force that can use dominant maneuver, precision
engagement, full protection of our assets, dominant
battlespace awareness, and focused logistics, backed up by
informational, technological, and weapons superiority, to
win and dominate across the full spectrum of war. This
spectrum includes humanitarian interventions, peace
operations of all kinds, ethnic and civil wars, etc. all the way
up to theater conventional, and perhaps even multi-theater
war. Our capabilities will be universally applicable across
that spectrum.
21
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Leveraged air power, long-distance strikes, and C4I
platforms in general have become the weapons of choice to
attain strategic objectives and open the path for the
harmonious joint interaction of all other forces. Then they
can achieve their tactical, operational, and strategic goals at
reduced cost and time, and with reduced friction and fog as
well. Hence, success in achieving these goals critically
depends on our ability to achieve preemptive or pre-combat
power projection so that we can become the decisive factor
on the scene even from afar. Alternatively, our forward
presence should allow us to deploy as rapidly as possible to a
threatened area and resist the enemy as far forward as
possible. Of course, without that forward presence or
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welcoming environment for our power projection, the notion
of a brief war flies out the window.
Thus we are subject to an endless race to maintain
technological superiority, realize the unmatched
capabilities now lying at hand, and preserve our lead over
all competitors. We are also developing or at least talking
about a capacity for controlling what both the domestic and
the foreign media can see and hear of the war and what they
present to their audiences.
The combined effects of our military technology and our
informational and telecommunications industry’s
capabilities allow and almost mandate global strike
capabilities in peacetime as well as war. These strike
capabilities especially pertain to information strikes
against enemy media, computers, and communication
facilities that can degrade enemy awareness and knowledge
even before an actual military first strike. We can strike at
the enemy’s front, middle, and rear at all times and obtain a
real-time capability to know what is happening due to those
strikes.
Accordingly, given the growing global capability to wage
IW or counter IW attacks on media and computer networks,
the distinction between peace and war in IW is eroding
along with notions of rear and front. This capability, along
with the stated intent to use it, will create a preemptive race
to get in the first strike even in peacetime. But since this
technology is available at low-cost to other entrants into the
strategy sweepstakes, we are also uniquely vulnerable to all
kinds of adversaries who are themselves conducting IW or
counter-communications warfare against us.
Admittedly this picture simplifies a great many issues in
the discussion of future war, but it does not caricature them.
It captures the essence of the promise of future high-tech
and information operations and the goals we have charted
for conducting such operations. But such warfare has
political, i.e., strategic, implications that are not fully
discussed in our writings.
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For instance, just as critical elements of IW and the
RMA’s operational side are the determination and the
means to attack the enemy’s understanding of reality, so too
is this form of war uniquely well-suited to manipulate
domestic opinion both here and abroad. John J. Fialka
writes that the U.S. military has long been capable of
secretly taking over an enemy’s airwaves. Our flying
television or radio studios can overcome a station’s signal by
a more powerful one, decisively affecting the information
available to key targets. And new technologies like
morphing only enhance our weapons capability to show our
enemies that “truth is a very powerful weapon.” As many
observers note, we initially saw the superweapons of
DESERT STORM, not their grim effects. But once the
highway of death flashed on TV screens, the images
decisively altered our operational and strategic goals.
Foreign observers also have charged that we can devise a
capability to take over a country’s media (e.g., Cuba)
without necessarily firing a shot. This capability to strike
at the opinion-forming processes of a country and
government extends the war so that an enemy itself
becomes a theater of war, and its media and government can
become the center of the war’s gravity. By this process, we
again immediately make it a total war for the enemy state,
with unfathomable consequences for our own forces and
government. This increasingly global capability can easily
be turned against us, making our own media and
government the center of enemy gravity.
23
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Future War and the Shortcomings of Our Theories.
The 1997 National Military Strategy recognizes that
enemies, in this hypothetical case Russia, may strike at us
using asymmetric means, WMD, unconventional war, or an
adaptation of our own techniques and weapons against
us.We may expect that Russia will employ all of these forms
of asymmetric threat against us at the same time. We
should not assume that such combined forms of warfare are
mutually exclusive. The partisan warfare on the Eastern
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front in 1941-45, and in France before and during the
Normandy invasion, and the guerrilla war in Vietnam show
how unconventional and large-scale conventional war can
be combined by a strategic leadership into a formidable
military instrument. Theater-level conventional or WMD
warfare and unconventional warfare are not inherently
incompatible. And unconventional or WMD forms of
warfare will clearly be employed against one of our centers
of gravity, the cohesion of our domestic and foreign
coalitions. These forms of war also avert, minimize, or
bypass a head-on collision with our high-tech precision
weapons, aiming to create a favorable asymmetry for states
who are willing to use unconventional or WMD forms of
warfare.
Yet despite continuing debate over what threats we may
actually face, it is not clear that we fully appreciate the
realities of asymmetric warfare. One of the abiding myths of
official U.S. strategic thinking is that our enemies will
resemble us and fight our kind of war. Our enemy will be
Saddam Hussein in 1990 for as long as we can see. Enemies
will try to fight a high-tech conventional war using large
conventional forces, precision-guided munitions, and
electronic and information warfare, thus contesting us in
areas where we are strongest. Thus it is more likely than
not, in the official view, that our opponents will be states
who are “peer competitors” of the United States rather than
stateless guerrillas or terrorists. This view prevails as
policy, though it is strongly challenged by many analysts.
26

This policy exists even though the whole world learned
from DESERT STORM not to fight us exclusively on our
terms. For instance, U.S. Navy Captain James FitzSimonds
of the Office of Net Assessment of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense suggested that the asymmetric threat of an
opponent waging a war of attrition against us is unlikely
since no opponent would deliberately and voluntarily
demodernize his country to fight a war entailing high
casualties on both sides. Likewise, according to Captain
FitzSimonds, “demodernization is not commensurate with
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the prospective image that a great power would want to put
forth.” This observation ignores the wars of Vietnam and
Algeria, and a host of other colonial wars in this century, not
to mention the World War II partisan wars cited above. It
also ignores the strategic imperatives that take over when
state and national survival are at risk. But this strategic
myopia and insularity are all too characteristic of our
military thinking and policy.
27

Likewise, while a more conceivable form of asymmetric
response is the resort to nuclear or other WMD strategies,
Captain FitzSimonds disparages this response as being
born of military impotence and despair and again as being
incommensurate with the image a great power wants to
project. Here again the fact that an enemy might decide its
survival is at stake and act accordingly seems to elude
FitzSimonds. Finally, the real, and apparently only, danger
he discerns is an enemy taking available technology and
using it in a conventional high-tech manner to exploit our
vulnerabilities. In other words, high-tech cruise and
ballistic missiles, ASAT platforms and weapons, and
weapons against our telecommunications and remote
sensing devices are the main danger and threat to us.
28

When we view each of these possibilities of asymmetric
threats, it becomes clear that FitzSimonds’ vision (and one
assumes he speaks for his superiors) of future war is
troublingly ethnocentric and complacent. For example, let
us consider protracted war. It has long been known that
low-intensity conflict, guerrilla war, etc. exemplify a
protracted war strategy that consciously involves the risk of
high casualties for both sides over a long time. It is chosen by
technologically inferior forces precisely to minimize that
weakness’ impact and attack not where the enemy is strong
but where he is weak. More importantly, in our time, many
su ch a tta ck s ag ai ns t mod er ni zed i nd us tr i al or
post-industrial states succeed.
Israeli Brigadier General (res.) Aharon Levran, a senior
intelligence officer, recently told an interviewer that,
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You don’t need heavy weapons to win. When you consider what
has happened to us, the Palestinians have succeeded in
beating us with the lightest of weapons. Clausewitz defines
war as gaining one’s goals. And when you consider what the
Palestinians have done—the territory which they have
gained—they truly have demonstrated that terror is not only
simply a nuisance—it is in and of itself a strategic threat.
We have already seen how short range light weapons, when
used to carry out a campaign of terror, can be just as effective
in achieving the Arabs’ goals as heavy weapons. After all,
terror has achieved something which, traditionally, one side
only loses after a crushing defeat—territory.29 (emphasis
added)

An analogous outcome seems to be developing in
Lebanon, where Israel seeks to end its 20-year military
intervention there due to the incessant pressure of
Hezbollah guerrilla warfare using mortars and low-tech
weapons. According to Ehud Ya’ari, a respected Israeli
military-political analyst, this turn in Israeli policy will be
taken abroad as a sign that one can win by using simple
weapons and keeping one’s distance from the Israeli
Defense Forces. Furthermore this denouement can also
suggest that escalation is no longer a feasible response to
this kind of warfare. Strong conventional military forces
like those of Israel and the United States can no longer
resort to escalation when facing such contemporary
manifestations of low-intensity conflict. The IRA’s success
in forcing its way into negotiations for Northern Ireland and
winning substantial compromises points to a similar
outcome, mocking the complacent assertions that we have
little to worry about from such threats.
30

We should consider as well the warnings of K.
Subrahmanyam, the former Director of India’s Institute of
Defence Studies and Analysis and one of India’s leading
strategists. He notes that India has been subjected to covert
external aggression since 1983 that has eroded the
distinction between external and internal security threats
and made covert internal war a legitimate foreign policy
instrument of certain nations. Moreover, such war is now
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becoming a norm in many parts of the world, not just
India. Foreign interventions now use not just men, money,
and weapons obtained from abroad, they also use narcotics
or professional mercenaries as weapons of war. Foreign
regimes can and do deliberately incite restive ethnic
minorities on the other side of the border to paralyze the
enemy’s domestic security. Similarly, organized crime can
become an instrument of transnational subversion. Such
covert war is a cost-effective option for subverting,
fragmenting, and destabilizing an enemy country and
allows those launching the war to maintain strong
conventional defenses against that enemy to prevent it
(which may be a stronger conventional power) from
retaliating and winning a quick, decisive victory. High-tech
and low-tech capabilities go together as part of an overall
strategy of protracted war where IW and the RMA can play
useful roles.
31
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Alternatively, a state may not be strong enough to
prevent transnational ethnic or criminal movements from
using its land as a base for the incitement of conflicts
elsewhere. Thus these elements penetrate it, use its
conventional forces as a shield, and obtain a kind of
sanctuary for their activities. It should be noted that
Subrahmanyam does not here mention IW and its uses in
this kind of war which are many and telling.
33

These illustrations reveal once again the misguided
nature of any strategy of modern war delinking war and
politics and assuming conventional warfare is a thing unto
itself. Clearly conventional warfare can fit well with
low-intensity asymmetric threats as an actual reality as in
the examples cited above, or in Chechnya and Afghanistan.
Or it can be successful in its own right as in French Algeria,
Israel, and Northern Ireland. Moreover, in all these cases
either high-tech or media warfare played no small role in
the conduct of the war and the achievement of victory.
Unfortunately, this misreading of the nature of the
threat we and others already face conforms to the strategic

256

requirements of the U.S. position. As the 1997 National
Military Strategy states,
As a global power with worldwide interests, it is imperative
that the United States be able to deter and defeat nearly
simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border aggression in two
distant theaters in overlapping time frames, preferably in
concert with regional allies. . . . In this regard, a particularly
challenging requirement associated with fighting and
winning major theater wars is being able to rapidly defeat
initial enemy advances short of their objectives in two theaters
in close succession, one followed almost immediately by
another. Maintaining this capability is absolutely critical to
our ability to seize the initiative in both theaters and minimize
the the amount of territory we and our allies must regain from
aggressors. Failure to halt an enemy invasion rapidly would
make the subsequent campaign to evict enemy forces from
captured territory much more difficult, lengthy, and costly.
Such failure would also weaken coalition support, undermine
U.S. credibility, and increase the risk of conflict elsewhere.34

This excerpt perfectly exemplifies the efforts of U.S.
strategists to formulate an operational template that
converts technological superiority into operational concepts
for gaining rapid decisive strategic superiority and victory.
These concepts are also the foundation of the armed forces’
Joint Vision 2010 that aims to provide an operational
template of future wars. Several other key concepts of
critical importance for understanding the strategic
implications of new forms of war emerge from an analysis of
this U.S. template of future war
35

The excerpt shows that the imperative of converting our
technological and informational superiority into enduring
strategic victory is tied to three key points in our strategy.
These points are (1) our refusal to prepare for anything
other than short wars, (2) the belief that we cannot achieve
public support for prolonged conflict and thus must win
quickly or else, and (3) the fragility of allied coalitions. Our
strategy seeks to convert technology into force as quickly as
possible and therefore is predicated on the possession of
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strategic agility and forward presence. Those concepts
mean that we can move everything quickly to a welcoming
forward base or bases from where we can launch our
preferred kind of war and halt the enemy’s advance before
taking the initiative for ourselves.
In fact this is a call to refight DESERT STORM against a
future opponent who may not be so negligent about denying
us our foreign presence or about striking at the heart of our
coalition and strategic agility. The notion that our agility
will be so overwhelming as to negate the threat to our
foreign presence overlooks not only the current shortfalls in
manpower, readiness, and lift afflicting the armed forces, it
also neglects the true history of the Gulf campaign.
Whatever else airpower can do, it cannot defend itself or its
bases. Nor do command of the air and air superiority
guarantee victory in low-intensity conflicts, as Chechnya
shows. In 1990 Iraq failed to move deeper into Saudi Arabia
to deny us both forward presence and strategic agility.
With future enemies taking note, it is unlikely that we will
again have opportunities to undertake a deliberate buildup
of the theater or sufficient access to bases for the use of our
long-distance platforms.
36
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Thus in future wars true jointness will be necessary,
entailing a large, not quick, buildup of forces. It likely
means a longer war than we want and one in which seizing
territory is of immense importance because we have the
political responsibility of defending the territory of our
coalition partners and allies as well as our forward presence
and platforms. Those requirements logically entail serious
consideration of the Army as an occupying, constabulary
force and of the decisive shaping of the occupied territory’s
political future. This is precisely the kind of question that
military commanders do not want to confront and which
make political leaders hesitate before acting decisively. We
seek to avoid the choice by wishing it out of existence in our
strategy.
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In our template of future war, we assume that we will
know when an attack occurs, who launched it, and the true
target. We will have informational certainty that overrides
the potential for “fog.” We will also have technological
superiority to be able to achieve this certainty. Moreover, we
will be able to move quickly to “the scene of the crime” and
proceed to fight back. However, as previous war games
demonstrate, our leaders are often unable to determine who
is attacking us and how. Worse yet, the spread of IW
capabilities adds to the difficulty of tracking down
aggressors in cyberspace. It will not only be more difficult to
know for sure what has happened to us or who gave the
order and who actually did it, but it is not even clear if such
actions directed against our own infrastructure constitute
acts of war that can justify military responses. If speed is
of the essence in future war, the absence of tactical warning
and the uncertainty in deciphering the elements of attack
strike directly at our ability to respond decisively in timely
fashion at the strategic level. For example, is it merely
happenstance that as the crisis with Iraq reached its apogee
in February 1998 the Pentagon reported an unprecedented
number of untraceable attempts to invade its computers?
Neither is it likely that our coalition partners will be
enthralled with our inability to attain a decisive
determination of whether or not they were attacked
38
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Nor is it foreordained that we will have control over what
our own and foreign news media will see, hear, and know.
Developments in telecommunications allow reporters and
media to be on the scene almost instantaneously,
preempting the intial government construction of events.
The international news media are now a globally available
system of information dissemination that is more or less
equally accessible to all sides in any conflict, largely
independent of government. Indeed, our own media have a
built-in suspicion of government efforts to muzzle or deceive
them or to spin what we see. Thus we cannot take for
granted, as we now do, that we will have uninterrupted
control of what goes over the media. Certainly the fiasco of
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the U.S. government teach-in at Ohio State University
concerning the February 1998 Iraqi crisis shows the
double-edged nature of the media’s sword.
41

Finally, it is not clear that we fully understand the
strategic political consequences of what we are creating.
Clearly the RMA places would-be peer or niche competitors
like Russia under enormous pressure against which they
already are rebelling. They may understand the strategic
implications of our actions better than we do precisely
because of their vulnerability and backwardness vis-à-vis
the United States. Precisely because they are among those
who feel most threatened, they see the threat in radically
different ways than we do. And if it is true that victory goes
not to the big battalions or to the technically superior force,
but to the force that can control the definition of the
battlefield, it is entirely possible that we could even defeat
Russia decisively in battle yet fail utterly to achieve
whatever strategic goal we have chosen.
42

Perhaps because they see the threat in all its dimensions
more cogently or at least differently than we do, they can
respond by redefining the battle away from ways that
accrue to our superiorities, e.g., by going nuclear. However,
that is only one among many options. Russia’s threat of
going nuclear can alone dissuade many opponents from
exploiting its current weakness.
43

Our own operational doctrine and strategy emphasize
attacking first, even preemptively, with conventional and
informational weapons. They also stress that the cohesion
of the enemy government and hence of its society is the
center of gravity that we aim to degrade. No self-respecting
enemy will wait for us to strike first and possibly end the
war along with his ability to function. He will seek to
challenge us, probably preemptively. He could resort to
WMD weapons, low-intensity conflict, or other asymmetric
threats that we do not handle well. As a recent game
indicated we are badly prepared for a nuclear attack.
Players found that despite years of training, they were
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unprepared for the pandemonium, the interagency sniping,
the conflicting intelligence reports, and the constant leaks
of half-truths. it is not surprising that here, as in a Rand
Corporation game, the result was “a sense of bafflement and
frustration.”
44

This consideration raises a more general point.
Everything we see about U.S. operational doctrine breeds a
high degree of aggressiveness up to and including
preemption. Yet at the same time the nature of IW
frequently makes it very difficult to know whom to attack or
counterattack, leaving us with that bafflement and
frustration. Therefore IW used on us, e.g., blinding our
satellites or computer systems, deprives us of key
operational capabilities that we have always assumed will
be available to us. IW or asymmetric forms of war that are
preemptively used against us because we threatened to use
them against the enemy preemptively will surely throw our
operational and strategic doctrines into disarray,
constituting strategic surprise against us. Thus our resort
to preemption or to the publicly voiced thought of acting
preemptively almost certainly will lead not just to
retaliation in kind but also to an effort to wrest control of the
escalation ladder away from us. That effort to take
escalation control away from us will be even more likely
where a state lacks our formidable conventional military
power. Hence, as in Russia’s case, we find the overt threat,
stated in Russian doctrine, to go first with nuclear weapons
should attacks occur against key installations. Even if the
attacks are purely conventional, the first-strike or even
preemptive nuclear option has already been invoked in
Russian doctrine. Our enemies’ fear of being preempted in
a war where the first strike can be the only strike should
inevitably lead them to race to preempt us. As Stephen
Cimbala writes,
45

the revolution in military affairs could help to undo itself if it
creates sufficient fears on the part of . . . nuclear nations that
their capabilities will be subject to timely and decisive
preemption whether or not they have have threatened explicitly
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to use nuclear weapons against regional opponents. . . .
However, counter-proliferation runs the risk of creating
anticipatory US allies and dependencies beyond the reach of
timely American reinforcement.46

Therefore the quest to attain technological superiority
and transform it into lasting operational and strategic
superiority and decisive outcomes easily translates into a
race to achieve strategic surprise to negate the enemy’s
technological superiority. Pearl Harbor is a perfect
example. Japan had no realistic chance of defeating the
United States and knew it, in large part due to our
technological and economic superiority. Yet Tokyo thought
that by achieving what it hoped would be a dissuasive
strategic surprise it could force us to take Japan seriously
and come to terms with it. Worse yet, we had more
information about the upcoming attack than virtually any
attacked nation has had before or since, and we failed to do
anything with that information. Fog, friction, etc. clouded
our understanding and resolution.
47

Since there is no reason to suspect that the speed of
strategic-level command decisionmaking relative to an
operation has increased in our government since 1941 (and
perhaps when including our allies it has decreased), we will
probably once again be surprised as in Somalia and
Lebanon and in our initial efforts against Haiti; and as
Kuwait in 1990, Israel in 1973, and Russia in Groznyi in
1994-96 were repeatedly surprised. Indeed, surprise is a
chosen weapon of the technologically inferior. Our effort to
transform technological superiority into lasting advantage
will surely generate a counter-race to preempt and surprise
us. Given Russian studies of IW and the RMA, we should not
be surprised if the first act of a war would be one of which we
were entirely unaware.
Indeed, there are a number of reasons why our vaunted
informational and intelligence capabilities may not be as
brilliant as advertised. First of all, many senior U.S. officers
and policymakers have voiced loud and repeated complaints
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about the overly secret and bureaucratized intelligence
process which provides intelligence that is often either
useless or late. Robert Steele argues that,
48

The U.S. intelligence community does not have the long-term
ethnic human penetrations it needs against international
criminal or terrorist organizations, nor does it possess the kind
of tactical SIGINT capabilities, or even air-breathing tactical
IMINT, that would be helpful in coping with these challenging
international threats. Cultural movements baffle “Western”’
technical indications & warning (I&W) systems because they
do not use point to point communications but rely instead on
couriers, the pulpit, and broadcast television indirectly to
mobilize action elements from the masses. The U.S. does not
have an electronic counter-intelligence capability worthy of
the name, nor has it established the most basic economic
counter-intelligence capabilities. 49

Nor is our record of understanding Russian goals,
intentions, and capabilities any better. Indeed, one recent
study on surprise in warfare notes that even when states
who suffered surprise attacks changed their view of the
enemy’s intentions before the attack, they proved unable to
adjust their view of enemy capabilities and were always
victimized by their belief in their own superiority and the
effective inferiority of the enemy. Given the visible hubris
that disfigures contemporary American military writing
and thinking, the likelihood of our being surprised by enemy
capabilities, if not ultimately by his intentions, is a very real
one.
50

What makes this race for preemption and surprise
particularly worrisome is that we have only one bite at the
apple. Historically those states that relied on technological
superiority or on strategic surprise to provide them with a
decisive and lasting victory had to operate under severe
time constraints. This was true for Germany in both World
Wars, for Israel in 1967, and for the Arabs in 1973. In most
of these cases, surprise failed to achieve the knockout blow.
Instead, a force optimized for fast-paced, intensive, but brief
war was drawn into a protracted one which it could not win
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or wh ich ex acted enor mous c osts and d omesti c
dissatisfaction. Since our strategy openly and consciously
strives to avoid protracted war, it paradoxically appears to
risk that outcome by its emphasis on avoiding that outcome
more than would otherwise be the case. If we optimize a
force for one strike and out, admitting that otherwise we will
not demand sacrifices, we probably will end up demanding
much more from ourselves and our allies for little gain.
What aggravates the strategic dilemma of surprise is our
failure to ponder the distinction between limited and total
or unlimited war. By making the war a total one for our
enemies and approaching them from a posture of
conventional and nuclear superiority and an announced
intention to preempt, we give them almost no choice but to
wrest the element of surprise from our hands. If both sides
are racing for technological or strategic surprise, the
outcome is as likely as not to be a stalemate, i.e., protracted
war of attrition, the exact opposite of what we want and our
greatest fear. If we fail to realize what our stated military
objectives logically entail and do not alter them or our
thinking, we will probably fail in our strategic quest.
In a future IW or RMA war, we will not have the luxury of
being a privileged sanctuary, where we can be the arsenal of
democracy for others while they fight. Let us remember this
kind of war erases distinctions between front and rear. The
entire state is now a legitimate target. Since today we define
national security in all-encompassing ways to include not
just defense, but social, ecological and economic security,
anything can be attacked in the guise of degrading that
security. Our homeland is now a potential target, and
homeland defense is no longer an option we can renounce.
As a RAND war game and ensuing study showed, our
enemies will relish opportunities to attack us here and
abroad below the threshold of triggering massive
retaliatory U.S. actions and will often successfully elude
detection and response. Our great vulnerability to such
attacks led players in the RAND game to exercise extreme
caution concerning escalation options, the heart of our
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strategy. This caution also reflected unforeseen friction, the
result of strategic surprise, and a lack of tactical warning.
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Because the United States, like its potential enemies, is
no longer a sanctuary, political dissidents, our media,
criminals, terrorists, etc. become even more legitimate
instruments of war, while our civilian structures become
even more tempting targets. Our vulnerability to surprise
attacks whose origin remains murky deprives us of the
capability to launch our kind of war and shows our strategic
vulnerability to both surprise and homeland attacks.
One should not think that in a future war we can tear
apart the enemy but escape retribution because of our
speed. We rely on one quick overwhelming blow and the
unverified belief that our superiority will be so
demonstrably crushing as to obliterate any reason for
resistance. Such thinking is extraordinarily optimistic
about mechanizing, automating, and rationalizing war to
our tastes. Although our strategists are well aware that
adversaries may try asymmetric war using weapons of mass
destruction or low-intensity or unconventional methods,
they disparage those possibilities; there seems to be little
awareness of the significance of the issues of preemption
and of total war that arise out of our strategy. Precisely
because for our enemies the war may be total and not
limited, they will race to preempt us.
Therefore another option for them is to remove our
capacity for preemption by announcing in advance the will,
if not the actual capacity, to put their WMD on automatic
pilot or fail-safe capability, so that if their C4I is disabled,
the dead hand will inflict unacceptable damage upon us or
our allies. Russia already has such a nuclear capability,
and it is relying ever more on nuclear missiles, both
strategic and tactical, for even tactical contingencies. Of
course, we could then retaliate in kind but by doing so we
would only assume responsibility for the post-nuclear
aftermath while we made the rubble bounce.
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It is easy to underestimate this danger. Russia’s tactical
and strategic nuclear weapons are associated with a high
degree of pre-delegated launch authority and local control.
The strategic systems are known to be on a launch on
warning (LOW) concept. Were the control systems for either
the strategic or tactical systems disrupted, commanders
might operate independently and launch nuclear strikes.
Moreover, Russia’s present doctrine lowers the nuclear
threshold quite deliberately, given its absence of usable
conventional power. Thus preemptive or accidental
nuclear or other WMD strikes (Russia apparently still has a
large biological and chemical weapons program and cannot
muster the money to dismantle the latter as it has agreed to
do) are hardly unlikely contingencies in war, especially a
total war. Indeed, Russian doctrine is increasingly
exploring the use of tactical nuclear systems as warfighting
weapons as well as the use of strategic weapons for tactical
purposes. If one were to combine the dangers of surprise or
preemptive attack with the possibility of nuclear
preemption or retaliation, the war would quickly spin out of
control. Since the whole thrust of our thinking about future
war is to put it under our control, nuclear or other WMD
scenarios strike at the very notion of such war. Such warfare
would be not only unprecedented in its destructive scope,
but also utterly unpredictable and perhaps uncontrollable.
The reason why Russian planners invoke nuclear use
against attacks by precision-guided and electronic weapons
is that they view such attacks so seriously.
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In 1992-93 Russia replied to Turkish talk of going to
Azerbaijan’s aid in Nagorno-Karabakh by threatening
nuclear war. The leader of Russia’s Security Council,
General Evgeny Shaposhnikov, stated that a Turkish
invasion meant “World War III.” The reason for this
dissuasive threat, which did deter Turkey, was that war
games had told Moscow that its conventional forces on the
Armeno-Turkish border would lose to Turkey, thus opening
Armenia to Turkish invasion. Absent usable conventional
power, nuclear weapons became the sole instrument
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available for use to dissuade or deter Ankara. This episode
is instructive, for it confirmed that nuclear weapons are the
weapons of the weak, and that post-nuclear capability in
high-tech, EW, IW, and space capabilities are trump. But
it also confirmed that nuclear threats do deter and induce
caution. It is likely that a similar threat against us would
have an equally inhibiting impact upon our leaders,
narrowing escalation choices as in the Rand game. But
nuclear and preemptive options in the ether and cyberspace
hardly exhaust the possibilities for asymmetric responses to
American strategy.
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Another alternative open to such asymmetric
warfighters derives from what happened to Iraq after 1991.
We do not take full account in our strategy of the fragility of
enemy regimes—that if we beat them, the state implodes.
Such implosions would present us with unforeseen
problems whose magnitude far outstrips our capability to
convert military victory into a stable and lasting political
solution. This is as true for Iraq in 1991 as it would be for
Russia or China if they lost a major war today. This state
implosion, as in Russia in 1917-18, would leave us no choice
but to occupy territories with millions of armed men. Victory
could not be achieved without occupying much territory for
without it the problem we had fought against would remain.
The logical outcome of such an American “victory” would be
a strategic defeat because we would be drawn into an
interminable occupation role of an immense swath of
territory with governmental responsibility for that land.
If our strategic target is the nerves of government and of
the armed forces, we risk disassembling the entire state and
society and then having the obligation to police it afterward,
a clearly unviable strategic option. Yet we simply cannot
walk away saying we had a job to do and we did it, so long.
Indeed, in every war and intervention that we have
conducted since 1941 we have had to sustain an enormous
nation-building effort or else a large forward deployment of
long duration in order to achieve our minimum strategic
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objectives. There is no a priori reason to suspect that the
future would be materially different in this regard.
It is worth pondering recent U.S. military operations
where we had to conduct major constabulary operations
alongside of or in place of large-scale combat operations.
One quickly discerns that we are in big trouble, particularly
if we have undone the basis of order throughout the invaded
societies. In all these cases, Panama in 1989-90, Kuwait in
1991, Somalia in 1993, Haiti in 1994, and Bosnia since 1995,
we find a failure to achieve our political objectives. And our
checkered history in conducting such operations goes back
at least to the planning for the postwar German occupation
after World War II, which is acknowledged to be a debacle in
planning from which the Cold War rescued us. As a recent
surveyor of the post-1989 operations observes, “There may
well be an important lack of connectivity between national
policy, national strategy, theater strategy, and
operations.” These failures were hardly unforeseeable.
Destroying a political community brings about a return to
anarchy which must then be overcome, often by force
majeure. The disappointing aftermath of Panama, a
technical democracy behind which high corruption
continues, should be a cautionary tale to any U.S. leader
who wants to take out a government.
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Similarly, in Kuwait there was a disjunction between
the military strategy and the political strategy. The latter
saw regional stability in an Iraq that remained intact but
could no longer threaten its neighbors. Yet it was not
foreseen that Iraq’s Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni Arab
factions would all go to war with each other and drag us in.
Under the circumstances it is not surprising that Iraq
rightly viewed our presence as an effort to dismember it and
to do away with its ruler. And to couple this policy with an
inspection regime that depended, like the Versailles Treaty,
on the cooperation of the embattled and unbowed Iraqi
government for compliance while we neglected to sustain
our coalition can only be described as naive.
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With regard to the February 1998 fiasco with Iraq, Jim
Hoagland wrote that,
[The] problem is the gap between the American military’s vast
destructive capacity and the limited ability of American
political leaders to use it to shape definitive outcomes
especially against Third World outlaw regimes. The American
Goliath is loath to fight to complete victory in such a
mismatch. Complete victory over a much weaker foe brings
encumbering consequences for a moral nation. America’s
unwillingness to accept the responsibilities of victory lies at
the heart of the paradox of a brilliant military campaign that
seven years later is politically unfinished.63

Hoagland’s insight returns us to the conundrum shaped
by the asymmetry between our aim to fight wars that are
fast and limited for us and the resulting total wars for our
enemies. For them defeat means the end of the government
and foreign occupation or dismemberment. Consequently if
we beat Russia or its proxies while retaining our strategic
focus, our forces will almost certainly end up trying to police
a protracted civil or ethnic war, or an insurgency, or both. In
this regard, the international experience of 1918-22 in the
Soviet Union bears recalling.
Our post-victory wars for state stabilization will be
inherently protracted, and once we are in them, we risk
forfeiting foreign and domestic support and the use of
strategic surprise based on technology to achieve a “liberal”
outcome. Here we face the asymmetric threat of
unconventional war that turns into attrition and protracted
conflict where we are clearly vulnerable at the strategic
level.
Russia’s Strategic Environment and Perceptions.
While unquestionably any country would prefer to have
our forces and problems than Russia’s, the fact remains that
the kind of complacency we display is often the harbinger of
defeat, while insecurity, if nothing else, can sharpen the
mind. Russian elites agree that their society faces multiple
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threats. While policymakers cannot, in fact, decide upon
priorities and formulate a coherent defense policy, there is
little doubt that they face multiple, and some would even
say, growing threats on a host of azimuths. Given this
context, informational threats that employ superior foreign
technology hold out some potentially dreadful potentialities
even in peacetime. In wartime these dreadful potentials are
much greater because Russian observers understand the
immense capabilities that reside in information technology
and high-tech conventional weaponry. Although there is a
substantial debate and many unresolved issues in Russian
thinking about information warfare and future war, some
things are quite clear already.
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Russian writers have a much broader notion of
information warfare than do American writers. They
include warfare targeted against the minds and physiques
of enemy combatants and even of whole societies. They see
this form of warfare as ushering in a new series of weapon
technologies that can strike enemies in wholly new ways,
including biological or psychotropic weapons. Many
commentators, civilians, and military officials, e.g., former
Chief of Staff Colonel General Viktor Samsonov, contend
that IW proceeds during peacetime. Some writers demand a
new definition of war to include this kind of bloodless,
peacetime campaign against key political and informational
strategic targets. Allegedly Russia has, for several years,
been in an information war with the United States and the
West. Moreover, in this view, Russia is losing or has lost
that war. Its domestic anomie and loss of values reflect the
West’s successful targeting of the Russian media, who, as
servants of the West, have betrayed Russia. Furthermore,
Russian writers also believe that IW carried out against
their conventional or strategic fores can undo strategic
parity and stability. Therefore an IW attack practically
forces Russia into a retaliatory nuclear first strike that
negates our basic strategic premises.
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Many of these ideas and perceptions turn up in Russia’s
1997 security blueprint stressing internal threats,
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including threats to Russia’s spirituality, morale, and moral
integrity. Other officials, like Foreign Minister Yevgeny
Primakov, evoke threats to Russia’s intellectual,
communications, or information space. The discussion
about an intellectual or ideological threat is pervasive, even
if assessments vary. While this discourse on an
in formation a l thr eat r ef l ec ts Rus si a’ s p r of ound
disenchantment, it does not necessarily entail the sense of
being presently in an information or psychological war.
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But those disaffected elites who believe this war is
occurring are updating Lenin’s notion of constant political
or ideological warfare with the West to our time and openly
raising the Leninist-Stalinist notion of internal enemies.
Internal political opposition equates to sabotage, opening
the way to a domestic war. War at home and war abroad
could become a seamless web. Information warfare provides
scope for political and military conflict beyond anything we
can envision, targeting whole sectors of societies through
what used to be called “the hidden persuaders.” Current
U.S. claims on behalf of its IW capability betray a touching
innocence about its strategic potentialities in troubled
societies and about the nature of war in general. Such
posturing only fuels Russian paranoia. These new weapons
could, in the Russian definition, include whole series of
biological or psychotropic weapons, or simply novel uses of
information and other technologies to destabilize a society
from within. Russia is still devising biological and
chemical weapons which could play an enormous role in this
context. We must increase our powers of empathy, realizing
that for other cultures information warfare, as they
understand it, is a radical, even revolutionary, development
that puts their whole society at risk and makes it the center
of gravity. The Russian perception of such a threat makes
many more contingencies possible and converts the
unthinkable into the conceivable.
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Friction and Coalition Warfare.
There are other reasons why our vision of future war is
not nearly as roseate as it seems. Barry Watts has
demonstrated the extent to which friction survives in
warfare notwithstanding the brilliance of our 1991
campaign in the Gulf. We can assume, as in Somalia or
even in the early-1998 Iraqi crisis, that the unforeseen
over-exertion, fatigue, and communications breakdowns
will continue to affect war at all levels. The claims made by
proponents of advanced technology about the dispelling of
fog and friction are fanciful and unproven. Though they are
aware of the problem of information overload, the promise of
warfare without human encounters obscures the fact that
human beings will still control war and still be prone to all
the dysfunctional behaviors and failings of past warriors
under stress. Human nature is not a Lego piece that we can
insert or remove at will from the military equation.
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But the problems of friction go deeper than that. As
Watts points out, Clausewitz first uses the word friction to
denote bureaucratic obstruction and intrigues. These are
the daily stuff of bureaucratic politics even under the best of
circumstances. For example, we now see in the Pentagon a
clash between those who who want to destroy enemy
computers and those who want to listen to them, using the
information gleaned thereby for intelligence purposes. Each
side has compelling arguments. But even in 1991, conflict
between the military who wanted to attack and the
intelligence agencies who wanted to listen created friction
between them which certainly affected the conduct of
military operations.
74

75

Moreover, the Pentagon is now devising weapons to
attack enemy computers actively to reduce the amounts we
must spend defending our own information systems from
enemy attack. Evidently it takes more people to defend the
numerous assets threatened by cyber-warriors than it takes
to be such a warrior. Since any system with more than one
computer is vulnerable, all systems are vulnerable. An
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active offense is crucial to self-preservation and self-defense
of our information systems. Furthermore, defense of
information, or operational security (OPSEC), increases
rather than decreases the number of people needed to
perform the mission, and they must all be trained
professionals. Does this mean we can confidently expect
legions of volunteers to spring to OPSEC missions in place
of soldiers who are needed elsewhere when we cannot even
distinguish who is attacking us and why? Such
considerations suggest that the human factor will become
more important, certainly with regard to quality and
perhaps to numbers.
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Since the threat to our computer systems is ubiquitous,
and since the best defense is a good offense, we are building
up for an active global offense. We must resort to preemptive
electronic assault on those identified as planning or who are
prepared to penetrate key computer networks. That assault
would, as in the initial phase of 1991, combine EW with air
strikes using specially treated munitions. But, as was
shown earlier, we cannot achieve the requisite level of
tactical, let alone strategic, warning. Nor can we overlook
the consequences of what our efforts to preempt will lead
our enemies to do. Thus bureaucratic friction impeded
operations in 1991 and has now led us into uncharted
strategic waters.
We now confront several alternatives. The necessity for
choice will inevitably increase bureaucratic friction, if not
fog. We can simply absorb the first blow and do violence to
our own strategy of going first in force. Or we can create
weapons and forces to target either unidentifiable hackers
or cyber-warriors as in the wargames that Fialka and the
Rand Corporation cited. Or we can launch preemptive
strikes to destroy an enemy’s computers and C4I, leading us
back to the unacceptable strategic outcomes discussed
above.
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Other examples of friction clearly arose in other games
using IW. The Rand Corporation game found that not only
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did we lack adequate tactical warning of cyber attacks or
identification of who the enemy was, the bureaucrats in the
game could not agree on whether suspected cyber attacks
constituted an act of war or discover whether these attacks
were at the limit of an enemy’s capability. Many players
were frustrated by the lack of adequate strategic
intelligence—a prime example of friction and fog—directly
refutating the confident forecasts of many writers on RMA
who assume near perfect knowledge. Such uncertainty
“crippled the administration’s capacity to take decisive
action.” It is thus quixotic to believe that the empty or
cyber-dominated battlefield will lack friction and fog, or
that it will find unanimity among commanders in the field
or back at headquarters, as to what is going on.
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Still other occasions for friction exist. It is an axiom of
contemporary politics and military thinking that in future
contingencies we will normally take part only via military
coalitions. While we have a rich history of participating in
such operations, we have insisted, not always wisely, that
we alone must lead them.
Anyone who has ever participated in a simulation, game,
or exercise involving a coalition, or who has understood the
troubles we had and have in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq, will
understand that coalition formation is not part of our
strategic genius. Our insistence on unilateral leadership
and our ethnocentric disdain for foreign insights, interests,
capabilities, experience, and skills already suffice to make
coalition formation a process replete with friction and fog.
Meanwhile our allies are under no a priori obligation to heed
our wishes or share our objectives. In the current Iraqi and
Kosovo crises, many of our allies strongly disagree with us.
Likewise, in 1991, it was concern for the cohesion of the
coalition made up of other Arab states that led us to abjure a
march on Baghdad. Clearly coalitions which must be
coordinated among many governments, each of which is
now a ramified series of bureaucratic networks that are
themselves prone to all the pathologies of bureaucratic
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politics, will inherently create the friction, discord, delay,
misinformation, fog, etc., that Clausewitz knew all too well.
For example, the entire question of foreign presence is
subject to the wishes of the coalition’s partners, as stated in
treaties, laws, and our executive agreements with them. If
they deny us that presence, our entire strategy is then
severely weakened. Or if they are attacked first, as in 1990,
and our enemy can deny our entry into the theater, other
states might well think twice about joining us. Obviously
these contingencies will force us into a prolonged conflict,
reduce our agility, force us to alter our strategy in
fundamental ways, and have secondary and tertiary
repercussions that we cannot fully predict. For example, we
might have to call in more troops and mobilize the reserves,
thereby precipitating an even more intense domestic
debate.
The coalition aspect of future war also provided some of
the most aggravating experiences of the Rand Study, which
suggests that we have serious future problems here. First,
apart from the normal bureaucratic and political friction in
all states, many of our allies are equally vulnerable to
untraceable attacks on their information systems and
probably lack some of our intelligence resources. So they too
will have comparable problems maintaining tactical and
strategic intelligence capability, warning, and strike
capability. Many allies might also have serious
infrastructural or political vulnerabilities that will not only
impede their decision-making, but may also deflect them
from joining us or take them out of the picture altogether. If
there are severe political issues in these states, which may
be undemocratic, we may end up wasting valuable time and
effort in trying to broker political deals within them before
getting agreement on key coalition issues. Such diversions
will weaken strategic unanimity concerning operations and
strategic goals.
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The fundamental error of the so-called “Millenarian
school,” those who see the RMA literally as the functional
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equivalent of a magic bullet, is that they assume first that
all relevant decisionmaking in war is either operational or
tactical at the battlefield level and have factored out
strategic political considerations. For them, politics no
longer exists in the world of the RMA, or, if it does,
communication is equivalent to decision. Despite the fact
that the RMA has undoubtedly accelerated the speed at
which information travels and the amount of information
available to commanders, it has not appreciably quickened
strategic and political decisionmaking. All commanders
have access to much of that information, and the more
information key players have the more power and
opportunity they all have to check each others’ decisions and
impede strategic decisionmaking. The political process,
especially in a large democracy, is intended to be
slow-moving and can be expected to remain so.
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Thus the Millenarian vision fails to account for the
impact of coalitional warfare in particular or politics in
general on the conduct of military operations. In the worst
tradition of previous failed U.S. endeavors, the Millenarian
concept of war divorces operations from strategy and fails to
focus on anything other than the operational missions
involved in destroying the enemy’s forces and information
networks. This separation of strategy from operations, of
the political objectives from the military means, pervades
both our civilian and military elites, who seem unable to
talk to each other openly. Hence there is mutual suspicion
and disdain on both sides of the fence as well as a strategic
culture of mutual mistrust among them. Thus the
Millenarian vision falls prey to the vice of strategic
ethnocentrism and to a dangerous insouciance concerning
war against opponents who have their own ideas about how
to fight modern war.
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Conclusions.
The operational concepts to which we are gravitating do
not provide us with sufficient clarity concerning strategic
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goals. We could win brilliant military victories only to fall
prey to strategic obligations that were not even foreseen
before the war began. Worse yet, as games suggest, we may
not be able to bring our force to bear as planned and end up
in a protracted war or conflict of attrition both in cyberspace
and battlespace.
The great failing of most U.S. security thinking, and
even about the RMA and IW, is that it remains confined to
the operational level of war, focussing on the indispensable
but insufficient task of defeating the enemy decisively. If the
objective of war is a better peace and the realization of
political goals, than our current thinking about war does not
face that issue. We also evade consideration of what the
enemy might do. Our capability for achieving decisive
military success is taken for granted. Yet this axiom, that
we can deliver rapid decisive strikes to obtain our objectives,
is paradoxically at odds with our political processes. As we
have seen above, victory often brings responsibilities that
are unwanted, burdensome, and antithetical to our
strategy. In other words, our operational doctrine misreads
strategic realities.
Increasingly, the Army, the other services, Congress,
and often the media demand that the administration
announce an exit strategy, a desired end-state, and a
guarantee of rapid victory before committing to arms. Our
strategy aims as much at our own news media as at the
media of other states. In fact, our strategy is disingeneous
because such guarantees in advance are plainly
unthinkable. Our strategy in fact amounts to a call for a
zero-defects security and defense policy. Yet simultaneously
we proclaim that we are building a generic military that will
achieve superiority across the spectrum of conflict even
when we have no idea of our goals in any of those future
conflicts.
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The focus on technological superiority cannot ensure
international security. True, it may secure the armed forces
against domestic challenges from the media, the public, or
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other branches of government by claiming the ability to
guarantee a victory in a short war with no casualties
provided the civilians let us manage it. But paradoxically, it
restrains our ability to meet future challenges credibly.
Finally, this uniquely American strategy ignores the
strategic context facing other states and assumes the
capability of victory for our forces throughout the entire
spectrum of conflict. Even as it is a totalizing and universal
theory, aiming to give weight to our Wilsonian and
moralistic urge to punish bad governments around the
world, the new vision of war remains ethnocentric and
divorced from true global reality. In a television interview
concerning the Iraq crisis of February 1998, Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright stated that “if we have to use
force, it is because we are America. We are the
indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the
future.” Nor are Albright’s views confined to the State
Department alone. Rather, in their suggestion that we need
not heed foreign concerns, they reflect deeply held views
within the military. Unfortunately for those who hold such
views, we are not talking about a John Wayne movie but
about the inherently unpredictable realm of war where
hubris generally pays a heavy price. Along with such hubris
goes a corresponding misunderstanding of war and force.
Secretary Albright said to a college audience in Tennessee,
“We are talking about using military force, but we are not
talking about a war. That is an important distinction.” It
certainly is not a distinction to Iraq. Once a nation starts
using force, it cannot tell where it will end, for where does
force end and war begin? Unfortunately, the conjoining of
the quest for technological superiority and one first strike do
not augur well for success in present or future crises. A
recent study of the strategic goals of our foreign policy
revealed that there were “enormous areas . . . of deficiency in
the conduct of international affairs in terms of clarity of
goal, clarity of purpose, and any close alignment of those
goals to those purposes.”
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Such troubling strategic thinking is rooted in a uniquely
American tradition that separates war from peace and
operations from strategy, disdains the lessons of history,
and believes in technology and massed firepower as a ready
answer to all wars. It assumes our enemies inferior and on
the brink of defeat before we set foot on the battlefield. It
assumes that we are giants and that everyone else will fall
or accept us. Yet while it may be wonderful to have a giant’s
strength, history shows that using it effectively is another
matter altogether.
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REGIONAL STATE COMPETITORS:
THE CASE OF IRAQ
Stephen C. Pelletiere

In any asymmetrical test of power, it is usually the case
that the clash has been initiated by the stronger party.
When the reverse occurs, that is bound to be of interest and
worth investigating. In February 1998 Iraq took on the
world’s only superpower, the United States, and—
expectations to the contrary—bested it. I want to look at
how Iraq achieved this feat. There should be some lessons
here for the United States to consider. I propose to suggest a
few.
1

Background.
Iraq had long ago decided that the inspections being
carried on by the U.N. inspection teams were going
nowhere. The modus operandi of the teams (in Iraq’s view)
was to poke into sites around the country, and, finding
nothing, announce that the results were inconclusive. This
would necessitate the teams’ returning at a later date. If
this went on, the Iraqis reasoned, the inspections would
never be finished, the sanctions would never be lifted, and
the Iraqi people would go on suffering.
2

Sometime in 1997 (I don’t think anyone but the inner
circle of the Iraqi leadership knows exactly when) the
leaders decided to call a halt, and thus in October 1997
Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein announced that he would
cease to cooperate with the weapons discovery effort,
because, he said, it was being manipulated by the United
States. At that, the United States prepared for a
confrontation. It let it be known that it would insist on Iraqi
compliance, otherwise the Baathists could expect to be
severely punished. As a spokesmen for the Administration
3
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in Washington put it, “This time there will be no pin
pricks.”
4

That was the setting in December 1997 as America
prepared to go to war. And yet, as we all know, no war came.
The Iraqis led the United States up to the brink, and then
pulled back. After the fact, some pundits professed to
believe that the Iraqis had lost in the test of nerves because
in the end they did agree to resume cooperation.
5

But for anyone who was following the episode at all
closely, it is hard to make it out this way. To appreciate the
scope of America’s defeat, one must pay attention to events
that led up to the eventual standdown. The devil is in the
details, so to speak.
Prelude to Breakdown.
First off, America was abandoned in the confrontation by
practically every one of her coalition partners. Only a
relatively few states stood fast. The rest (and particularly
this was the case with three of the Security Council
members—Russia, China, and France) dissociated
themselves from taking military action. As if this were not
bad enough, all of America’s Arab allies (with the exception
of Kuwait) abandoned it. Most striking was the defection of
Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Turkey refused to support the
operation. While not an Arab state, Turkey is an important
player in the Middle East, and one whose support America
has come to count upon.
6

7

8

It seems to me that none of the defections came about
accidentally—Iraq set every one of them up. Baghdad
planned the confrontation with the expectation that it
would be possible to isolate the United States; and it did.
How did it do it?
Manipulating Counters.
Iraq manipulated strategic and political counters. For
example, Baghdad played on apparent contradictions in
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America’s great power role. On the one hand, the United
States is the leader of the New World Order. Whereas in the
past it led the fight against communism, now it claims to be
the bastion of stability, the mainstay of the world economic
system, the entity that facilitates the smooth running of the
global system so that all of its operations mesh. That role, as
presented, is eminently positive.
However, at the same time, America is a power, in the
most primitive, brutal sense of the term. Nothing like its
strength has been seen in history. And moreover that
strength can be quantified, in actual numbers of weapons
possessed. Power like this is intimidating. Lesser powers
fear that the hegemon will throw its weight around.
This is the contradiction that Iraq played upon. It
harped on the theme that America was in the Gulf—not, as
the United States declared, to preserve stability, but to
maintain the area as its personal sphere of economic and
political influence. There was to be no activity carried on in
the Gulf of which the United States did not approve. This
specifically applied to trade relations. In the case of Iraq,
Washington embargoed all trade; as to Iran, specific types of
trade were interdicted. Why, the Iraqis asked, should the
United States be able to set the terms of trade of nations like
Russia, China, or France?
Iraq encouraged these and other states to trade with it.
It let lucrative oil contracts, against the day when the
embargo would be lifted. Many states responded to Iraq’s
overtures, and grabbed at the opportunities held out. This
gave them a vested interest in seeing the sanctions lifted.
From there, it was small step to working to get them so.
9

That is how Iraq behaved with influential states in the
United Nations. It behaved similarly with the Arab
members of the coalition. Here, Baghdad manipulated the
theme of the double standard. Why, asked Iraq, is Israel
allowed to defy the United Nations with impunity, when
Arab Iraq is castigated for conduct that really is not so bad?
For example, Israel has an estimated 200 atomic bombs;
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10

Iraq has none. But the United Nations is embargoing Iraq
on the chance that it might have some. Israel is occupying
the territory of its neighbor, Lebanon, and has been since
1978, but the United Nations has allowed this occupation to
go on. Why? Because—according to the Iraqis—the United
States defends Israel and supports its trespasses, at the
same time that it requires the United Nations to deal
harshly with Iraq.
11

This theme of the double standard resonates with the
moderate Arab leaders—not because they are perturbed by
the seeming illogicality of America’s position, but because
most of these regimes are basically unstable. They do not
have an easy relationship with their people. Some states are
only barely legitimate. The double standard theme,
properly wielded, works on the Arab street to turn the
people against the rulers. Indeed, worked on long enough
and skillfully enough, it could bring down more than one of
these regimes.
12

As a longtime observer of events in the Middle East, I
found it fascinating to watch how the double standard
theme played out in this latest crisis. Towards the end of the
affair—as Iraq and the United States were preparing to go
to war—the moderate Arab rulers practically pleaded with
the Iraqis to give in; do not force a confrontation over
this—let it lie, please!
13

Why were they so supplicatory? Because what Iraq was
doing compromised them, fundamentally. In the
streets—as the demonstrations started gearing up—Iraq
was portrayed as the courageous party, standing up to
W estern imperial i s m and Zi oni sm; whi l e—by
implication—the moderate Arab leaders were traitors who,
by failing to come out in support of Iraq, actually were
supporting the enemy.
14

As a consequence, with open hostilities about to break
out, America found that it practically could not get into the
region. Almost without its being aware, America had lost its
access to the Gulf. Not because the Iraqis barred the way,
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but because moderate Arab regimes—fearful of a popular
backlash—refused permission to use their bases for combat
missions, and in some cases even denied overflight
permission.
15

This, I submit, represented the nadir of American
involvement in this part of the world. At no time that I can
think of has America’s influence dipped so low. And, I
contend, we were brought to this unhappy impasse by clever
Iraqi maneuvering. The Iraqis so structured the situation
that America could not exploit its greatest advantage, its
vastly superior military power.
Of course, Washington could have used it. It could have
gone ahead and attacked without coalition support. But
this, in my view, would have been a very dangerous thing to
have done. In the first place it would have put enormous
strains on America’s military, but, along with that, it would
have deprived the nation of the moral basis that it needed
for an operation like this. How could Washington claim to be
acting in the interests of the international community,
when practically the whole of the community had
abandoned it?
Now what lessons can we draw from the affair?
Lessons.
The first lesson, obviously, is to take care of coalitions. In
this particular crisis, coalition-building was not something
that it was just good to do; it was essential. The Iraqi leaders
saw that America’s center of gravity was the coalition, and
then set about to dismantle it. In doing so, they proved
themselves to be good Clausewitzians.
At the same time, the Iraqis were aided by the
Washington policymakers, who seemed incapable of
assessing the danger—despite the fact that the Iraqis had
practically telegraphed the strategy they would use. In
November of 1996, they conducted what amounted to a trial
run of the February 1998 showdown. I refer to their
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operation in Irbil, where they came to the aid of the
beleaguered Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), being
assaulted by the Iranians and their client the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK). In the 1996 affair the Gulf
sheikhs abandoned Washington, giving reasons similar to
those expressed in February 1998. The same was the case
with France; it stood aside on both occasions, justifying its
behavior in practically identical terms.
16

Despite this warning, in February 1998 U.S. policymakers behaved—right up to the end—as if the coalition
would hold together. It did not. When Saddam Hussein
threw down the gauntlet a second time, America found itself
constrained—actually, physically constrained. It could put
its forces into the Gulf, but, once there, their maneuver room
was limited. What was wanted was a substantial,
land-based platform from which to launch, and that was
denied it.
17

The lesson here, then, is that coalitions once struck must
be maintained. The coalition partners must be regularly
consulted to test their commitment, and if there is the
slightest disaffection, this must be overcome.
Now for the second lesson—in any operation where the
U.S. military might is employed, homefront support must
be assured well in advance of the launch date. This is
particularly so when (as happened in February 1998) the
offending state shows an evident intention not only to stand
up to a military trial, but an intention to survive the initial
clash and force the issue.
18

Iraq is a complex society. The regime there is largely
misunderstood in the West. Western intelligence tends to
emphasize the thuggish aspects of Baathist rule; and, it is
true, the regime is ruthless. But it also is extremely well
organized; its security apparatus extends throughout the
society, and, as a consequence of this, the regime can count
on considerable popular support.
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In the February 1998 test, Hussein declared he would
absorb whatever punishment Washington intended to
inflict, on the assumption that his people would prove equal
to the test. Afterwards, in the lull which would inevitably
succeed the initial strikes, he planned to renew his
challenge. By that time, he reasoned, world public opinion
would have come over to his side—he would be seen as the
victim and Washington the bully. Hence, it might be
difficult for the United States to resume its assault.
Hussein’s strategy may have been crafted for world
consumption; in fact, however, it was likely to have had its
greatest impact in the United States. Americans dislike
being cast in the role of world policemen, and will submit to
such a role only if individual “police actions” are easily
gotten over with. An action such as Hussein planned, which
was bound to drag out, would practically mandate an appeal
by President Clinton to the American public for support—if
not sacrifice. One can only wonder whether that would have
been forthcoming.
If one looks at what occurred at Ohio State, there is cause
for concern. There we witnessed the spectacle of three
members of Mr. Clinton’s cabinet trying to defend his Gulf
strategy against a hostile audience. One can say that Ohio
State was a blip, that it revealed nothing of the true state of
American attitudes. I think this would be a mistake. I
suspect that the behavior of the dissidents betokened a
profound unease felt by many Americans.
19

Most distressing about this episode was the character of
the attack mounted against the hapless officials. To be sure
there were unruly elements in the crowd, but there was also
a lot of cogent questioning. And many questions, which
ought to have been easily disposed of, either went
unanswered or the replies proved unsatisfactory.
20

Given everything that went on, clearly there was a need
for good public relations to prepare the public for a
sharp—possibly costly—engagement. That PR should have
been well thought out and deftly handled. As the affair at
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Ohio State showed, an element of the population is
knowledgeable about world affairs and is sufficiently
articulate to demolish glib defenses.
Finally, lesson three—perhaps the most important of
all—which has to do with timing. It seems to me that, in the
February 1998 confrontation, Iraq took advantage of the
Asian meltdown. Financial conditions in the Far East began
to unravel about the time that Hussein issued his
ultimatum to the United Nations. As the Middle East
embroglio escalated, Asia’s situation became dire. The
world looked to Washington to calm the financial turmoil in
the Far East, but instead America prepared for war in the
Middle East. This, of course, only increased the jittery
condition of the markets.
I don’t suggest that the Iraqis timed their challenge to
coincide with the meltdown; obviously, they could not have
done so. However, the Iraqis did nothing to mitigate the
effects of their action; they went on apparently oblivious to
the system-threatening aspects of what they were doing.
Whereas another state might have pulled back, knowing
that the system was endangered, the Iraqis apparently gave
this no thought. They may even have wished to cause a
wreck. Given the situation the regime found itself in, a
meltdown probably would have had little effect upon it.
Why?
Iraq is a pariah stae. And what does that mean? It means
to be shut out of the system, not considered a part of it. The
system, as we know, is economically oriented. Thus, a state
that is excluded is denied access to capital. Not only can it
not get any, if it has some it must hold on to it, since
investment possibilities—for the pariah—are virtually nonexistent.
Thus Iraq, having no stake in the world financial system,
did not a care what might happen as a result of last
February’s confrontation. The system could come crashing
down in ruin, and the Iraqis would not care. I believe
something similar went on with Suharto and the Indonesia
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crisis. There, too, an outcast leader played a spoiler’s role. In
Suharto’s case, he too plunged recklessly on, ignoring
International Monetary Fund (IMF) injunctions to amend
his behavior, probably in the belief he could get away with it.
Yugoslavia’s Slobovan Milosevic’s behavior over Kosovo
may be another instance of this sort of risk-taking.
We must consider then that the true bandits of the world
(those who have been cast so far out of the system they
practically have lost touch with it) can, if they are
sufficiently cold-blooded, wreak enormous damage. One
could speculate that it was this perception of Iraq’s
damage-potential that persuaded American policymakers
to let U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan try to defuse the
crisis before it got violently out of hand.
In an asymmetrical contest, look out for conditions the
pariah can exploit—and, indeed, which are peculiarly
suited to his advantage. As a pariah, he—like Samson
pulling down the temple—has nothing to lose.
Now before I wrap this up I want to take up one last
point—could this happen again?
Forcing the Issue.
I do not think there is any question about it. It not only
can, but it will happen. Iraq sees the U. N. inspections crisis
as one of national survival. It is determined to get out from
under the sanctions, and the Iraqi people (because of the
peculiar nature of the society) will go along with whatever
step the leadership takes, no matter how apocalyptic.
Hence, this is not a crisis that is going to go away.
Moreover, unfortunately for us, it is not a one-on-one affair,
us against the Iraqis. (Were it so, I think our chances of
imposing our will would be good.) Quite the contrary, in
order to obtain closure, the United States must advance
step-by-step with its coalition partners, and avoid doing
anything that might dispose them to defect.
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This is an almost impossible task. In two areas, U.S.
policy has embarked on a course that is certain to offend the
very states on which it must depend. The first involves
trading with the Iranians—there, Washington’s insistence
that this not be done has alienated much of Europe.
Moreover, it happens that two of the European states,
France and Russia, currently are involved in a major deal
with Tehran. I am referring to the effort by the French oil
company Total (in conjunction with Russia and Malaysia) to
exploit an Iranian gas field. President Clinton is seeking to
finesse this confrontation, but it is not at all certain
Congress will go along. In the meantime the Europeans
have elevated the Total controversy to the status of a test
case—if America remains intransigent, the Europeans have
made it plain they intend to retaliate. In any case, we should
not expect our European allies to support us in our next
showdown in the Gulf.
21

The second area in which problems are bound to arise is
over the Arab-Israeli peace talks. Washington has shown it
is dubious about going to the mat with the Israelis on this
issue, which the Arabs feel it must do if the talks are to
survive and bear enduring fruit. I do not believe that the
administration has the will to force the issue with Israel.
Consequently, the Arabs will remain disaffected, and they
will not be on board when the next confrontation
materializes.
The test almost certainly will come in October 1998 and
possible sooner. When it develops, we will be no better
positioned to meet Iraq than we are today.
22

Overall, as I see it, the prognosis is bad; America is
heading into a lose-lose situation. Is there anything it can do
by way of extricating itself from this impasse?
Recommendation.
I think there is. But first off we must take a hard look at
what is that we are dealing with here.
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What we attempted to launch in February 1998—and
are contemplating repeating at some future date—is a
Military Action in the Absence of Threat (MAAT). That is
my peculiar coinage; it is my way of referring to what I
believe is a distinct class of operations. These are actions
which—no matter how necessary they may be—are not
perceived to be so by the public; rather the public views
them as supererogatory.
As a consequence, such operations entail considerable
risk. The officers conducting them have little margin for
error, and should anything go drastically wrong they will
find that the public has withdrawn support. As in the case of
Somalia, demands will be voiced to bring the troops home. I
think the Israeli experience in Lebanon is a good instance of
this. It seems the ragtag Hezbollah militia is on the point of
driving the mighty Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) out of
Lebanon’s southern region. The reason for this, primarily, is
that the Israeli leadership has not persuaded the Israeli
public there is a reason for staying on.
It is beyond the scope of this article to explain why
America’s leaders have failed to justify our military venture
against the Iraqis. But it does seem to be the case that they
have not. That, and the wholesale desertion by America’s
allies, betoken the unacceptability of the mission.
My advice, then, would be to avoid the looming
confrontation with Iraq. We should do as former Defense
Secretary Casper Weinberger did in Lebanon in the
1980s—withdraw, regroup and rethink our involvement. A
good place to start would be with our assessment of the
enemy, Baghdad. It seems to me we are ill informed on such
basics as the nature of the leadership there, the relation of
the leaders to the Iraqi public, and the place of a state like
Iraq in the overall world system.
I think ignorance on that last point is part of what led us
to concoct the truly, in my view, disastrous Dual
Containment strategy whereby we set out to isolate both
Iraq and Iran. That strategy has failed. The events of
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February 1998 proved it so. We should use this experience
as the basis for initiating a thoroughgoing examination of
how Dual Containment should be revised, if it should not be
totally abandoned.
23
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BEYOND RUSSIA AND CHINA:
A SURVEY OF THREATS TO U.S. SECURITY
FROM LESSER STATES
Kori N. Schake

Introduction.
This paper addresses state-to-state threats excluding
Russia and China. It reviews challenges posed by the usual
suspects—North Korea, Iran, and Iraq—none of which are
considered to be major military challengers. It also
identifies six functional areas of state-to-state threats that
could diminish U.S. security or require rethinking our
approach: (1) anti-U.S. coalitions; (2) contested emergence
of new states; (3) regime change among existing allies; (4)
inhibiting the use of U.S. forces; (5) critical dependence on
allies; and (6) criminalization of governments.
The Usual Suspects.
The United States faces very little prospect of an attack,
and our values are shared by more countries than ever
before. The intelligence community has determined that a
“peer competitor” to U.S. power is unlikely to emerge within
15 years. This makes rounding up the usual suspects more
difficult than it used to be.
Russia and China have been ruled out of bounds for the
purposes of this paper. Of the remaining possible regional
challengers, Libya is probably no less implacably opposed to
U.S. interests than previously, but has been so circumspect
since the 1986 El Dorado Canyon raid as to barely merit
mention.
Iraq. Iraq continues to be an irritant, but not a major
military threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf. Iraq poses a
more tangible state-to-state threat than either North Korea
or Iran; however, the threat it poses is more of a political
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than military nature. Iraqi military forces could not pose a
serious challenge to a dedicated U.S. force even during the
1991 Gulf War, when they were in considerably better shape
than now. The 7 years of operational and economic
restraints imposed by the U.N. authorities have not
permitted serious reconstitution of their forces.
Saddam Hussein’s chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons programs remain cause for considerable concern,
and could be used in attacks against military installations
or civilian targets in the Middle East. However, the clear
result would be targeting of the Iraqi regime by U.S. forces,
so it is more likely that the weapons are to deter attacks on
the regime than to conduct offensive or terrorist operations.
While Iraq continues to require careful U.S. and
international attention, it does not pose a major challenge to
the United States.
North Korea. The state-to-state threat against which the
United States has committed the most resources is
aggression by North Korea against South Korea, possibly
coupled with attacks on Japan and other regional U.S.
allies. In the past few years, North Korea has massed its
troops along the demilitarized zone, proliferated missile
technology export to rogue regimes like Iran, sent a
submarine load of special forces commandos into South
Korean waters, and continued to fund a substantial nuclear
weapons program. North Korea maintains the world’s third
largest chemical weapons inventory and, despite terrible
economic deprivation, is building ballistic missiles with
ranges from 600 through 6,000 miles. In addition, the KIM
Chong-il regime gives every indication of being aggressive
and irrational. Distinguished experts in Asian security
issues believe North Korea to be capable of a “suicidal
gamble,” attacking South Korea rather than fading from
power under the weight of a failed economy and political
system. None of these are reassuring prospects for
maintaining the status quo or achieving a peaceful
unification of the Koreas.
1

2
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However, there are significant signs that the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is moving toward a “soft
landing” of gradual unification with the South rather than a
violent implosion. All of North Korea’s potential adversaries
have been providing substantial aid during the past two
years’ famine, making them less likely targets of
aggression. China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the
United States are all committed to managing North Korea’s
decline without provocation. South Koreans have little
desire to undertake the massive development task of rapid
unification, especially after the Asian economic crisis. The
newly-elected South Korean government is more
conciliatory toward the North, which may further ease
tensions on the Korean peninsula. The DPRK appears to be
responding in positive ways to these developments; it
recently offered to hold bilateral talks with the South
Korean government in Geneva, demonstrating a greater
interest than before in cooperation.
3
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Even if the DPRK wanted to attack South Korea, it is
unlikely to have the ability to do so. North Korea is facing
starvation on a scale so debilitating that it is unlikely to be
able to put an army in the field. While it is impossible to
assess the motivating effect of North Korean propaganda, it
is difficult to imagine troops who have starving families
(even if they are not starving themselves) fighting an
aggressive war waged by the DPRK. Any effort by the North
Korean government to organize a conventional military
assault on South Korea would probably result in large-scale
defections and surrenders. In fact, the North Korean regime
should be more concerned about troops turning their
weapons against the government than against troops
assembled on the southern side of the demilitarized
zone—and the North Korean government must be well
aware of that possibility.
8

The prospect of an unconventional “last-gasp” attack by
a collapsing DPRK is a more serious threat. Faced with the
imminent crumbling of state authority, the North Korean
government could probably motivate special forces units to
9
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stage terrorist attacks throughout South Korea and in
allied states. These could take the form of a coordinated
campaign of covert attacks intended to disable U.S. and
South Korean military capabilities: chemical or nuclear
attacks on airfields and other large military installations,
interdicting communications lines, and assassinations of
South Korean and American military leaders. A North
Korean attack of this nature could also be directed at the
South Korean political system, in which case the targets
would be more punitive: assassinations of South Korean
political leaders, poisoning water supplies, and directing
nuclear weapons at Seoul and other large population
centers.
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The problem with a North Korean last-gasp attack
scenario is discerning the purpose it would serve. If the
regime were completely irrational, there is no reason to
believe it would have waited this long to attack the South;
what rational objective the DPRK could achieve in its
current condition is unclear. The DPRK may hunger over
the prospect of forcing the South into servitude, or acquiring
the wealth and food enjoyed by South Koreans. But
desperate military measures such as the last-gasp attack
could not achieve those ends. Without the ability to take and
hold territory, which only a disciplined army could provide,
the North could not enjoy the advantages potentially stolen
from the South.
Even if the North’s motive were simply to punish the
South, a last-gasp attack could only take South Korea down
as the North sinks itself. The long-standing U.S.
commitment to defense of South Korea and the impressive
military capabilities assembled in the South make the
consequences of any attack, military or paramilitary,
abundantly clear. The United States would certainly
retaliate for an attack on South Korea, and would probably
target the DPRK regime rather than territory or even
organized Northern military forces. It is possible that the
last-gasp scenarios serve domestic purposes in North
Korea, since the threat of launching such attacks serves the
306

interests of regime survival as circumstances in North
Korea grow ever more desperate.
11

Even if a coterie of the North’s leadership were irrational
enough to want to go out with a bang, it is quite possible that
some in the political and military leadership would seek to
stymie that effort. The election of a South Korean president
more conciliatory toward the North, and himself a victim of
repression by former South Korean regimes, makes a
last-gasp attack even less likely. Some in the DPRK
regime—paralleling decisions by some in Hitler’s regime—
could well consider their prospects more attractive in
assisting the ROK government than in carrying out a
suicidal last-gasp attack.
For all these reasons, North Korea is losing its credibility
as a potential aggressor state. While the DPRK regime
remains worrisome, its ability to threaten the South is
diminishing. Tensions on the Korean peninsula appear to be
dissipating as both Koreas become more conciliatory, and
the DPRK teeters on the brink of economic collapse.
Iran. Iran is the final state generally conjured up as a
usual suspect for attacks on U.S. interests by another state.
It has emotional appeal as a villain because of the 1979
hostage crisis and the anti-Western revolutionary fervor of
Ayatollah Khomeni and his successors. The Islamic
Republic of Iran funds terrorist organizations, may well be
embarked on a clandestine nuclear weapons program, is
acquiring long-range ballistic missiles, opposes the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, makes America’s
regional allies nervous by challenging their support of U.S.
military presence in the Gulf, and continues to enjoy the
lather of its own anti-American rhetoric. Since the Gulf
War, Iran has been engaged in a substantial military
buildup. It boasts the largest regional navy in the Gulf,
substantial missile and mine capabilities, limited power
projection capability, and a growing submarine force. Iran
probably already has the ability to threaten oil shipments
through the Straits of Hormuz.
12
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Iran’s ability to influence states in the Middle East
appears limited to supporting terrorism. Religious
differences inhibit Iranian influence beyond its borders,
since Shi’i Muslims constitute only 15 percent of the world’s
Muslim population and most reside in Iran. In the 19
years since the revolution, Iran has failed to become a model
for other Islamic states, even in Iraq, which has a majority of
Shi’i Muslims. Arab states remain wary of Iran for
promoting Islamic militancy. The end of the Cold War
probably also diminished Iran’s power by making Russian
collaboration less commercially and politically profitable
and, due to arms control agreements like the Missile
Technology Control Regime, less militarily beneficial.
15
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Positive political developments in Iran in 1997 make the
picture more conducive to U.S. interests and influence than
it has been at any time since the 1979 revolution. In May of
1997, Iran’s leaders acquiesced in election results that
brought President Mohammed Khatemi to power with
public support around 60 percent, even though he was not
their preferred candidate. This may mark Iran as the most
honestly democratic Islamic state in the Middle East.
At a December 1997 meeting of Gulf leaders, Ayatollah
Khameni voiced the standard Iranian attacks on the United
States and Israel, but President Khatemi took a much more
moderate and cooperative line, even professing that Iran no
longer would support covert operations against other
governments. There is some evidence that the Iranian
military supports this more moderate approach. In a
January 1998 interview on CNN, President Khatemi even
called for greater contact with the American people. The
widely divergent approaches of President Khatemi and
Ayatollah Khameni suggest a power struggle within Iran’s
ruling circle. While Khameni holds most of the statutory
authority for security and foreign policy, the breadth of
support for Khatemi may sway Iran in the direction of
greater common interests with the United States.
18
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Even before Khatemi’s election, Iran may have adopted
a more conciliatory policy toward America. Iran may have
been attempting to signal a desire for improved relations
with the United States as early as 1996, when Conoco was
granted an oil development contract. These developments
clearly suggest that “dual containment” is no longer a useful
strategy for the United States. American interests would
be better served by rewarding cooperative Iranian behavior
than continuing the embargo.
22
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Nightmare Scenarios.
If not the time honored shibboleths of North Korea, Iran,
or Iraq, what other state could pose a threat to the United
States?
The possible conflicts to be adumbrated here are not
likely prospects. Even if they were to become likely, the
United States has many tools to shape events as they occur.
But examining nightmare scenarios can nonetheless be
useful, even when they are as unlikely as any state
developing the ability to defeat the U.S. Army in the coming
15 years. Nightmare scenarios can probe for weaknesses in
our forces or our decisionmaking practices that could be
exploited by potential enemies. They can identify policies
that limit or compensate for U.S. vulnerabilities. And they
can suggest possibilities that straight-line extrapolations
from present trends might miss.
I’d like to suggest six categories of state-to-state threats
that could emerge as nightmare scenarios for the United
States: (1) anti-U.S. coalitions; (2) violent emergence of new
states based upon ethnic consolidation; (3) adverse regime
change among existing allies; (4) enemy manipulations
inhibiting the use of U.S. forces; (5) RMA-induced
incompatibilities between U.S. forces and allies; and (6)
criminalization of governments. I use examples to illustrate
the arguments, but would like to emphasize that none are
likely futures.
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Anti-U.S. Coalitions. While no single state may pose a
threat to the United States, it is relatively easy to imagine
coalitions of states who could find common cause in
opposing U.S. interests, even without bringing in Russia or
China directly. While even in combination most countries
could not defeat American forces, it is important to recall
that states do not always have to achieve military success
for military operations to successfully serve strategic
purposes. The Egyptian invasion of Israel in 1973
demonstrated Israel’s vulnerability, garnering an
important political success for Anwar Sadat. The Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait resulted in a resounding military defeat
but may well have served Saddam Hussein’s broader
political purposes in the Arab world. It is not necessarily
irrational for states to use force against U.S. interests even
when they cannot conceivably defeat U.S. forces. Two
examples of anti-U.S. coalitions that could serve the
members’ strategic interests are: a coalition of Iran and
Iraq; and a coalition of the ailing Asian tigers.
While Iran and Iraq fought a costly 8-year war against
each other, the “dual containment” policy provides them
common cause. If sanctions against both countries were to
cause widespread public deprivation or call the regimes into
question, the two governments might eventually find
reason to cooperate in attacks on U.S. forces in the region, or
assist each other in eluding U.N. (in the case of Iraq) and
International Atomic Energy Agency (in the case of Iran)
inspections of their nuclear facilities.
This possibility could actually increase if Saddam
Hussein were deposed. The paramount internal threat to
the Iraqi regime emanates from Iraq’s Shi’i, who constitute
the majority of Iraq’s population and oppose the regime. If
Iran, which is also predominantly Shi’i Muslim, actively
supported Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, a friendly Shi’i
government could well come to power in Iraq.
25

Gulf allies might fear supporting the United States
against an Iranian-Iraqi coalition, even if U.S. forces in
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their territory are attacked, because of domestic unrest or
fear of delegitimizing their own regimes. The presence of
U.S. military forces in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
states could become “a lightning rod for domestic
discontent.” Iran and Iraq could also team up in attacks on
regional U.S. allies, several of whom (including Saudi
Arabia) have aggrieved both Iran and Iraq. There are such
fractious divisions among the GCC states, so little security
cooperation among them, and despite substantial arms
procurements such little defense capability, that the
combined military forces of Iran and Iraq could inflict
substantial damage. Collusion by either Russia, which
still covets a Middle East role, or China, which is growing
ever more dependent on Middle East oil as its economy
develops, would further aggravate the U.S. position. Either
Russia or China could stymie U.N. action, supply weapons
and intelligence, and make unilateral U.S. action more
costly. Such a coalition of Iran and Iraq, even if only
temporary, would prove disastrous to U.S. interests in the
Arab world.
26
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Another anti-U.S. coalition of moment would be among
the authoritarian Asian regimes. The economic crisis that
Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia are
currently experiencing not only deflates the myth of
invincible Asian tigers, it also constrains their
sovereignty. If economic restrictions required by the
International Monetary Fund cause public resentment,
governments could attempt to deflect criticism onto the IMF
or the United States as the Fund’s ideological center of
gravity. Senior officials from the affected countries have
already denounced American currency speculators, and
anti-IMF sentiment has become a public rallying cry in
Indonesia.
30

Forcing a level economic playing field will undercut the
crony capitalism through which political allegiances have
been cemented in several of the Asian states. The pains of
the economic crisis are likely to hit urban poor the hardest,
mobilizing the greatest threat to authoritarian govern311
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ments. If authoritarian leaders eventually decide this
threatens their hold on power, they could turn against the
United States in an effort to shield their economies and
political systems from change. Even without cooperating
with China or Russia, the Asian tigers could interdict
shipping across the Straits of Malacca and other choke
points in the Pacific. With sympathetic Chinese support of
anti-American authoritarian regimes, Asia could look much
less hospitable to U.S. interests.
Contested Emergence of New States. The Wilsonian ideal
of state borders representing identifiable ethnic
communities is coming into being, in many cases violently,
now that Cold War restraints have been lifted. Ethnic
communities in territorially cohesive regions pulled away
from the Soviet Union to establish states in Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia,
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan—and more may yet
be coming from within Russia. States which have
intermingled ethnicity and territory, like Bosnia, are at
even higher risk of violent dissolution as new ethnicallybased states are created. The emergence of new states has
already instigated U.S. military involvement to prevent
epidemic starvation and atrocities, while upholding
humanitarian and democratic values.
In most cases, support to collapsing or emerging states is
a luxury rather than a necessity for the United States.
However, the emergence of two particular states could pose
definite challenges to U.S. security interests: a Kurdish
state across swaths of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria; and an
Albanian state cut out of Yugoslavia.
Iraq’s borders do not cohere to ethnic or national
boundaries; they were set by fiat in 1926. U.S. intervention
to protect Kurds in northern Iraq after the Gulf war, now
sustained for 7 years, has both fomented the idea of a
Kurdish state and resulted in the de facto detachment of the
territory occupied by Kurds from Iraq. Kurds also live in
Iran, Syria, and Turkey—all of which oppose establishment

312

of a Kurdish state, even if it were composed solely of
territory from Iraq. While Iran and Syria sporadically
support Kurds in Iraq, they do so on the basis of harming
Iraq’s government; Turkey supports Iraqi Kurds in return
for their assistance in putting down the PKK Kurdish
movement in Turkey. None of the three governments would
accept any one of the others incorporating Kurdish territory
from Iraq into their own states.
32

All of which suggests that if Iraq collapses, Turkey, Iran,
and Syria will probably use military force to prevent each
other from absorbing parts of Iraq. Turkey would almost
certainly seek support from the United States if the
territorial status quo were challenged by Iran or Syria.
Denying such support would validate Turkish suspicions
that its NATO allies do not appreciate the gravity of the
“Kurdish problem” and cannot be counted on for support in a
crisis, giving Turkey yet one more reason to turn away from
the West. Providing support would damage U.S. relations
with the Arab states, who view Turkey with suspicion, but
who in any event would have a strong interest in supporting
the retention of existing borders. Either way, the United
States loses critical allies.
If Iraq begins to collapse, Turkey could also be the first
state to use force, since its army is already operating in
northern Iraq. It is in position to intervene and is already
familiar with the terrain and patterns of operation by
Kurdish factions in Iraq. There were suggestions during the
Gulf War that Turkey might move quickly into northern
Iraq to prevent Iran or Syria from gaining territory. If
Turkey were the first state to challenge Iraq’s territorial
integrity, it would be even more difficult for the United
States to support Turkish military action. Having fought
Iraq to preserve the principle of territorial integrity,
America would have a public relations nightmare
explaining its support for a Turkish invasion of Iraq.
A second scenario detrimental to U.S. interests based on
the emergence of a new state could occur in Yugoslavia.
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Kosovo holds so powerful a position in the Serbian sense of
identity that Serbian acceptance of Kosovo’s independence
is difficult to imagine. Ethnic Albanians constitute 90
percent of the population of the Yugoslav province of
Kosovo, yet they have very little autonomy and virtually no
political power. Serbs living in Kosovo, with the support of
the Milosevic regime in Belgrade, have constrained political
and social freedoms for Albanians in Kosovo for the past 2
years, breeding radicalism among Albanian Kosovars.
Serb paramilitary forces have used force indiscriminately,
killing dozens of people who do not appear to have been
involved in illegal activities.
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The U.S. government has long considered violence in
Kosovo to be the major potential flash point in the former
Yugoslavia—the contingency that could bring two NATO
allies (Greece and Turkey) into a war on opposite sides.
U.S. pressure for sanctions against Serbia met a cool
response from Italy, France, Germany, and Russia; German
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel has even suggested that the
Serbian repression was legitimated by the actions of
Albanian Kosovars. Signatories of the Dayton Peace
Accords know that the success of NATO’s mission in Bosnia
depends on support of Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic for any hope of eventual success in pacifying
Bosnia. Although both countries condemned violence in
Kosovo, Turkey is sympathetic to Albanian Kosovars,
Greece to Serbs.
36
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If the latest round of Serbian pressure creates more
rather than less agitation for independence in Kosovo,
subsequent rounds of negotiations could see a yawning gap
between the positions of the United States and Turkey on
one side and our major European allies along with Russia on
the other. Albanian Kosovars may declare independence
from Yugoslavia, challenging President Milosevic to defy
Western warnings. If Serbia continues its repressive tactics
in Kosovo, the Albanian majority may turn violently against
Serbs living in the province, precipitating a destabilizing
exodus of refugees to neighboring countries and even more
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violent repression by Serbian military and paramilitary
forces brought in to quell the disturbance. An Albanian
uprising supported by Turkey and other opponents of
Serbia would quickly precipitate calls for an American
military intervention, even though there would be very
little public support for it in the United States.
38

An explosion of Kosovo would not only affect the
Balkans, but Greece would almost certainly encourage
European Union action against Turkey, aggravating
disagreements over Cyprus and the status of Turkey’s
application for EU membership. The United States would
be caught between its allegiance to Europe and its
responsibility as the only country able to keep Turkey in the
Western camp. Even if Kosovo were able to overcome
political and military challenges to its independence, the
Balkans would have one more fragile, turbulent,
economically marginal country with outsiders angling for
influence.
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Regime Change Among Existing Allies. The United
States depends heavily on the support, both political and
military, of regional allies in the conduct of our security
policy. In many cases, and especially in the Middle East, the
United States is supported by unstable or only marginally
stable ruling regimes—-those with uneasy relationships
with their populaces. A change of regime in any number of
states allied to the United States, whether peaceful or
violent, could have dramatic effects on our ability to
successfully continue current security policies. A regime
change in either Egypt or Saudi Arabia could have
particularly devastating effects on U.S. interests.
Egypt is unlikely to “succumb to a reign of theocratic
zeal,” but the steady descent into poverty and hopelessness
that has characterized Egyptian political life in the past
decade could well have unpredictable results. The
economy is moribund and losing even its tourist cachet
because of violence against foreigners intended to punish
the government. The government of President Hosmi
40
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Mubarak has cracked down on terrorist and dissident
activity, but has not engendered an active and positive state
role to balance its negative effects. In addition, Mubarak’s
acceptance of a third presidential term in 1993 created the
prospect of an authoritarian Egypt with no orderly
succession.
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It is difficult to imagine Egypt becoming an aggressor
against its neighbors, but an escalation of domestic violence
like that which occurred when President Anwar Sadat was
assassinated is conceivable. An effort to overthrow the
regime, especially if it were supported by Egyptian military
units, could create an upheaval within Egypt. The United
States would likely be called on to support the regime with
military forces in the region.
A regime more focused on Egypt’s domestic problems,
even if not explicitly anti-American, would cost the United
States a valuable partner in the Middle East peace process.
A regime that challenged the Sadat and Mubarak
governments’ commitment to peace with Israel could have
much more nefarious effects on U.S. interests. If an
Egyptian government worked with Iran, Iraq, and other
opponents of peace with Israel, the nature of political
dialogue and U.S. calculations about the cost of support to
Israel could change significantly.
A regime change in Saudi Arabia could also have
deleterious effects on U.S. interests in the Middle East.
Pressure is rising there for more representative and liberal
government. While internal change is in both Saudi and
U.S. interests, unless that change toward democracy is well
managed, the Saudi government could be destabilized. The
deployment of U.S. forces in GCC states strains the
legitimacy of those regimes in the best of circumstances, but
a virtual collapse of the Middle East peace process
(particularly since many Arab publics ascribe its failure to
Israeli intransigence) coupled with a seemingly
personalized American crusade against Saddam Hussein
that punishes the Iraqi people without removing Saddam,
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will make GCC governments that support U.S. policies and
forward deployments more vulnerable.
An economic downturn among the GCC states, similar to
that currently being endured by Asian governments, would
badly aggravate the problem. Oil prices plummeted 40
percent in the February-April 1998 timeframe, and 75
percent of the Saudi economy depends on oil. While an
unusually warm winter in 1997-98 and the Asian slowdown
have contributed to the international oil glut, prices are also
low because Saudi Arabia is producing oil in excess of OPEC
guidelines—which suggests that the Saudi government is
concerned about the effects of an economic downturn. Cuts
in government subsidies could increase public unrest and
diminish tolerance for the government’s other unpopular
policies. Even if the Saudi government were not toppled,
concern about public unrest could lead to reticence in
supporting U.S. positions that would impair U.S. ability to
harness the Iraqi government, coax moderation from Iran,
and sponsor peace negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority.
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Regime changes precipitated by domestic developments
would be difficult scenarios for the United States to
intervene in militarily. They require a sophisticated
understanding of the societies that we rarely achieve and
seldom provide opportunities for “clean” uses of force.
However, if either the Mubarak government in Egypt or the
Saudi government were in danger, they may well call for
U.S. military assistance. If that assistance were not given,
the United States could watch two of its most valued allies
in the Middle East sink. If that assistance were given, it
could result in our propping up a government lacking
domestic legitimacy and thus requiring long-term
constabulary commitments. It is difficult to think how with
anything less than constabulary use of its forces, the United
States could stave off regime change—resulting in the
emergence of governments hostile to U.S. interests.
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Manipulations Inhibiting the Use of U.S. Forces. States
determined to oppose U.S. security policies need not fight
the U.S. military if they are able to prevent the United
States from fielding or employing our forces. One of the
easiest ways for a state to achieve that goal would be to
threaten retaliation against U.S. allies. For example, if the
Iraqi government threatened to use chemical or biological
weapons against Israel in response to an attack by U.S.
forces, it would gravely increase the political and moral
costs to the United States of attacking Iraq. It may not
prevent an attack, but it would send U.S. decisionmakers
searching for options. The actual use of chemical or
biological weapons against Israel would probably
strengthen U.S. resolve to use force, resulting in U.S.
military forces directly targeting the regime rather than its
military forces. But the simple threat of itself would raise
the costs to the U.S. for using force.
A regime sophisticated enough to work on U.S. public
and congressional anxieties about high casualties, mission
creep, or long-term commitments of force could raise the
price to the U.S. government of using force in the conduct of
security policy. Once forces were deployed, sniper attacks,
guerrilla tactics, and atrocities like torturing prisoners
could also generate public pressure to end commitments of
U.S. military force.
T h rea ts a g a inst al l i es and d emons tr ati ng a
determination to inflict sustained pain on the United States
are ways that a state could defeat the U.S. military by
preventing it from ever being employed or precipitating its
premature withdrawal.
RMA-Induced Incompatibilities Between U.S. Forces
an d Allies. T h e Uni ted States i s i nc or p or ati ng
communications and other technologies into the equipment
of its military in ways that are already changing our
warfighting doctrine. Whether or not these changes
constitute a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA), they are
making our military forces different in important ways from
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the forces of our friends and allies. U.S. forces are
developing a battlefield awareness far superior to that of
other militaries, giving us control that could result in far
fewer casualties than would be risked by other nations. The
great leap forward in technology could make it more difficult
for the United States to build coalitions—other nations will
not have the ability to contribute much to the kind of
warfare our forces will be trained to conduct, and those that
still contribute could face the prospect of being mere
fussvolk with high casualty rates not suffered by the
Americans.
One way out of this dilemma being discussed at NATO is
increased mission specialization among allied forces.
Mission specialization already occurs, as the United States
realized during the Gulf War when it depended on
European navies for much of the coalition minesweeping
capability. But it could be extended over time to having
allies responsible for things like strategic lift, theater
reconnaissance, and other compartmented capabilities that
would allow allies to materially contribute as peers to a
U.S.-led coalition, even though they do not maintain the full
range of capabilities in their forces. A mission specialization
system would allow allies to target their defense spending in
narrow slices of the spectrum so that they could afford
high-end capabilities.
Such an approach would diminish Congressional
burdensharing concerns. However, it could also create
critical dependencies on allied forces if the United States
does not maintain redundant capabilities. The end of the
Cold War made it more difficult to predict the states that
will join “coalitions of the willing.” If U.S. forces become
dependent on niche capabilities of other states’ forces, the
failure of a particular ally to support U.S.-led coalition
operations could bring operations to a screeching halt. A
savvy antagonist would ferret out those dependencies,
identify the countries that hold the keys, and them exploit
that vulnerability.
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Criminalization of Governments. The gravest security
problems for the United States would result from
criminalization of Russia or Mexico. In either case, the rise
of criminal influence over the government would make the
United States vulnerable: in the case of Russia, because of
the remaining nuclear arsenal; in the case of Mexico,
because of its barely guarded 2,000-mile border with the
United States. The most problematic scenario would involve
retaining the forms of democratic governance without their
substance, because that would make it more difficult for us
to mobilize support for isolating the criminal regimes.
Organized crime has already reached worrisome
proportions in Russia. The government in Moscow could be
at risk of losing control, with the country reverting to feudal
fiefdoms controlled by thugs. There are enough leaks in the
Russian security system to make a true nightmare scenario
believable: a Russian government cooperative with the
West but lacking control of its nuclear forces; antagonists
able to steal or buy cooperation from Russian regional,
intelligence, or military leaders; and the Russian
government not wanting to appear so weak as to need U.S.
intervention in maintaining control over its own force. A
Russian government grown disgruntled by its loss of
stature, economic deprivation, and being taken advantage
of by the West for its weakness would only aggravate the
situation by making the Russians less cooperative in
supporting our common interests.
Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey recently characterized
Mexico as “fighting for its very life against drug lords.” The
Mexican government brought its military into law
enforcement in 1996 because it was considered the least
corrupt enforcement agency; but the arrest in 1997 of
General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, the head of drug
enforcement, demonstrated how quickly the military was
compromised. A recent Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
report suggests widespread collusion between the Mexican
military and drug mafia. The huge amount of bribe money
drug cartels can provide to politicians and law enforce45
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ment—on both sides of the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexican
border—allows the drug mafia to buy silence and
acquiescence. The money also increasingly allows them to
buy sophisticated intelligence systems, weaponry, and the
expertise of former U.S. military personnel.
Aside from a Russian nuclear threat, U.S. loss of border
control is the most direct threat to its security interests.
Such a development would destabilize the southwest, one of
the most vibrant economic and cultural regions of our
country. It would exacerbate the social problems associated
with drug abuse in the United States. It could make the
nature of the U.S. immigration debate much more hostile. A
public belief that their country had lost control of the border,
coupled with substantial violence along it, would likely
precipitate a call for redirecting U.S. defense efforts closer
to home. Border defense and constabulary functions could
become major U.S. military activities, changing both the
nature of defense efforts and the military’s relationship
with our society.
A different but related threat would be delegitimation of
the Mexican government. If Mexico were to become as
penetrated by drug money as Colombia, its institutions
would be unreliable. The Juarez drug cartel has already
breached Mexico’s banking industry, although the Mexican
government successfully identified the incursion.
Drug-related corruption and kidnapping are occurring in
the top echelons of state law enforcement apparatuses
throughout Mexico.
Delegitimation of Mexican
governmental institutions would be compounded if Mexican
citizens foment rebellion against the government in areas
like Chiapas.
46
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The increasing democratization of Mexico’s political
system diminishes the prospect sketched above somewhat,
but the Mexican government will have to guard against
outright purchase of legislative seats, keep police pressure
on drug cartels, and better enfranchise its population in
order to avoid the kinds of problems currently being
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experienced by Colombia. Moreover, Mexico’s citizens will
have to demand good government and police it with a free
press.
Conclusion.
None of the state-centered threats identified in this
paper are likely developments. A return to revolutionary
fervor in Iran coupled with an Iranian-friendly regime in
Iraq; a coalition of authoritarian Asian states building
common cause against international financial institutions;
the collapse of Iraq with subsequent involvement by Syria,
Iran, and Turkey to prevent emergence of a Kurdish state;
regime change by internal revolt in Egypt or the GCC
states; and criminalization of Russia or Mexico—are all long
odds. For the most part, trends in security are moving in
positive directions for U.S. interests. Democratic
institutions, the expansion of free markets, peaceful
settlement of disputes, and promotion of collective security
are diminishing state-to-state threats to U.S. interests.
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Russia and China, the two most likely peer-competitors
on the 15-year horizon, seem to have governments with
which the United States can work on common interests and
manage areas of divergence. North Korea, Iran, and
Iraq—the usual suspects for state-to-state threats when
Russia and China are excluded—all appear to be moving in
directions conducive to U.S. interests. For the most part,
America is in clover as far as threats to our interests from
other states are concerned.
However, as this paper has attempted to demonstrate,
the United States should not become complacent about its
current good fortune. As we have seen, several types of
state-to-state threats could develop that would
dramatically impair the U.S. ability to carry out its current
security policies.
Some of these situations the United States is unable to
control or even materially affect. However, most of them are
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amenable to U.S. pressure and influence, provided that
careful attention is paid to early detection and
management. Sensible diplomacy, targeted aid, help to
allies in resolving domestic problems, and the selective use
of military force can defuse or ameliorate many of these
potential problems.
General John Galvin, the former Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, has remarked that if someone had told
him when he became SACEUR in 1986 that NATO’s first
combat operations would be as part of a 35-nation coalition
fighting to repel an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he would not
have believed it. This insight illustrates the inescapable
uncertainty of the international environment, especially
now that Cold War inhibitions on the use of force have been
dissolved. While none of the specific state-to-state threats
identified in this paper may be probable, they, and others
like them, are perhaps no less likely than the challenge
posed in 1991 by Iraq and the American-led response to that
threat.
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PART IV: ROUNDTABLE ON FUTURE
RESPONSES—
John Allen Williams
Timothy A. Kinnan
Robert H. Scales, Jr.
Summary.
Panel Chairman Dr. John Hillen opened discussion
with an admonition against the tendency of many American
defense thinkers to connect U.S. vulnerabilities directly
with strategies, capabilities, and intentions of shadowy,
unidentified “enemies.” No nation, not even the United
States, can eliminate all its vulnerabilities. Rather, we as a
nation must narrow our security focus to those particular
vulnerabilities that correlate with actual capabilities and
intentions on the part of real-world enemies. With regard to
defense thinkers in general, he makes the additional point
that the United States has precious few defense
thinkers—perhaps a dozen—who see deeply into the human
condition as the wellspring of war and conflict. We must
contrive to produce many more such thinkers who
instinctively divine that we can never understand the
nature of the threat to our security and survival unless we
understand the nature of Homo sapiens himself.
Dr. John Allen Williams adduced four overarching
themes. First was the utility of history in preparing for the
future. The problem is not that we ignore history. The
problem, rather, is that we do hearken to history but
misapply its lessons, e.g., in applying the lesson against
appeasement learned from Munich in 1938 to the situation
in Vietnam in 1965. His second theme was the difficulty in
dealing with complexity and nonlinearity. Defining the true
national interest, for instance, is complicated by the
participants’ tacit political, career, and economic interests,
which figure in deliberations but have nothing intrinsically
to do with national interests. Systems analysis, ever
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mechanistic, still reigns, though it has little utility in
attacking the often decisive human dimension of strategic
problems.
Dr. Williams’ third theme was the role of reserve forces.
There is plenty of work to go around in an age of declining
defense budgets and thus no need for the present fiscal food
fights. The reserves pull their weight, not only with their
special capabilities but also as a valuable link between the
military and civil society. The fourth theme was the poor
U.S. record in dealing with ambiguous conflicts. Give us
back the Cold War and a conventional opponent, and U.S.
forces would be well nigh invincible. But give us
unconventional war or terrorism, and suddenly the outcome
is dicey.
Going beyond the foregoing themes, Dr. Williams makes
a plea for greater flexibility in military planning directed to
the distant future; for greater appreciation of asymmetrical
advantages the United States can apply against enemy
disadvantages; for consideration of broader participation by
the professional military in the nation’s defense dialogue;
for increased attention to problems posed by the cultural
gap between the military and civilian society; and for
rewarding people who think constructively out of the box of
prevailing orthodoxy.
Major General Timothy A. Kinnan elaborated upon a
single theme: the present absence of a true dialogue among
the uniformed services concerning strategy and
warfighting. What usually masquerades as dialogue is sly
digs at the other services’ agendas rather than objectively
presented solutions to the problems at hand. For example,
rather than simply explaining the efficiency and
effectiveness of aerial technology in halting an advancing
enemy, the airman instead accuses the soldier of
indifference to casualties in proposing a force-on-force
response. Or, faced with disagreement from the airman on
the issue, the soldier rejoins that the airman doesn’t
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understand war because he never smells cordite in the
foxhole and never holds a dying buddy in his arms.
Any ad hominem thrust of this nature—whether it
impugns the other side’s motives or its insight—instantly
halts dialogue and renders agreement impossible. Anger,
insult, and sarcasm have replaced objective analysis in
interservice discourse because of one underlying reality:
the struggle for resources in a fiscally constrained
environment. Each service believes it can protect its
resources by achieving a more prominent role in future
military operations and war plans. Hence most interservice
discussion of tactics, operations, and strategy today is in
fact a thinly disguised struggle for resources. It should be
the aim of all participants to banish preoccupation with
resources from their minds and to focus instead upon the
optimum military solution. Disagreements may still occur,
but at least those disagreements will occur within the
context of genuine debate.
As budgets fall faster than force structure, it is tempting
to throw out expensive technology as a means of preserving
force structure. But rather than concerning ourselves so
single-mindedly with force structure, we need to
concentrate instead upon how best to accomplish the
assigned missions with whatever force structure remains.
Technology can help us do that. Technology, by providing a
real-time picture of the battle space plus command and
control mechanisms for integrating the battle systems of all
service components in a seamless web of coordinated action,
enables us to quit drawing lines to govern where we fight.
No longer would we have to sunder battle space, assigning
sacred parcels of turf to each of the components, with all the
loss of efficiency and synergy that such a fractionated
system entails. Instead, we would impose a genuinely joint
effort throughout every cubic inch of the theater battle
space, thus achieving maximum efficiency from the total
force available.
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If the services start thinking of themselves as partners
rather than adversaries, the budget allocation process will
proceed far more smoothly, and we can save our bullets for
the enemy.
During the question-and-answer period, replying to a
questioner who attributed present service disunity to the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), General Kinnan
replied that the QDR is a symptom, not a cause.
Interservice friction results from insufficient budget to
accomplish the tasks assigned. The services must find the
strength to rise above this shortfall.
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., framed his
remarks as a series of impressions. During a lengthy trip
prior to taking up his present billet, he visited the militaries
of 13 countries around the world, including those of Russia
and China. He encountered four recurring questions:
(1) How do you build an NCO corps?
(2) How do you integrate women into a military force?
(3) How do you professionalize the military of an
emerging state, keeping it subordinate to civilian
authority?
(4) How did the United States and its allies accomplish
their striking victory in the Gulf War of 1991?
The younger officers are highly professional; they are
bent not upon borrowing U.S. technology, but rather its
ethos, culture, and methods. American field manuals are
ubiquitous; American military materials are harvested
from the Internet; China is one of the largest consumers of
U.S. military literature.
With regard to Joint Vision 2010, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) Chairman’s vision of future war, an unintended
consequence of it apparently is the gradual division of the
offensive function into precision engagement, to be
performed by the Navy and Air Force, and dominant
maneuver, to be performed by the Army and Marines.
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Instead of a convergence of these two elements as witnessed
in the Gulf War, General Scales sees divergence, which to
him is troubling.
As to the relative priority of precision engagement and
dominant maneuver, neither should receive priority over
the other. Rather we should seek a balance between the
two. It is impossible at this remove to be certain of the
nature of the threat prevailing beyond the critical year of
2010. To hedge our bets, we must build toward ample
capability both in reaching out to strike the enemy and in
out-maneuvering him when we close. Though our goal is
indeed to mold a true joint force, we must do so without
dissolving service identities. Soldiers, sailors, marines, and
airmen fight out of pride in what they are; we must not
tinker with this vital factor in esprit and combat motivation.
Returning to the theme of uncertainty, General Scales
emphasizes that, in planning the force that will take the
field in the years beyond 2010, we must prepare to operate
anywhere along the spectrum of conflict, ranging from
purely service operations like hurricane relief on one end to
ultimate combat such as theater nuclear war on the other.
To prophesy at this time the precise points on the spectrum
of conflict where we’ll be operating 15 years from now, and
then to build a force based on that prophecy, are to invite
disaster.
In capitalizing upon the technology associated with the
Information Age, General Scales counsels against rushing
in too quickly, trying to assimilate the new tools in one gulp.
Like the Iron Age and the Industrial Age before it, the
Information Age will unfold through time, consolidating
and defining itself as it evolves. The same is true for
Information Age warfare, which no one can suddenly
invent, but which rather must develop organically at its own
pace over the coming decades, taking turns and assuming
forms that are undiscernible to us today. Our best posture is
vigilant observation, active trial-and-error, and continued
adaptation, keeping our eye always on the longer-range
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picture. We should give up our neurotic insistence on
inventing Information Warfare at a single bound. Rather
than attempting to accelerate the technology artificially
with huge investments of military research money, our best
bet is to borrow wisely from the commercial sector, which is
already churning out products and applications faster than
we can conceive them. By taking a more measured
approach to preparing for future war, we lessen chances of
compounding our errors, wasting our resources, and getting
our people killed unnecessarily.
In thinking about future war, rather than technology we
should be concerned primarily with these four areas: leader
development, training and education, doctrine, and
experimentation. All are challenging because they require
long lead times, with leader development taking the longest
time, more so even than technology. It takes 17 years to
develop a battalion commander, 17 for a platoon sergeant.
A vision of future warfare is, of course, necessary, but the
vision is never static, fixed for all time, but rather is
dynamic, refining itself constantly by an iterative process to
take account of new developments. From the maturing
vision, we draw concepts. From the concepts, we design
forces and doctrine. We are headed in the right direction.
For the next 10 years or so, we have the luxury of a period of
calm deliberation. There is no hurry. We have the time and
opportunity to do it right. Let’s not become so busy in our
obsession with effecting change that, despite our
intelligence, we act stupidly. Brilliance in operational
technique is a good thing, but an intellectual grasp of the
larger patterns of war and history is essential, too, if we are
to avoid the mistakes of past generals who failed to master
the discontinuities of time and fortune.
During the question-and-answer period, a questioner
wondered whether, in the coming age of domestic terrorism,
we shouldn’t get rid of the posse comitatus law, which
forbids the use of U.S. armed forces to enforce civil laws.
General Scales stated that the authors of the law knew what
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they were doing, and that for a host of reasons it is best not
to involve the Federal Armed Forces directly in civil law
enforcement. In response to a question regarding the
present lack of a military peer competitor for the United
States, General Scales observed that if we continue
unilaterally reducing our present conventional military
dominance, we might thereby create peer or major
competitors.
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